Maroncelli v. Starkweather

• Decision Date: 07 May 1926
• Citation: Maroncelli v. Starkweather, 104 Conn. 419, 133 A. 209 (Conn. 1926)
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: MARONCELLI v. STARKWEATHER ET AL.

133 A. 209

104 Conn. 419

MARONCELLI v. STARKWEATHER ET AL.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

May 7, 1926

Appeal from Superior Court, Hartford County; Earnest C. Simpson Judge.

Proceeding for the probate of a certain instrument as the last will and testament of Elizabeth S. Manning, deceased.From an order of the court of probate approving and admitting said instrument as the deceased's last will and testament, an appeal was taken by Dorothy Manning Maroncelli to the superior court where a verdict was entered by jury for contestant.From an order setting aside the verdict and granting a new trial upon motion of John A. Starkweather and others, executorscontestant appeals.No error.

Samuel Rosenthal and George Schwolsky, both of Hartford, for appellant.

Josiah H. Peck and Frederick H. Waterhouse, both of Hartford, for appellees.

CURTIS, J.

Upon the trial of the appeal from probate, the appellant relied upon these reasons of appeal:

" The deceased did not have testamentary capacity when she executed the instrument.The deceased did not execute the instrument freely, but was unduly influenced."

The jury found the issues for the appellant, and, upon the defendant's motion, the trial court set aside the verdict and ordered a new trial.

Upon the plaintiff's appeal, she sets forth the claimed errors of the trial court as follows:

" The court erred in its decision and judgment in setting aside the verdict returned by the jury in the above-entitled cause, on the grounds that the verdict was manifestly against the weight of the testimony as to undue influence, and because the jury could not have reasonably found that the testatrix was not of sound mind and memory."

We are required to review the evidence in the case and determine whether the trial court abused the legal discretion vested in it when it set aside the verdict.Under what conditions can a trial court exercise its legal discretion and set aside a verdict?In Schulte, Inc., v. Hewitt Grocery Co.,101 Conn. 750, 125 A. 365, we state the conditions as follows:

" In setting aside a verdict, the trial judge is acting in the exercise of a legal discretion, and his action will not be disturbed by us unless it clearly appears that the discretion was abused; and, in passing upon the question of abuse, great weight should be given to his opinion, and every assumption made in favor of its correctness."

In Cables v. Bristol Water Co.,86 Conn. 224, 84 A. 929, we say in this connection:

" The supervision which a presiding judge has over a verdict * * * is an essential part of the jury system.* * * This judicial supervision involves the exercise of a legal discretion, and action by the court in its exercise will not be reviewed by this court unless it clearly appears that that discretion has been abused."

The limitations surrounding the exercise of this discretion have been pointed out by us in Robinson v. Backes,91 Conn. 460, 99 A. 1057.We there say:

" One obviously immovable limitation on the legal discretion of the court in such cases is the constitutional right of trial by jury, which in a proper case includes the right to have issues of fact, as to the determination of which there is room for a reasonable difference of opinion among fair-minded men, passed upon by the jury and not by the court.The question here is whether there was room for such a reasonable difference of opinion in respect of the issue.* * * If so, the trial court erred in setting aside the verdict."

In Phelan v. Waterbury,97 Conn. 87, 115 A. 631, we say:

" In the exercise of its legal discretion, the trial court should have set aside this verdict if it was not apparent that there was some evidence upon which the jury might reasonably have reached their conclusion; * * * or if it was not a conclusion to which the jury, acting fairly and intelligently, could reasonably have come."

From this brief survey of our law as to the exercise of the legal discretion of a trial court in setting aside a verdict, such action should be upheld unless it appears that under the evidence the conclusion of the jury could be reasonably arrived at by fair and intelligent men acting reasonably.

Reference was made by the court in its memorandum setting aside the verdict, to what it deemed to have been an improper appeal to the jury by counsel for the appellant.No exception was taken by the appellee to this argument.The argument used does not appear in the record, and hence is not before us for consideration.No reasons of appeal relate to the charge to the jury, and hence the charge does not appear in the record.We must assume that the charge was a correct presentation of the case to the jury.

We will consider first whether the jury could reasonably have found that the testatrix did not have testamentary capacity at the date of the execution of this will, December 4, 1924.There were a number of witnesses who testified that in their opinion she was of abnormal or unsound mind before the claimed will was executed.The jury must be deemed to have believed that these witnesses stated their true opinion.In this case there was no claim that the evidence offered by the appellant tended to prove that the testatrix was insane or had delusions.The evidence offered by the appellant tended to prove that the testatrix had endured a severe shock to her entire system about 28 years ago, when her husband abandoned her, and that in recent years, 1918-1924, she had suffered three severe illnesses and that on the date of the execution of the will she was seriously ill and in a weak and diseased condition of body.

The testimony of witnesses of the appellant that the testatrix before the execution of this will was abnormal or unsound in mind is singularly lacking in any details of conduct or behavior on her part indicating an abnormal or unsound mind.In a contest over the validity of a will, where testamentary capacity is in issue, the question to be determined by the jury is whether, at the time the testatrix executed the paper purporting to be her will, her mind and memory were sound enough to enable her to know and understand the business in which she was engaged when she executed the paper.Sturdevant's Appeal, 71 Conn. 392, 42 A. 70;Dripps v. Meader,94 Conn. 559, 109 A. 808;40 Cyc. p. 1009.

When witnesses testify that she was abnormal or in their opinion of unsound mind, such testimony gets probative strength for the most part from the subordinate facts detailed by them from which their opinion or conclusion has been drawn.An eminent English judge said, in Cartwright v. Cartwright, 1 Phillim. 122, a will case, that " the court did not depend on the opinions of witnesses, but on the facts to which they deposed."

In this case the absence of substantially any details of behavior or conduct of the testatrix which tends reasonably or logically to support a conclusion of abnormality or unsoundness of mind robs such testimony of persuasive force.

We said in Dripps v. Meader,94 Conn. 560, 109 A. 809:

" Mere physical weakness or disease, old age, eccentricities, blunted perceptions, weakening judgment, failing memory or mind, are not necessarily inconsistent with testamentary capacity."

The appellant's evidence in this case falls short of tending to prove such facts as to this testatrix as therein recited.

There was evidence tending to prove that in April, 1923, the testatrix received, as devisee and legatee under the will of a Mr. Barnes, a considerable property, which, in addition to a small property that she then possessed of her own, made up an estate at her death of about $20,000; that of the property so received under the Barnes will, there was a house on 125th street, New York City; that the question of whether to dispose of this house or retain it was a matter which she had to determine and did determine in 1924; and there is no suggestion that she did not act reasonably in her decision to dispose of this house or in the business of disposing of it, and, furthermore, she determined to buy and did buy a home in Connecticut in the fall of 1924, and there were business questions which she was called upon to decide and perform in this matter, and there is no suggestion that in executing this business she did not act reasonably in all particulars.The testimony of the witnesses to the execution of her will of December 4th, present a portrayal of a woman acting sanely and normally in the performance of this business and in the execution of the will before the local judge of probate,...