Maroon v. State, Dept. of Mental Health
| Decision Date | 14 October 1980 |
| Docket Number | No. 1-180A3,1-180A3 |
| Citation | 411 N.E.2d 404 |
| Parties | Ina MAROON, Legal Representative of the Estate of Catherine Jo Harris, Deceased, and Wayne Maroon, and Ina Maroon, Individually, as husband and wife, as father and mother of Catherine Jo Harris, Deceased, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. STATE of Indiana, DEPARTMENT OF MENTAL HEALTH, and State of Indiana, Department of Corrections, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Michael C. Cook, Douglas B. King, Wooden McLaughlin & Sterner, Indianapolis, Robert Douglas, Robinson, for plaintiffs-appellants.
Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., Terry G. Duga, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for defendants-appellees.
Ina Maroon, legal representative of the estate of Catherine Jo Harris, deceased, and Ina Maroon and Wayne Maroon, individually as mother and father of the deceased, plaintiffs-appellants, appeal from December 11, 1979, and January 3, 1980, interlocutory orders of the Hancock Circuit Court, dismissing Counts I and II of their complaint against the defendant-appellee, the State of Indiana, Department of Mental Health and Department of Corrections, and reinstating Count III which had been dismissed earlier.
On November 18, 1977, Plaintiffs filed a complaint in three counts: Count I under the Illinois wrongful death act, S.H.A. ch. 70, § 1 and § 2 (Supp.1980); Count II under the Illinois survival act, S.H.A. ch. 3, § 339, 1 and Count III under Ind.Code 34-1-1-8, Injury or death of a child; action by a parent or guardian.
All three counts contained allegations, inter alia, that: 1) in the spring of 1976, agents, employees, and servants of the Department of Mental Health and the Department of Corrections knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known that During extensive pretrial maneuvering, the trial court first dismissed Count III in response to the State's arguments that a choice of law had to be made. Next, the trial court responded to the State's arguments that Indiana law should be applied and would not allow Plaintiffs' claim, that the State owed no duty to Catherine, and that the State was immune from liability for losses resulting from the act of a person not a governmental employee, by dismissing Counts I and II because "Indiana law and not Illinois law applies."
Michael Lee Lett was a criminal sexual deviant dangerous to the community; 2) on or about April 13, 1976, Lett was in the custody of agents, employees, and servants of the two departments; 3) Lett was released by, escaped from, or otherwise left the custody of agents, employees, and servants of the two departments on or about April 13, 1976, while they were acting within the scope of their employment; 4) negligence on the part of agents, employees, and servants of the two departments was the direct and proximate cause of Lett's release or escape from their custody; 5) after his release by or escape from agents, employees, and servants of the two departments, Lett, on or about April 19, 1976, abducted Catherine Jo Harris, a minor, from an area near where she then resided in Newton, Illinois; and 6) after abducting Catherine, Lett assaulted and killed her.
Plaintiffs then filed a motion to reinstate Count III because the effect of the trial court's rulings was to leave them with all three counts of their complaint struck down in contravention of the court's apparent intentions. The trial court granted Plaintiffs' motion and reinstated Count III.
On January 3, 1980, Plaintiffs filed a motion to certify an interlocutory appeal under Ind.Rules of Procedure, Appellate Rule 4(B)(5). The trial court certified an interlocutory appeal and, in compliance with A.R. 4(B)(5), Plaintiffs petitioned this court and secured findings that the issue to be raised in this appeal involves a substantial question of law the early determination of which would promote a more orderly disposition of the case, and that Plaintiffs' remedy on appeal after judgment would be inadequate. Pursuant to A.R. 7.2(A)(1)(b), Plaintiffs filed an assignment of errors with this court on February 11, 1980.
We construe the court's dismissal of Counts I and II as a ruling that Plaintiffs' cause of action does not arise under Illinois law; we construe the court's reinstatement of Count III as a ruling that Plaintiffs' cause of action arises under Indiana law and a rejection of the State's arguments that, as a matter of law, the State owed no duty to Plaintiffs' daughter and was immune from liability for losses resulting from the act of a person not a governmental employee.
We reverse the dismissal of Counts I and II and reverse the reinstatement of Count III.
I. Should Illinois or Indiana substantive law be applied in this cause of action?
II. Did the State of Indiana owe Plaintiffs' daughter a duty to exercise reasonable care in its custody and control of Michael Lee Lett?
III. Is the State of Indiana immune from liability under Ind.Code 34-4-16.5-3(9)?
The record before this court contains indications that on April 23, 1973, the Knox Circuit Court found Michael Lee Lett to be a criminal sexual deviant under Ind.Code 35-11-3.1-1 et seq. 2 and ordered Lett committed to the care and custody of the Department of Mental Health for treatment as a criminal sexual deviant for a term of not more than 21 years or until otherwise sooner discharged in accordance with the law. Lett was to begin his commitment for treatment at the Maximum Security Division of Norman M. Beatty Hospital. On
April 13, 1976, Lett escaped from Beatty Hospital and on or about April 19, 1976, he abducted, assaulted, and killed Catherine Jo Harris near her home in Newton, Illinois.
The parties appear to agree that if the State is not found to be immune from suit under these facts, this cause would go to the jury under Count III if Catherine had died in Indiana. They disagree, however, as to whether the case should go to the jury under Counts I and II or Count III given that Catherine's death occurred in Illinois. It is this disagreement we address: since Catherine died in Illinois, does Illinois or Indiana substantive law apply?
In their brief, Plaintiffs contend the applicable Indiana choice-of-law rule is lex loci delicti requiring that the substantive law of the place where the injury or death occurred determines what kind of actions may be brought and by whom, for whose benefit damages are recoverable, and the type, measure, and amount of such damages. The State argues the rule of lex loci delicti is not a hard and fast one and that its application here would violate the public policy of Indiana generally and as implied in the Tort Claims Act, Ind.Code 34-4-16-. 5-1 et seq., particularly in one section of that act, Ind. Code 34-4-16.5-5(d). The State further contends the cause of action could not have brought in Illinois under Ind.Code 34-4-16.5-5(d); therefore, it cannot be brought in Indiana under Baltimore and Ohio Southwestern Railway Company v. Reed, (1902) 158 Ind. 25, 62 N.E. 488. The State lastly argues that if this court looks to Illinois law under lex loci delicti, it should adopt the renvoi doctrine which requires the application of the Illinois choice-of-law rule as well as the internal substantive law of Illinois. Illinois would apply the substantive law of the state with the most significant contacts with the cause of action, here, according to the State, Indiana.
This cause of action is one in tort brought under statutory law of Illinois and Indiana. It is well established as a general rule that the lex loci delicti, the law of the place where the tort was committed, is the law which governs the resulting cause of action and which is to be applied with respect to the substantive phases of torts or the causes of action therefor. The lex loci delicti determines the question of whether or not an act or omission gives rise to a right of action or civil liability for tort even though the tort is founded on statute rather than on the common law. 15A C.J.S. Conflict of Laws § 12(2)a. (1967).
Indiana has long followed this choice-of-law rule as well as the general rule that the tort is committed, the wrong occurs, and the cause of action arises where the injury or death occurred. Vera Cruz v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company, (1961 N.D.Ind.) 192 F.Supp. 958; Zirkelbach v. Decatur Cartage Co., (1954 N.D.Ind.) 119 F.Supp. 753; Hellrung v. Lafayette Loan & Trust Co., (1951 N.D.Ind.) 102 F.Supp. 822; Wabash Railroad Company v. Hassett, Admx., (1908) 170 Ind. 370, 83 N.E. 705; Baltimore and Ohio Southwestern Railway Company, supra; Cincinnati, Hamilton and Dayton Railroad Company v. McMullen, Admr., (1889) 117 Ind. 439, 20 N.E. 287; Burns Admr. v. Grand Rapids and Indiana Railroad Company, (1888) 113 Ind. 169, 15 N.E. 230.
The Indiana Supreme Court in Wabash Railroad Company, supra, 170 Ind. at 375, 83 N.E. 705, said:
The rule of law generally followed is that where a cause of action is brought in a state other than the state in which the cause of action arose, matters of a substantive nature are governed by the law of the state in which the cause of action arose, and the law of the forum is applied in order to determine what constitutes matters of substantive law and what constitutes matters of remedy and procedure. Prudence Life...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Reed v. United States, Civ. No. F 81-164.
... ... Dist. Counsel, Dept". of the Army, Louisville, Ky., for defendants ... \xC2" ... of the Huntington Lake project area was leased to the State of Indiana, Department of Natural Resources, on July 1, ... 295, 384 N.E.2d 1177 (1979); see also Maroon v. State Dept. of Mental Health, 411 N.E.2d 404 ... ...
-
Mahomes-Vinson v. US
... ... A medical report from Larned State Hospital describes Prewett's kidnapping of a woman in ... Prewett obtained medication and was evaluated by a health care professional at the time of his visits. He was ... 's wife, Barbara, who was receiving treatment for mental illness at another hospital, stated on July 7, 1986, less ... 121, 412 N.E.2d 472 (1980); Maroon v. Ind. Dep't of Mental Health, 411 N.E.2d 404, 414 ... ...
-
Dearborn v. Everett J. Prescott, Inc.,
... ... 498, 506, 61 S.Ct. 1023, 85 L.Ed. 1481 (1941) (forum state's choice of law principles governed whether public policy ... Island Shipyard, 437 F.Supp.2d at 845; accord, Maroon v. State, 411 N.E.2d 404, 411 (Ind. App.1980) (applying ... law to remedy available to victim of escaped state mental patient). The Maroon court quoted one of the more ... Community Health Foundation of Man, 171 W.Va. 368, 298 S.E.2d 906, 916 ... ...
-
Torres v. Department of Correction, CV-01 0819015S.
... ... murder of a one year old child that occurred in the state of Florida in 1990. The facts 1 related to the child's ... South Carolina Dept. of Labor, Licensing & Regulation, 336 S.C. 373, 389, 520 ... a defense for the state department of public health, the state and state troopers. Ward v. Greene, supra, ... See, e.g., Doe v. United Social and Mental Health Services, 670 F.Supp. 1121, 1130-31 (D.Conn.1987) ... on issue of foreseeability of victim's injury); Maroon v. State, Dept. of Mental Health, 411 N.E.2d 404, 415 ... ...