Marquis v. Sadeghian
| Decision Date | 10 April 2023 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 4:19-cv-626-KPJ |
| Parties | BILLY MARQUIS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. KHOSROW SADEGHIAN and AMY JO SADEGHIAN, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
Pending before the Court is Defendants Khosrow Sadeghian (“Khosrow Sadeghian” or “Sadeghian”) and Amy Jo Sadeghian (together, “Defendants” or “Sadeghians”) Motion for Summary Judgment (the “Motion”) (Dkt. 176). The Motion (Dkt. 176) is fully briefed. See Dkts. 177, 178, 179, 181. Having considered the briefing, the summary judgment evidence, and the applicable law, the Court finds the Motion (Dkt. 176) is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART.
This lawsuit stems from Defendants' alleged employment of Plaintiffs Billy Marquis (“Billy Marquis” or “Marquis”), Alexis Marquis, and Anthony Marquis (together, “Plaintiffs”). See generally Dkt. 151. In their third amended complaint (the “Third Amended Complaint”) (Dkt. 151), Plaintiffs assert claims under the Fair Labor Standards Act (the “FLSA”) and the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (“DTPA”), and Billy Marquis asserts a negligence claim, against Defendants. See id. at 5-7.[1]
The following facts are undisputed. Billy Marquis is the father of Alexis Marquis and Anthony Marquis. See Dkt. 151 at 1; Dkt. 159 at 2. Amy Jo Sadeghian and Khosrow Sadeghian are husband and wife. See Dkt. 151 at 1. Through Kamy Real Estate Trust, the Sadeghians owned residential properties in Texas. See Dkt. 151 at 2; Dkt. 159 at 2. Khosrow Sadeghian uses Kamy Investments, Kamy Real Property Trust, and Kamy Real Estate Trust in doing business. See Dkt. 151 at 2; Dkt. 159 at 3. Billy Marquis first met Khosrow Sadeghian in September 2014. See Dkt. 151 at 2; Dkt. 159 at 3. When Marquis and Sadeghian first met, Marquis was working as a truck driver. See Dkt. 151 at 2; Dkt. 159 at 3. Sadeghian told Marquis that if Marquis moved with his family to North Texas, Sadeghian would hire Marquis to do maintenance and repairs on the Sadeghians' properties. See Dkt. 151 at 3; Dkt. 159 at 3.
The details regarding the work Plaintiffs performed for Defendants is largely disputed. Sadeghian testified that generally, “there was nobody [at the work sites] watching [Plaintiffs] all day or anything like [that],” “[Defendants] had no control over [Marquis]”, and that “occasionally” Defendants sent managers to the work sites to “kind of pass by . . . to see . . . what's going on.” Dkt. 176-4 at 31:19-25, 32:1-5. Sadeghian testified that he did not require Plaintiffs to work certain hours; rather, he only set deadlines by which work was to be completed. See id. at 44:1-9. To the contrary, Marquis swore that “[t]he Sadeghians told us what to do, when to do it, and how to do it” and that “[w]e were ordered to work at least five days a week and frequently six or seven.” Dkt. 177-1 at 21-22.
Further, Marquis alleges that around sunset on February 26 or 27, 2018,[2]Defendants instructed Plaintiffs to perform repairs on one of Defendants' houses, which Defendants knew to be dilapidated and without lighting, rendering it a dangerous house on which to work after dark. See Dkt. 151 at 4. Marquis alleges Defendants continued to demand Plaintiffs work on the house, despite Plaintiffs' protestations that such work was too dangerous. See id. Marquis alleges that as he was performing repairs on the house, he “stepped on the unsecured threshold of a door” and the door “gave way, plunging him into the crawl space and breaking both bones in his lower leg and his ankle.” Id. Defendants deny the allegations. See Dkt. 159 at 5.
Finally, Plaintiffs allege Sadeghian promised Marquis that if he moved his family from Houston to North Texas, Sadeghian would pay Marquis between $3,000 and $4,000 per month to do maintenance on the Sadeghians' properties and provide free lodging to Plaintiffs. See Dkt. 151 at 2-3. Plaintiffs allege Sadeghian deceived Marquis, as Sadeghian did not pay Marquis the promised amount, Sadeghian charged Marquis rent for the property on which Plaintiffs resided, and the property was uninhabitable. See id. at 3, 6. Defendants deny the allegations. See Dkt. 159 at 6.
Plaintiffs brought this case on August 27, 2019, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated. See Dkt. 1. On January 21, 2022, Plaintiffs' Motion to Certify Class Collective Action (Dkt. 115) was denied. See Dkt. 143. On June 23, 2022, Plaintiffs filed the Third Amended Complaint (Dkt. 151), in which they assert claims as individuals only. See Dkt. 151. After the close of discovery, see Dkt. 169, on November 23, 2022, Defendants filed the Motion (Dkt. 176). On December 14, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a response in opposition to the Motion (Dkt. 177), and on December 15, 2022, Plaintiffs filed a supplement to their response (Dkt. 178). On December 21, 2022, Defendants filed a reply (Dkt. 179). On January 19, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a sur-reply (Dkt. 181).
Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the evidence and all justifiable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(A); Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, 549 (1999) (citations omitted). The summary judgment inquiry is “whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 251-52 (1986).
The party moving for summary judgment has the initial burden to prove there are no genuine issues of material fact for trial. Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Goel, 274 F.3d 984, 991 (5th Cir. 2001). To sustain this burden, the movant must identify “those portions of the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). The moving party, however, “need not negate the elements of the nonmovant's case.” Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (en banc) (emphasis omitted) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323). The movant's burden is only to point out the absence of evidence supporting the nonmoving party's case. Stults v. Conoco, Inc., 76 F.3d 651, 656 (5th Cir. 1996) (citation omitted).
In response, the nonmovant “may not rest upon mere allegations contained in the pleadings, but must set forth and support by summary judgment evidence specific facts showing the existence of a genuine issue for trial.” Ragas v. Tenn. Gas Pipeline Co., 136 F.3d 455, 458 (5th Cir. 1998) (citing Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255-57). The citations to evidence should be specific, as the district court is not required to “scour the record” to determine whether the evidence raises a genuine issue of material fact. LOCAL RULE CV-56(c); see also FED. R. CIV. P. 56(C)(3) (“THE COURT NEED CONSIDER ONLY THE CITED MATERIALS, BUT IT MAY CONSIDER OTHER MATERIALS IN THE RECORD.”). NEITHER “CONCLUSORY ALLEGATIONS” NOR “UNSUBSTANTIATED ASSERTIONS” WILL SATISFY THE NONMOVANT'S BURDEN. Hathaway v. Bazany, 507 F.3d 312, 319 (5th Cir. 2007) (internal quotation marks omitted).
“When the nonmoving party bears the burden of proof at trial, summary judgment is warranted if the nonmovant fails to ‘make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to [its] case.'” Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584, 590 (1993) (quoting Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322). “In such a situation, there can be ‘no genuine issue as to any material fact,' since a complete failure of proof concerning an essential element of the nonmoving party's case necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.” Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23.
In the Motion (Dkt. 176), Defendants seek summary judgment on all claims asserted by Plaintiffs in the Third Amended Complaint (Dkt. 151). For the reasons discussed below, the Court grants the Motion (Dkt. 176) as to Plaintiffs' DTPA claim and denies the Motion (Dkt. 176) as to Plaintiffs' FLSA claim and Marquis's negligence claim.
Defendants argue the undisputed facts show that as a matter of law, Plaintiffs were independent contractors, not employees, and therefore, Defendants cannot be liable to Plaintiffs under the FLSA. See Dkt. 176 at 7-12. Plaintiffs respond that the facts underlying whether Plaintiffs were employees or independent contractors are entirely disputed, and therefore, summary judgment is inappropriate. See Dkt. 177 at 3-11.
Congress enacted the FLSA in 1938 after finding “‘labor conditions detrimental to the maintenance of the minimum standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general wellbeing of workers.'” Parrish v Premier Directional Drilling, L.P., 917 F.3d 369, 378 (5th Cir. 2019) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 202(a)). The FLSA mandates that as to covered employers and employees, “no employer shall employ any of his employees . . . for a workweek longer than forty hours unless such employee receives compensation for his employment in excess of the hours above specified at a rate not less than one and one-half times the regular rate at which he is employed.” 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (emphases added). If an employer violates the overtimecompensation requirement, it is “liable to the employee or employees affected in the amount of their unpaid minimum wages, or their unpaid overtime compensation, as the case may be, and in an additional equal amount as liquidated damages.” Id. § 216(b)...
To continue reading
Request your trial