Marquis v. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp.
Decision Date | 10 December 1991 |
Docket Number | Civ. No. 91-436-D. |
Citation | 779 F. Supp. 6 |
Parties | Serge MARQUIS, Gail Marquis v. FEDERAL DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of New Hampshire |
Jay L. Hodes, Manchester, N.H., for plaintiffs.
Michael F. Merra, Nashua, N.H., for defendant.
Before the court, after hearing, are the issues raised by a motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction in Civil No. 91-436-D, Marquis v. FDIC. Document no. 6. That motion was filed by Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC).
On February 13, 1991, the plaintiffs, Serge and Gail Marquis, commenced a state court action against Hillsborough Bank and Trust Company ("HBT"). On August 30, 1991, the New Hampshire Bank Commissioner declared HBT to be insolvent and appointed FDIC as Receiver. New Hampshire Revised Statutes Annotated (RSA) 395:10-a.1 FDIC accepted the appointment, and on September 30, 1991, it removed the Marquis action to this court.2
On October 28, 1991, the motion at issue was here filed. Plaintiffs filed their objection on November 6, 1991. Document no. 7.3 Oral argument was heard on November 27, 1991.
On August 9, 1989, the President signed the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act (FIRREA).4 With certain exceptions not here relevant, FIRREA provides that all civil actions to which FDIC is a party "shall be deemed to arise under the laws of the United States," 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(A), and that "without bond or surety" such actions may be removed "from a state court to the appropriate United States district court." 12 U.S.C. § 1819(b)(2)(B).
Legislation hastily enacted in response to a perceived emergency occasionally gives rise to certain internal inconsistencies. As highlighted by the circumstances of this case, FIRREA is no exception.
FIRREA initially requires FDIC to publish a notice which provides a period of not less than 90 days during which claimants can file administrative claims. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(3)(B). From the date of any such filing, FDIC has 180 days in which to either allow or disallow the claim and to notify the claimant of its determination. 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(5)(A)(i).
The filing of a claim with FDIC as receiver constitutes the commencement of an action, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(5)(F)(i), and, following a period of 90 days, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(12)(A)(ii), the filing of such claim "shall not prejudice any right of the claimant to continue any action which was filed before the appointment of the receiver." 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(5)(F)(ii).
Additionally, within 60 days of either the end of the 180 days provided for claims consideration, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(A)(i), or the date of any notice of disallowance of such claim, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(A)(ii), whichever is earlier, a claimant may request administrative review of the claim, 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(6)(A)(ii). Alternatively, the claimant "may file suit on such claim (or continue an action commenced before the appointment of the receiver)." Id.
On an earlier occasion, this court noted that FIRREA, carefully read, distinguishes between cases where (as here) a suit is filed before FDIC takes over, and those in which claims are first sought to be advanced after FDIC has been appointed. Bank of New England, N.A. v. Callahan, 758 F.Supp. 61 (D.N.H.1991). In that case, however, no judicial action had been filed prior to the appointment of FDIC, and it was therefore unnecessary to resolve the issue. Id. at 64.
Without consideration of this distinction, FDIC here argues that the court must dismiss the instant action because of the language of a portion of FIRREA which provides:
12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D).
Review of those cases in which a claim was initiated but after FDIC had been appointed receiver has proven to be of little assistance to this court. See, e.g., Circle Indus., Div. of Nastasi-White, Inc. v. City Fed. Savings Bank, 749 F.Supp. 447 (E.D.N.Y.1990), aff'd, 931 F.2d 7 (2d Cir. 1991) (per curiam); FDIC v. Shain Schaffer & Rafanello, 944 F.2d 129 (3d Cir.1991); Rosa v. Resolution Trust Co., 938 F.2d 383 (3d Cir.1991). And the court is likewise unpersuaded by the opinions in United Bank of Waco v. First Republic Bank, Waco, N.A., 758 F.Supp. 1166 (W.D.Tex. 1991); and International Fidelity Ins. Co. v. Yorkville Fed. Savings & Loan Assoc., 1990 W.L. 165720 (S.D.N.Y.1990). Both of the latter decisions rely in large part on the decision in Tuxedo Beach Club Corp. v. City Fed. Savings Bank, 737 F.Supp. 18, 19-20 (D.N.J.1990). It was the decision in Tuxedo Beach, however, which satisfied this court that there must be a distinction between cases where suit has been filed before FDIC has been appointed as a receiver and those where the claimants seek relief after such appointment. See Bank of New England, N.A. v. Callahan, supra, 758 F.Supp. at 64.
To hold that 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D), standing alone, grants authority to FDIC to dismiss all actions, including those which Congress has expressly provided may be continued after a specific hiatus of 90 days, renders the statutory provisions for continuance of such actions a nullity. The court cannot believe that Congress so intended, and finds that Judge Anderson of the District of Utah has recently held to the contrary. In a thorough and scholarly opinion, Marc Dev., Inc. v. FDIC, 771 F.Supp. 1163 (D.Utah 1991), Judge Anderson held that 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(13)(D) was intended only to insulate FDIC from judicial review of its actions as either receiver or administrative claims processor in cases where the claim was initiated after FDIC had been appointed receiver. Id., 771 F.Supp. at 1167-68. Guarantee of the rights to continue a preexisting litigation equates with establishment of a duality of remedies available to those claimants whose suit was brought before FDIC was appointed receiver. Id. As Judge Anderson eloquently states:
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