Marovec v. PMX INDUSTRIES

Decision Date18 March 2005
Docket NumberNo. 03-1325.,03-1325.
Citation693 N.W.2d 779
PartiesBrett MAROVEC, Appellant, v. PMX INDUSTRIES, Employer, and Martin Boyer Company, Insurance Carrier, Appellees.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Pete Leehey of Pete Leehey Law Firm, P.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellant. John M. Bickel and Robert K. Porter of Shuttleworth & Ingersoll, P.L.C., Cedar Rapids, for appellees.

LAVORATO, Chief Justice.

The workers' compensation commissioner dismissed the appeal of Brett Marovec, claimant, because he failed to file an appeal brief in his intra-agency appeal as required by the commissioner's rules. He petitioned the district court for judicial review and that court affirmed. Marovec then appealed to this court, and we transferred the case to the court of appeals, which affirmed the district court's decision. We granted Marovec's application for further review. We conclude, as did the district court and the court of appeals, that the commissioner did not abuse her discretion in dismissing Marovec's appeal. We therefore affirm the decision of the court of appeals and the judgment of the district court.

I. Background Facts and Proceedings.

On February 10, 1999, Marovec sustained an injury while working for PMX Industries. Later, he sought workers' compensation benefits. On March 13, 2001, following a hearing, a deputy workers' compensation commissioner determined in an arbitration decision that Marovec had failed to establish any permanent disability as a result of the February 10, 1999 injury. The deputy therefore did not award Marovec any permanent partial disability benefits. The deputy also rejected Marovec's claim for healing period benefits, temporary total disability benefits, and reimbursement of medical expenses.

On March 29 Marovec filed with the Iowa Workers' Compensation Commissioner notice of appeal and affidavit of ordering transcript. On April 5 Marovec filed notice of filing transcript.

On June 4 Iris J. Post, Iowa Workers' Compensation Commissioner, filed an order to show cause why Marovec's appeal should not be dismissed because he had failed to file a brief as required by Iowa Administrative Code rule 876 — 4.28 (2001). The brief should have been filed by May 18. Iowa Admin. Code r. 876 — 4.28(1). The commissioner stated that Marovec "shall have until twenty days from the filing of this order to file evidence, briefs, and exceptions on the issue to be decided as stated above." (Emphasis added.) The show-cause order stated the issue as follows: "Claimant, Brett Marovec, is ordered to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed pursuant to rule 876 IAC 4.36 for failure to file a brief as required by rule 876 IAC 4.28."

On June 13 Marovec filed his reply to the show cause order. In the reply, Marovec recited the dates of filings made and noted the show cause order. His sole response to the show cause order was this: "Claimant's brief was not filed due to an oversight." Marovec also stated the following: "The Order states that Claimant `shall have until twenty days from the filing of this order' to file his brief. Claimant's brief will be filed by the deadline set in the Order to Show Cause." So, apparently, Marovec interpreted the show cause order as setting a new deadline for filing briefs on the substantive issues.

Marovec filed an appeal brief on June 21 on the substantive issues. The brief made no reference to the show cause order.

On June 27 the employer filed a motion for additional time to file a brief in response to Marovec's appeal brief. On July 10 the employer filed its appeal brief, addressing the substantive issues. The employer's appeal brief made no mention of the show cause order. Marovec filed a reply brief addressing only the substantive issues.

On July 31 the commissioner filed her ruling on the show cause order. She determined there was no reason to review the deputy's decision sua sponte. Her ruling continued:

The show cause order filed June 4, 2001, ordered claimant to show cause why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file a brief as required by rule 876 IAC 4.28. Claimant filed a brief on the merits of the appeal arguing that the deputy's arbitration decision be reversed and remanded. Claimant submitted no arguments nor brief why the appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file a timely brief. Claimant gave no cause or reason why its appeal should not be dismissed. Defendants filed a brief on July 10, 2001, but the issue discussed in the brief was whether the deputy erred in making a determination of a disability award. Defendant, like claimant, gave no cause or reason why claimant's appeal should not be dismissed.
Claimant has failed to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed. Claimant has failed to file a brief within the time required by rule 876 IAC 4.28. Claimant has failed to comply with rule 876 IAC 4.28. Claimant's notice of appeal should be dismissed.

(Emphasis added.)

On August 6 Marovec filed a petition for judicial review, claiming, among other things, that the show cause ruling was unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, and characterized by an abuse of discretion. PMX Industries filed an answer denying the allegation.

On August 4, 2003, nearly two years after the petition for judicial review was filed, the district court ruled. The court noted that the file did not reach it until shortly before this date and that it ruled as soon as possible after receiving the file.

The district court denied the petition, ruling that the commissioner had acted reasonably in dismissing Marovec's appeal for failing to file a timely brief. Contrary to Marovec's interpretation, the district court interpreted the show cause order as providing Marovec an opportunity to show why he did not file a timely brief. And because, as the show cause ruling indicated, Marovec did not provide an adequate reason for his failure to file a timely brief, the court ruled the commissioner was well within her discretion to dismiss the appeal.

Marovec appealed, and we transferred the case to the court of appeals. The court of appeals affirmed, stating:

The commissioner gave claimant an opportunity to respond to the order to show cause, including filing evidence, briefs, and exceptions to the order. Claimant's only response [for his] failure to timely file a brief was [that his failure was due to] "an oversight." The commissioner found this response inadequate and imposed sanctions. The district court correctly evaluated the commissioner's exercise of discretion and affirmed. We cannot say the commissioner's decision meets the definition of "unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion." Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(n).

We granted Marovec's application for further review.

II. Issue.

The sole issue is whether the commissioner abused her discretion when she dismissed Marovec's intra-agency appeal because he did not file an appeal brief by the deadline imposed by Iowa Administrative Code rule 876 — 4.28.

III. Scope of Review.

Iowa Code chapter 17A governs judicial review of a decision or order of the workers' compensation commissioner. Iowa Code § 86.26 (2001). When the district court exercises its judicial review power, it acts in an appellate capacity. Mycogen Seeds v. Sands, 686 N.W.2d 457, 463 (Iowa 2004). In reviewing the district court's decision, we apply chapter 17A standards to determine whether the conclusions we reach are the same as those of the district court. Id. at 464. "If they are the same, we affirm; otherwise we reverse." Id.

In this case, the issue involves whether the commissioner abused her discretion. Abuse of discretion is encompassed in one of the grounds chapter 17A recognizes as a basis for reversing agency action:

10. The court may affirm the agency action or remand to the agency for further proceedings. The court shall reverse, modify, or grant other appropriate relief from agency action ... if it determines that substantial rights of the person seeking judicial relief have been prejudiced because the agency action is any of the following:
....
n. Otherwise unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion.

Iowa Code § 17A.19(10)(n). "`Discretion is abused when it is exercised on grounds clearly untenable or to an extent clearly unreasonable.'" Martin Marietta Materials, Inc. v. Dallas County, 675 N.W.2d 544, 553 (Iowa 2004) (citation omitted). An abuse of discretion also means the decision lacked rationality and was made clearly against reason and evidence. Dico, Inc. v. Iowa Employment Appeal Bd., 576 N.W.2d 352, 355 (Iowa 1998).

In making the determination whether the agency's action is unreasonable, arbitrary, capricious, or an abuse of discretion, the court "[s]hall give appropriate deference to the view of the agency with respect to particular matters that have been vested by a provision of law in the discretion of the agency." Iowa Code § 17A.19(11)(c). In this instance, we think we must give appropriate deference to the commissioner's decision because by law the commissioner is required to adopt and enforce rules and procedures necessary to implement Iowa Code chapter 86. See id. § 86.8; see also id. § 17A.3(1)(b) ("[E]ach agency shall ... [a]dopt rules of practice setting forth the nature and requirements of all formal and informal procedures available to the public, including a description of all forms and instructions that are to be used by the public in dealing with the agency."). In reaching its decision, the commissioner relied on several of those rules, which we will mention shortly. More specifically, with respect to intra-agency appeals, Iowa Code section 86.24 provides that "[a]ny party aggrieved by a decision, order, ruling, finding or other act of a deputy commissioner in a contested case proceeding arising under [chapter 86] or chapter 85 or 85A may appeal to the workers' compensation commissioner in the time and manner provided by rule." Id. § 86.24(1) (emphasis added).

Finally, in our review, ...

To continue reading

Request your trial
23 cases
  • Baker v. Bridgestone
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • 18 Diciembre 2015
    ...(Iowa 2004) (concluding a fault-based interpretation of statutes "has no place in workers' compensation law"); cf. Marovec v. PMX Indus., 693 N.W.2d 779, 787 (Iowa 2005) (concluding language from Flint describing the purpose of workers' compensation is just as true now as it was then). With......
  • Estate of Ludwick v. Stryker Corp.
    • United States
    • Iowa Court of Appeals
    • 29 Octubre 2014
    ...can only be justified where the noncompliance with the rules was “the result of willfulness, fault, or bad faith.” Marovec v. PMX Indus., 693 N.W.2d 779, 786 (Iowa 2005) ; In re Marriage of Williams, 595 N.W .2d 126, 129 (Iowa 1999) ; Munzenmaier 449 N.W.2d at 371 ; Kendall/Hunt, 424 N.W.2d......
  • Heartland Coop. Co. v. Murphy, 15–0446.
    • United States
    • Iowa Court of Appeals
    • 28 Septiembre 2016
    ...discovery order there must be a finding that the failure to comply was a result of willfulness, fault, or bad faith." Marovec v. PMX Indus., 693 N.W.2d 779, 786 (Iowa 2005). Heartland contends the district court found willfulness when it imposed a sanction based on contempt, see Reis v. Iow......
  • Hoeft v. Fleetguard, Inc., No. 8-810/07-0551 (Iowa App. 6/17/2009)
    • United States
    • Iowa Court of Appeals
    • 17 Junio 2009
    ...The commissioner must give the parties notice of the issues it will consider, and allow the parties to file briefs. Marovec v. PMX Indus., 693 N.W.2d 779, 784 (Iowa 2005). This case involves the first method of appeal because Hoeft appealed the deputy's review-reopening decision. The commis......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT