Maroun v. Tarro, 12209

• Decision Date: 20 September 1994
• Docket Number: No. 12209,12209
• Citation: 646 A.2d 251,35 Conn.App. 391
• Court: Connecticut Court of Appeals
• Parties: Frederick MAROUN v. Richard TARRO et al.

Page 251

646 A.2d 251

35 Conn.App. 391

Frederick MAROUN v. Richard TARRO et al.

No. 12209.

Appellate Court of Connecticut.

Argued May 2, 1994.

Decided Aug. 9, 1994.

Certification Denied Sept. 20, 1994.

Kimball Haines Hunt, Hartford, with whom, on the brief, was Heidi Cornish, Bridgeport, for appellant (named defendant).

Barbara E. Gardner, Hartford, for appellee (substitute plaintiff).

Before EDWARD Y. O'CONNELL, LANDAU and HEIMAN, JJ.

EDWARD Y. O'CONNELL, Judge.

The named defendant appeals from a $45,000 jury verdict for the substitute plaintiff in this conversion action. ¹ The defendant claims that the trial court (1) improperly denied his motions for a directed verdict and his motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, (2) improperly failed to set aside the plaintiff's verdict because the evidence did not support the award of damages, and (3) improperly denied the defendant's motion in limine to preclude the plaintiff from introducing certain exhibits. We reverse the judgment of the trial court. ²

The jury reasonably could have found the following facts. On June 27, 1986, the plaintiff purchased a 1969 280 SE Mercedes Benz automobile from Newfield Motors, Inc., for $19,000. The plaintiff paid the purchase price by conveying a used car to Newfield Motors. At the time of the purchase, the Mercedes was in a gutted skeletal condition. It was agreed that Newfield Motors would renovate the Mercedes into a classic show car. The plaintiff paid $8000 for this service with a check payable to the order of Newfield Motors, Inc.

Kathleen Wallack was the president of Newfield Motors and signed all documents pertaining to the transaction. The defendant was Wallack's friend and spent considerable time at Newfield Motors. The defendant denied being an employee of Newfield Motors but was unable to explain why his name appeared on the bill of sale as the salesman. The restoration originally was to take six months, but complications with the leather for the interior and a cracked windshield caused extended delays.

In late 1987, the plaintiff received a telephone call from a deputy sheriff advising him that Newfield Motors was being closed and suggesting that the plaintiff retrieve his car because vandalism to other vehicles had taken place on the Newfield Motors premises. At that time, the plaintiff's wife spoke to Wallack by telephone and was assured that although Newfield Motors had been closed, the Mercedes was in storage at her residence at 9 Sunny Ridge in New Britain and that work on it was continuing. There was evidence from which the jury could have found that the 9 Sunny Ridge property was owned by the defendant and occupied by the defendant and Wallack.

In early March, 1988, the plaintiff received two parking tickets in the mail, charged to the Mercedes. On March 12, 1988, the plaintiff's son went to Wallack's residence to obtain the car. Wallack refused to turn over the car to the plaintiff's son at that time, but did return it to the plaintiff later that same day when the plaintiff arrived at Wallack's residence with a New Britain police officer. This return was facilitated when the defendant, at Wallack's request, took the car keys from his pocket and gave them to the plaintiff. The vehicle, covered with sand and salt, was parked in the driveway of Wallack's residence. Its odometer registered an increase of nearly 4000 miles over what it showed at the time of purchase. It had a scratch on the passenger side door and the left rear brake made a loud scraping sound for which Wallack gave the plaintiff a brake rotor. The plaintiff's son drove the car away that night.

Prior to the day on which the plaintiff retrieved his car, the last time the plaintiff or his wife had seen the vehicle was in the middle of 1987 in a showroom at Newfield Motors. At that time, neither the leather upholstery nor the carpeting had been installed. The plaintiff's son saw the car in the Newfield Motors garage ³ about a month prior to the March 12, 1988 retrieval and did not observe any damage to it at that time.

We commence our analysis by noting that this case was tried on one count alleging conversion by the defendant. ⁴ There was no claim of a breach of bailment by Newfield Motors or by anyone else, nor was there a claim of negligence in the operation of the vehicle by the defendant or by anyone acting as the agent or servant of Newfield Motors. The complaint alleged that subsequent to June 26, 1986, the defendant operated the vehicle on the highways without authority and damaged or caused the vehicle to be damaged while it was in his possession and control. ⁵

The defendant moved for a directed verdict at the conclusion of the plaintiff's case and also at the conclusion of all the evidence. Both motions were denied. Following return of the jury's verdict, the defendant filed a motion to set aside the verdict and for a new trial and a motion for judgment in favor of the defendant notwithstanding the verdict. Practice Book §§ 320 and 321. In each of those motions, the defendant argued that the facts submitted in evidence were insufficient to sustain a verdict for the plaintiff.

"Directed verdicts are not favored. Puro v. Henry, 188 Conn. 301, 303, 449 A.2d 176 (1982)[;] Petyan v. Ellis, 200 Conn. 243, 244, 510 A.2d 1337 (1986). Our review of a trial court's refusal to direct a verdict or to render a judgment notwithstanding the verdict takes place within carefully defined parameters. We must consider the evidence, including reasonable inferences which may be drawn therefrom, in the light most favorable to the parties who were successful at trial; Bleich v. Ortiz, 196 Conn. 498, 501, 493 A.2d 236 (1985); giving particular weight to the concurrence of the judgments of the judge and the jury, who saw the witnesses and heard the testimony.... Chanosky v. City Building Supply Co., 152 Conn. 642, 643, 211 A.2d 141 (1965). The verdict will be set aside and judgment directed only if we find that the jury could not reasonably and legally have reached their conclusion.... Bound Brook Assn. v. Norwalk, 198 Conn. 660, 667, 504 A.2d 1047, cert. denied, 479 U.S. 819, 107 S.Ct. 81, 93 L.Ed.2d 36 (1986).... Iseli Co. v. Connecticut Light & Power Co, 211 Conn. 133, 140, 558 A.2d 966 (1989)." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) John T....