Markham v. Yankee Clipper Hotel, Inc.

• Decision Date: 09 March 1983
• Docket Number: No. 81-1450,81-1450
• Citation: 427 So.2d 383
• Parties: William MARKHAM, as Broward County Property Appraiser, Appellant, v. YANKEE CLIPPER HOTEL, INC., a Florida Corporation, Lester Bauer, as Broward County Revenue Collector, and Randy Miller, as Executive Director of the State of Florida Department of Revenue, Appellees.
• Court: Florida District Court of Appeals

Page 383

427 So.2d 383

William MARKHAM, as Broward County Property Appraiser, Appellant, v. YANKEE CLIPPER HOTEL, INC., a Florida Corporation, Lester Bauer, as Broward County Revenue Collector, and Randy Miller, as Executive Director of the State of Florida Department of Revenue, Appellees.

No. 81-1450.

District Court of Appeal of Florida Fourth District.

March 9, 1983.

Gaylord A. Wood, Jr., Fort Lauderdale, for appellant.

William Robert Leonard of Coleman, Leonard & Morrison, Fort Lauderdale, for appellee Yankee Clipper Hotel, Inc.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and Barbara Staros Harmon, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee, for appellee Randy Miller, as Executive Director of Dept. of Revenue.

GLICKSTEIN, Judge.

This is an appeal from a final judgment in which the trial court concluded the following: 1) that the improvements ¹ to appellee's property on January 1, 1979, were not substantially completed, i.e., they were not at the point at which they could be used; and 2) that section 192.042(1), Florida Statutes (1977), ² is constitutional on the basis of Culbertson v. Seacoast Towers East, Inc., 212 So.2d 646 (Fla.1968). We affirm and shall discuss briefly each of the four issues involved.

First, appellant had standing to bring the present action. See Department of Education v. Lewis, 416 So.2d 455 (Fla.1982).

Second, the subject statute is constitutional, as Culbertson so held regarding an earlier statute. ³ See also Sherwood Park Ltd. v. Meeks, 234 So.2d 702 (Fla. 4th DCA 1970), approved and adopted sub nom. Markham v. Sherwood Park Ltd., 244 So.2d 129 (Fla.1971). The legislature's determination that an incomplete structure, unusable for the purposes intended upon its completion, should not be assessed in that condition is a matter of perception. To this court it appears as a choice based on reason, although in the eyes of the property appraiser the property is escaping ad valorem taxation. As the Supreme Court of the United States said in Lehnhausen v. Lake Shore Auto Parts Co., 410 U.S. 356, 364, 93 S.Ct. 1001, 1006, 35 L.Ed.2d 351 (1973):

In Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83, 60 S.Ct. 406, 84 L.Ed. 590, a State laid an ad valorem tax of [$.50] per $100 on deposits in banks outside the State and only [$.10] per $1,000 on deposits within the State. The classification was sustained against the charge of invidious discrimination, the Court noting that "in taxation, even more than in other fields, legislatures possess the greatest freedom in classification." Id., at 88, 60 S.Ct., at 408. There is a presumption of constitutionality which can be overcome "only by the most explicit demonstration that a classification is a hostile and oppressive discrimination against particular persons and classes." Ibid. And the Court added, "The burden is on the one attacking the legislative arrangement to negative every conceivable basis which might support it." Ibid. That idea has been elaborated. Thus, in Carmichael v. Southern Coal Co., 301 U.S. 495, 57 S.Ct. 868, 81 L.Ed. 1245, the Court, in sustaining an unemployment tax on employers, said:

"A state legislature, in the enactment of laws, has the widest possible latitude within the limits of the Constitution. In the nature of the case it cannot record a complete catalogue of the considerations which move its members to enact laws. In the absence of such a record courts cannot assume that its action is capricious, or that, with its informed acquaintance with local conditions to which the legislation is to be applied, it was not aware of facts which afford reasonable basis for its action. Only by faithful adherence to this guiding principle of judicial review of legislation is it possible to preserve to the legislative branch its rightful independence and its ability to function." Id., at 510, 57 S.Ct., at 872.

(Footnote omitted.)

We reject appellant's remaining constitutional arguments; discuss the following in view of the principles recited in Lehnhausen, which we consider to be generally dispositive; and conclude:

A. That the substantial completion statute does not have the effect of making the levy of each taxing district at less than a uniform rate within that district in violation of article VII, section 2, Florida Constitution. ⁴ All substantially completed buildings are taxed at a uniform rate. Some unsubstantially completed buildings are not taxed one way and other unsubstantially completed buildings, another.

B. The statute does not violate article VII, section 4, Florida Constitution, ⁵ by taxing at less than just valuation. That term equates with fair market value, the formula for which is "the amount a purchaser willing but not obliged to buy will pay to one willing but not obliged to sell." ITT Community Development Corp. v. Seay, 347 So.2d 1024, 1027 (Fla.1977). It strains credulity to suggest that sale of an unusable hotel, in the middle of construction, would normally be the result of action by a seller "not obliged to sell." This clause does not contemplate forced sales.

C. The statute does not violate article VII, section 4, Florida Constitution, by not securing a just valuation of all property. All substantially completed property is taxed. Its just valuation is readily identifiable in terms of fair market value, which is a reasonable, constitutional classification within the framework of Lehnhausen.

Third, the improvements were unusable for the guests of the hotel. This is not a case in which several individual units and common elements in a condominium were completed, such as in Manufacturers National Corp. v. Blake, 287 So.2d 129 (Fla.3d DCA 1973), cert. denied, 294 So.2d 291 (Fla.1974). Nor are the facts in this case similar to those in City National Bank of Miami v. Blake, 257 So.2d 264 (Fla.3d DCA 1972), wherein the hotel was operating two of its six floors and seventy-six of its two hundred ten rooms on January 1, 1970, pursuant to a temporary certificate of occupancy issued on December 9, 1969. Accordingly, the principle of substantial completion of a self-sufficient unit recited in those cases is inapplicable here.

Fourth, there is substantial competent evidence that the building was not substantially completed on January 1, 1979. In January, 1979, the Super Bowl was being played in Miami; and if there is any doubt that the resort owner in this case was doing all that it could to be open before January 1, it does not appear from the record. Guests were only first allowed into the building on a temporary basis on January 18th because of the football game; and the building was not completely finished when those guests had left. The certificate of occupancy was not issued until January 12th; and numerous...