Marler v. Missouri State Bd. of Optometry, 96-1336

Citation102 F.3d 1453
Decision Date19 December 1996
Docket NumberNo. 96-1336,96-1336
PartiesRobert E. MARLER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MISSOURI STATE BOARD OF OPTOMETRY; Michael Pier; Lynette Lui; William F. Kiefer; Jerry W. Long; Melanie Crandall; James E. Bureman; V.E. Falkenhain, also known as Bud Falkenhain; Karen Rose; Sharlene Rimiller; Mary Jean Wilhite; Lloyd Dixon; Vickie Young; Gerald Birkmann, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (8th Circuit)

Kevin Allen Thompson, argued, Jefferson City, MO, for plaintiff-appellant.

Stephen Russell Martin, Assistant Attorney General, argued, Jefferson City, MO (Bruce Farmer, on the brief), for defendants-appellees.

Before WOLLMAN, HENLEY, and HANSEN, Circuit Judges.

HANSEN, Circuit Judge.

Robert E. Marler appeals the district court's 1 grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants in this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action. Marler filed this lawsuit against the Missouri State Board of Optometry and several of its members in both their individual and official capacities, 2 alleging that they violated his procedural and substantive due process rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court determined that the Board's conduct did not violate Marler's constitutional rights. We affirm.

I.

Marler's claims arise out of a series of disciplinary actions taken by the Board against his license to practice optometry in the state of Missouri. At some point prior to June 4, 1987, the Board filed a complaint with the Missouri Administrative Hearing Commission (AHC), alleging that Marler had engaged in conduct that warranted disciplinary action against him. The Board filed this complaint with the AHC in compliance with section 336.110 of the Missouri Revised Statutes, a provision governing the operation of the State Board of Optometry. On June 4, 1987, after a full trial-type hearing, the AHC determined that Marler was subject to discipline on several of the counts in the Board's complaint. 3 On August 6, 1987, pursuant to the AHC finding, the Board revoked Marler's license to practice optometry. Both the Board and Marler appealed the June 4 AHC determination to the Missouri Circuit Court of Cole County, as provided for under Missouri law. See Mo.Rev.Stat. § 621.145 (1988).

While these appeals were pending, in January of 1990, Marler asked the Board to reinstate his license to practice optometry. 4 The Board denied Marler's request, and on June 18, 1991, Marler appealed the Board's denial to the AHC, alleging that the Board wrongfully refused to reinstate his license. Approximately one month later, on July 31, 1991, Marler voluntarily entered into a settlement agreement with the Board in which he agreed to dismiss both his recent appeal to the AHC and his earlier appeal to the Missouri Circuit Court of Cole County. In exchange, the Board agreed to dismiss its earlier appeal to the Missouri Circuit Court and to issue Marler a new license subject to several probationary conditions. On August 1, 1991, the AHC adopted the terms of the settlement agreement as its findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Almost two years later, on May 19, 1993, the Board served Marler with both a complaint alleging he had violated the terms of his probation and a notice informing him of his opportunity to challenge the validity of the charges at an upcoming hearing before the Board. The Board did not file the complaint with the AHC, because one provision of the 1991 settlement agreement empowered the Board to pursue additional disciplinary action against Marler's license solely upon its own determination that Marler had violated his probation.

Marler sought a preliminary writ of prohibition from the Circuit Court of Cole County preventing the Board from holding such a hearing on the question of his alleged violation of his probation. The court initially granted the writ finding that the Board must obtain a determination from the AHC that Marler is subject to discipline before initiating disciplinary proceedings against him. On March 30, 1994, however, the Circuit Court quashed its preliminary writ. Marler appealed this decision to the Missouri Court of Appeals.

During the pendency of the appeal, the Missouri Court of Appeals did not prevent the Board from holding a hearing regarding Marler's probation. Consequently, on October 6, 1994, the Board held a hearing to determine whether Marler had in fact violated the terms of his probation. Marler was present and was represented by counsel. The Board held its determination in abeyance, however, pending the decision of the Missouri Court of Appeals.

On November 29, 1994, the Missouri Court of Appeals decided that under section 336.110 of the Missouri Revised Statutes, the Board did not have authority to subject Marler's new license to the probationary terms of the 1991 settlement agreement without first having the AHC's independent determination that cause existed to discipline his license. Marler, 898 S.W.2d at 562. Because the Board lacked the authority to place Marler's license on probation in the first place, the court then determined that the Board also lacked the power to begin the disciplinary proceedings that were based on Marler's alleged violations of that probation. Id.

In July of 1995, Marler filed this section 1983 claim alleging that the Board's actions violated his procedural and substantive due process rights guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment. After reviewing the evidence in a light most favorable to Marler, the district court determined that Marler received adequate notice and had a meaningful opportunity to be heard both prior to and after the deprivation of his property interest in his optometry license. Consequently, the court found that the Board had not committed a constitutional violation and thus granted summary judgment in its favor. Marler appeals.

II.

In a section 1983 action, a plaintiff must prove that persons acting under color of state law deprived him "of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws" of the United States. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994). In part, the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from depriving "any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. Marler claims the district court erred in concluding that he is not entitled to relief under section 1983 based on his allegations that the Board violated his Fourteenth Amendment procedural and substantive due process rights.

We review the district court's grant of summary judgment de novo. See Zakrzewski v. Fox, 87 F.3d 1011, 1012 (8th Cir.1996). Summary judgment is appropriate if the record, when viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, reveals that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).

A.

To establish a procedural due process violation, a plaintiff must first demonstrate that he has a protected liberty or property interest at stake. Batra v. Board of Regents of Univ. of Neb., 79 F.3d 717, 720 (8th Cir.1996). Secondly, a plaintiff must prove that he was deprived of such an interest without due process of law. Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 125, 110 S.Ct. 975, 983, 108 L.Ed.2d 100 (1990). Under Missouri law, Marler had a property interest in his optometry license. See Larocca v. State Bd. of Registration for Healing Arts, 897 S.W.2d 37, 42 (Mo.Ct.App.1995). While we recognize that he was, at times, deprived of this interest, we do not believe he was deprived of it without due process of law.

Due process requires adequate notice and an opportunity to be heard "at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner." Post v. Harper, 980 F.2d 491, 493 (8th Cir.1992) (quoting Armstrong v. Manzo, 380 U.S. 545, 552, 85 S.Ct. 1187, 1191, 14 L.Ed.2d 62 (1965)). We agree with the district court's conclusion that Marler received meaningful opportunities to be heard both prior to and after the deprivation of his property interest. 5

Our previous recitation of the facts reveals the myriad procedural protections afforded to Marler regarding his optometry license. Missouri law provides for extensive administrative hearings before, as well as judicial review of, the Board's disciplinary determinations. See, e.g., Mo.Rev.Stat. § 336.110 (1989); id. § 536.100 (1988); id. § 621.145 (1988). The timing and substance of these measures provided Marler with adequate opportunities to be heard throughout his course of dealings with the Board. Prior to the Board's initial revocation of Marler's license on August 6, 1987, Marler received a full trial-type hearing in front of the AHC. After the Board revoked his license, Marler appealed the decision to the Missouri Circuit Court, as provided for under Missouri Law. See id. § 621.145.

With respect to the 1991 settlement agreement under which Marler received an optometrist's license subject to probation, Marler had notice of the probationary terms before they were imposed, and he consented to those conditions. If he objected to the probation, he could have rejected the settlement offer and continued to pursue both his complaint with the AHC as well as his appeal in the Missouri Circuit Court. These avenues afforded Marler adequate procedural protection. The fact that Marler did not actually utilize these procedures does not mean that he was denied due process, because the Due Process Clause requires merely a meaningful opportunity to be heard. See Boddie, 401 U.S. at 378, 91 S.Ct. at 786.

Regarding the Board's initiation of disciplinary proceedings against Marler in 1993 for allegedly violating his probation, once again, Marler received notice of the charges and had an opportunity to challenge them at the hearing on October 6, 1994. Moreover, the Board did not actually deprive Marler of any property right in...

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