Marks v. Scottsdale Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 30 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | Civil No. 3:14-cv-25 (DJN) |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
| Parties | DANNY RAY MARKS, JR., et al., Plaintiffs, v. SCOTTSDALE INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. |
This case requires the Court to construe the language of an insurance policy to determine whether the policy covers a member of a hunt club who allegedly discharged his firearm negligently while hunting, resulting in bodily injury to the driver of a vehicle on a nearby public road. Both the shooter and the injured driver seek a declaratory judgment that the policy covers the shooter. The insurance company that issued the policy opposes coverage, arguing that the hunt club member's allegedly negligent shooting neither occurred during a hunt club activity nor constituted an activity performed on behalf of the hunt club, as required for coverage under the policy.
The parties have filed cross-Motions for Summary Judgment (ECF Nos. 30, 32, 34), and the matter is ripe for review.1 Because the Court finds that no dispute of material fact exists and agrees with Defendant Scottsdale Insurance Company, the Court GRANTS Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 34) and DENIES Plaintiffs' Motions for Summary Judgment (ECF Nos. 30, 32).
On January 3, 2013, Plaintiff Timothy B. Johnson ("Johnson") went hunting at land leased by the Northumberland Hunt Club ("Hunt Club") in Richmond County, Virginia. At one point, a deer jumped out, giving Johnson an opportunity to take a shot. Johnson fired his shotgun at the deer. At the same time, Plaintiff Danny Ray Marks, Jr. ("Marks") drove along Route 642, a route that lay in Johnson's line of fire. One of the pellets from Johnson's shotgun spray struck Marks, causing him bodily injury. On July 1, 2013, Marks commenced a separate suit against Johnson and the Hunt Club in the Richmond County Circuit Court, alleging that Johnson's negligence and the Hunt Club's negligence proximately caused Marks' bodily injury.
Defendant Scottsdale Insurance Company ("Defendant") issued to the Hunt Club a commercial insurance policy to insure the Hunt Club for damages caused by bodily injury. The policy contains an additional endorsement protecting Hunt Club members from liability for Hunt Club activities or activities performed on behalf of the Hunt Club. On December 16, 2013, Marks filed this declaratory judgment action, seeking a declaration that the policy provided coverage for Johnson in Marks' separate, liability suit against Johnson and the Hunt Club.2
Little dispute exists between the parties as to the underlying facts, such as whether Johnson was a member of the Hunt Club at the time of the incident. Instead, the parties debate whether the language of the endorsement is ambiguous and whether the Policy provides coverage to Johnson. Marks and Johnson (collectively "Plaintiffs") argue that the endorsement is ambiguous and, therefore, the Court should construe the policy against Defendant and in favor of coverage. Plaintiffs alternately argue that the policy covers Johnson's actions as his liabilitystemmed from a Hunt Club activity, because Johnson was hunting on land leased by the Hunt Club and with other Hunt Club members at the time of the incident. Defendant asserts that the language is unambiguous and that Johnson's potential liability arose from his own voluntary activities — not those of the Hunt Club nor those performed on behalf of the Hunt Club — and, therefore, the endorsement does not extend to cover Johnson's liability.
The Court has reviewed each party's statement of undisputed facts, including the extensive supporting documentation filed in support of their respective positions. Pursuant to Local Rule 56(B), "[e]ach brief in support of a motion for summary judgment shall include a specifically captioned section listing all material facts as to which the moving party contends there is no genuine issue." E.D. Va. Loc. R. 56(B). Further, any "brief in response to such a motion shall include a specifically captioned section listing all material facts as to which it is contended that there exists a genuine issue necessary to be litigated." E.D. Va. Loc. R. 56(B). In ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the Court "may assume that facts identified by the moving party in its listing ... are admitted, unless such a fact is controverted in the statement of genuine issues filed in opposition." E.D. Va. Loc. R. 56(B). Accordingly, the Court has concluded that the following narrative represents the undisputed, material facts for purposes of resolving the cross-motions for summary judgment.
The Hunt Club exists "[t]o provide [an] opportunity for members to collectively work together to enjoy [a] safe environment for hunting" in Virginia's Northern Neck region. (Mem. of Fact and Law in Supp. of Johnson's Mot. for Summ. J. ("Johnson's Mem.") (ECF No. 31), Ex. 3 Northumberland Hunt Club By-Laws ("By-Laws") (ECF No. 31-3) ¶ 1.A.; see also T.Vaden Warren Jr.'s Decl. Supporting Marks' Summ. J. Mot. ("Warren Decl.") (ECF No. 33), By-Laws (ECF No. 33-3); Mem. in Supp. of Mot. for Summ. J. ("Def.'s Mem.") (ECF No. 36), Ex. D By-Laws (ECF No. 36-4).)3 The Hunt Club, as an entity, operates as an unincorporated association. (Def.'s Mem. at 5.)4 To become a member of the Hunt Club, an active member must recommend an individual, and the members must approve that individual by a majority-vote. (By-Laws ¶¶ V.A.-C.) Further, to maintain membership, a member must pay monthly dues payments and yearly land fees. (By-Laws ¶¶ VI.A.-B.) Other "informal" requirements included selling raffle tickets and participating in workdays to improve land that the Hunt Club owned or leased. (Johnson's Mem., Ex. 4 Dep. of Roland M. McIver ("McIver Dep.") (ECF No. 31-4) 21:7-22:2, May 27, 2014.)5
The Hunt Club had officers, including a President, a Treasurer, two Business Managers and a Building Manager, among others. (By-Laws ¶ II.A.) The By-Laws tasked the individuals in these roles with certain responsibilities. The President presided over meetings and represented the Hunt Club in matters relating to Hunt Club business. (By-Laws ¶ II.C.) The Treasurer kept financial records, including paying bills. (By-Laws ¶ II.C.) Business Managers managed land that the Hunt Club leased and developed plans for generating money to support the Hunt Club's activities and holdings. (By-Laws ¶ II.C.) The Building Manager maintained the clubhouse and Hunt Club property. (By-Laws ¶ II.C.)
The Hunt Club owned real property and maintained a cinder-block building there, where the Hunt Club held meetings. (Def.'s Mem., Ex. E, Dep. of Timothy B. Johnson ("Johnson Dep.") (ECF No. 36-5) 39:5-15, May 12, 2014.)6 Members and guests usually met there after a successful hunt to skin deer and divvy up the meat, because the By-Laws required that the meat be split. (Johnson Dep. 35:8-12; By-Laws |H IV.A.-B.) Additionally, the Hunt Club leased property so that its members had access to hunt, and the Hunt Club would mark that property to note that members had permission to hunt there. (Johnson Dep. 35:23-25, 36:1-3; McIver Dep. 25:2-24, 27:3-24.)
Hunt Club members customarily hunted together every Saturday during deer season, and on other days, members made informal arrangements with each other to hunt. (Johnson Dep. 43:10-20; McIver Dep. 33:1-25, 34:1-24.) Members could hunt the Hunt Club's land on their own without having to seek permission. (Johnson Dep. 42:23-25, 43:1-5; McIver Dep. 35:7-15.) The hunts were completely voluntary, and members did not have to participate as a condition of membership. (Johnson Dep. 47:17-19; McIver Dep. 35:20-24.) If a member chose to hunt, he could do so at whatever time he desired and was not required to stay for any length of time. (Johnson Dep. 55:15-21; McIver Dep. 40:11-24.) A member could choose to hunt any piece of the land that Hunt Club members had permission to use. (Johnson Dep. 49:21-25; McIver Dep. 41:4-24.) Each member supplied his own gun and his own ammunition. (Johnson Dep. 41:1620; McIver Dep. 32:17-21.) Guests could accompany members on hunts for a fee. (By-Laws ¶ III.)
Defendant issued to the Hunt Club commercial policy number CPS 1658644, effective between November 2012 and November 2013. (Johnson's Mem., Ex. 2 ("Policy") (ECF No. 312) at 3.)7 The Policy designated the named insured as the Hunt Club and provided the Hunt Club coverage for liability for bodily injury up to $1,000,000. (Policy at 8, 12.) An additional endorsement ("Endorsement") modified the Policy to include members of the club as insureds under the Policy. (Policy at 27.) The Endorsement specifically provided that "WHO IS AN INSURED (Section II) is amended to include as an insured any of your members, but only with respect to their liability for your activities or activities they perform on your behalf." (Policy at 27.)
Johnson had been a member of the Hunt Club for over twenty years and was a member on January 3, 2013 — the date of the incident. (Johnson Dep. 16:7-8, 17:24-18:2; McIver Dep. 18:19-22.) Johnson's involvement with the club mainly involved hunting. (Johnson Dep. 18:56.) He paid regular dues and occasionally sold raffle tickets for the Hunt Club. (Johnson Dep. 22:19-20; McIver Dep. 20:6-7, 23-25.) The Hunt Club sometimes held dances, but Johnson had not attended one in several years. (Johnson Dep. 26:20-21.) Johnson had not participated in Hunt Club workdays since about 2010 or 2011, but he provided materials that the Hunt Club used for those workdays. (Johnson Dep. 27:8-24.) Although Johnson previously served as President and Treasurer of the Hunt Club, on January 3, 2013, he was no longer an officer of the Hunt Club. (Johnson Dep. 30:20-31:1, 32:6-9.)
On the day before the incident, members of the Hunt Club called Johnson to let him know where they would be hunting...
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