Marr v. State

Citation134 Md. App. 152,759 A.2d 327
Decision Date11 September 2000
Docket NumberNo. 2587,2587
PartiesNathaniel Damian MARR v. STATE of Maryland.
CourtCourt of Special Appeals of Maryland

George E. Burns, Jr., Asst. Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, for appellant.

Diane E. Keller, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., Baltimore, and Jack Johnson, State's Atty. for Prince George's County, Upper Marlboro, on the brief), for appellee.

Argued before MOYLAN, EYLER and STEPHEN P. JOHNSON (Specially assigned), JJ. EYLER, Judge.

Nathaniel Damian Marr, appellant, was convicted by a jury sitting in the Circuit Court for Prince George's County of attempted second degree murder and use of a handgun. He was sentenced to consecutive terms of imprisonment of thirty and twenty years.

Questions Presented

1. Did the trial court err in denying the motion to suppress Appellant's statements to the police?

2. Did the trial court err in denying Appellant's motion for a mistrial and in refusing to reopen the suppression hearing?

3. Did the trial court err in refusing to give requested instructions?
A. Did the trial court err in refusing to instruct the jury that a defendant does not forfeit his right to self-defense by arming himself in advance if he does not seek the encounter and has reason to fear an unlawful attack on his life?

B. Did the trial court err in refusing to instruct the jury on [its] duty to assess reasonableness from the defendant's perspective at the time of the incident?

Facts
Motion to Suppress

The facts, as developed at the hearing on appellant's motion to suppress, are in substance but not verbatim taken from appellant's brief. On December 4, 1998, Prince George's County detectives obtained an arrest warrant for appellant in connection with the attempted murder of Kevin Jackson on that same date. Police detectives "held" the warrant, which meant the warrant was not entered into the computer. One of the reasons given by the detectives for holding the warrant was to "prevent the attorney from coming in and assisting the defendant."

On December 14, 1998, Detective Norman Miller received a telephone call from Steve Kupferberg, Esquire, who had represented appellant over a number of years in a number of cases, and who had been retained in December 1998, to represent appellant in connection with the investigation of crimes in the Seat Pleasant area. In that conversation, Mr. Kupferberg told Detective Miller that he represented appellant, inquired as to the existence of an arrest warrant, and indicated that if there were an outstanding warrant, appellant would turn himself in to police. Mr. Kupferberg made it clear to Detective Miller that appellant did not want to talk to police officers without Mr. Kupferberg being present. Detective Miller, although he knew that an arrest warrant was outstanding, did not inform Mr. Kupferberg of the warrant.

Later that same day, Mr. Kupferberg faxed Detective Miller a letter confirming the telephone conversation, wherein Mr. Kupferberg confirmed that he represented the appellant and repeated his statement that, if a warrant were issued, appellant would turn himself in to police. Mr. Kupferberg also repeated appellant's position that appellant would make no statement to police officers without his attorney being present, and Mr. Kupferberg asked Detective Miller not to question appellant outside of his presence. Mr. Kupferberg testified that he had discussed the letter with appellant and advised appellant that if he were arrested without Mr. Kupferberg being present, he should tell the police that he did not want to make a statement.

On December 28, Mr. Kupferberg met with Ranganoff Manthrapagada, a member of the U.S. Attorney's Office and a former Assistant State's Attorney. Mr. Kupferberg told Mr. Manthrapagada that he wanted appellant to turn himself in if there was an outstanding warrant and asked him to find out if there was one. Mr. Manthrapagada told Mr. Kupferberg that he would not do so.

On December 30, at approximately 8:30 a.m., appellant was arrested pursuant to the warrant issued on December 4. Appellant and the arresting officer were in appellant's apartment, the place where he was arrested, until 11:00 a.m., when homicide investigators arrived. Appellant was transported to the Criminal Investigation Division Office and placed in an interview room. Appellant was alone in that room from 11:20 a.m. until 1:00 p.m.

From 1:00 p.m. until 2:00 p.m., appellant was questioned by Detective Troy Harding about the murder of Arthur Carroll and other shootings in the Seat Pleasant area. According to Detective Harding, appellant waived his Miranda1 rights. Appellant was alone for approximately 20 minutes, but Detective Harding went back into the interview room at 2:20 p.m. and questioned him until 2:40 p.m. Detective Harding testified that appellant did not ask to talk to a lawyer.

Other than a trip to the bathroom, appellant was alone in the interview room from 2:40 p.m. to 7:50 p.m. From 7:50 p.m. to 8:35 p.m., he was questioned by Detective Joseph McCann about several shootings, including the Arthur Carroll murder. Appellant executed a written waiver of his Miranda rights.

Except for another trip to the bathroom, appellant was alone in the interview room from 8:35 p.m. until 11:40 p.m. At 11:15 p.m., he appeared to be sleeping. From 11:40 p.m. until 12:40 a.m. on December 31, appellant was questioned by Detective Whitaker. From 12:59 a.m. to 2:04 a.m., appellant was questioned by Detective Dwight DeLoatch. At 2:10 a.m., Detective McCann returned to the interview room. Detective McCann confronted appellant with information to the effect that Curtis Alston had confessed to his involvement in the Arthur Carroll murder and had provided information relating to other murders in the Seat Pleasant area. After being confronted with that information, appellant made an oral statement in which he acknowledged that he and Curtis Alston shot Carroll. Appellant then gave a written statement which concluded at 3:45 a.m. Detective McCann continued to question appellant about other shootings, including Kevin Jackson, until 4:30 a.m. Detective McCann, knowing about Mr. Kupferberg's letter to Detective Miller, testified that appellant never asked to talk to a lawyer, including Mr. Kupferberg.

From 9:30 a.m. to 5:00 p.m. on December 31, appellant was questioned by Detective Ismael Canales. Appellant executed another written waiver of his Miranda rights and wrote on the waiver, "I would like to stay and continue to talk with this investigator." Detective Canales testified that he believed the note was necessary because the officers wanted to make sure that appellant did not mind continuing to talk. This episode of questioning produced four written statements concerning other shootings. Appellant was presented to the commissioner at 8:00 p.m. on December 31, almost 36 hours after his arrest.

Appellant testified that he and Mr. Kupferberg discussed Mr. Kupferberg's telephone conversation with Detective Miller, the letter that Mr. Kupferberg faxed to Detective Miller, and that Mr. Kupferberg had advised him that he should not make a statement but should ask for his attorney. Appellant testified that he told Detective Harding at least three times that he wanted to talk to Mr. Kupferberg, but Detective Harding told him that he could not make a phone call because Mr. Kupferberg was representing appellant's uncle and would not be able to represent appellant because it would be a conflict of interest. At about 8:00 p.m. on December 30, according to appellant, he told Detective McCann that he did not want to talk without his lawyer present. He explained that he signed the Miranda waiver forms because he had been in the interviewing room so long and had repeatedly requested to contact his lawyer but that they had ignored the request.

The hearing judge found that appellant was not a credible witness and that he had knowingly and voluntarily waived his Miranda rights.

Trial

Darrell Allen testified that at approximately 2:00 p.m. on December 4, 1998, he was leaning on Kevin Jackson's car talking to Kevin Jackson, who was inside the car. Allen stated that he stood up and saw a gun pointing at him so he started running. He heard at least eight gunshots.

Kevin Jackson, pursuant to a plea agreement, testified that he had plead guilty to armed robbery and use of a handgun in connection with the robbery and murder on November 29, 1998, of Ronald Muse, appellant's cousin. He also had plead guilty to possession of cocaine and transporting a handgun. Jackson elaborated and stated that on November 29, 1998, he, Jerome Wright, and Arthur Carroll had gone to appellant's house to rob him. Appellant was not at home, but Ronald Muse was present, and Arthur Carroll gun-whipped, shot, and killed Ronald Muse.

Jackson further testified that, on December 4, 1998, he was in his car when Darrell Allen came over to talk to him. He heard Allen yell and saw him run. Jackson attempted to drive away but his car would not accelerate, so he was "just in the middle of some fire." Jackson got out of the car and ran. He stated that he had not seen the assailant.

In his statement to police, appellant admitted that he wanted to speak to Jackson about his alleged involvement in the shooting of Ronald Muse, but that when he walked up to the car, he saw that Mr. Jackson had a gun, and he fired at Mr. Jackson at that time.

The State and appellant stipulated that Jerome Wright, if called to testify, would testify that he gave a statement to Detective Harding on February 4, 1999, wherein he stated that Arthur Carroll shot Ronald Muse. It was further stipulated that, subsequently, Mr. Wright testified under oath in a court hearing that Kevin Jackson was the person who shot Ronald Muse.

Discussion
1.

Appellant first contends that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to...

To continue reading

Request your trial
36 cases
  • Hoerauf v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • February 8, 2008
    ...1, 37, 807 A.2d 732 (2002) (citing Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 100 S.Ct. 1682, 64 L.Ed.2d 297 (1980)); see Marr v. State, 134 Md.App. 152, 173, 759 A.2d 327 (2000) ("`Mt is clear . . . that the special procedural safeguards outlined in Miranda are required not where a suspect is si......
  • Conboy v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • March 2, 2004
    ...the circuit court, unless they are clearly erroneous. See Riddick v. State, 319 Md. 180, 183, 571 A.2d 1239 (1990); Marr v. State, 134 Md.App. 152, 163, 759 A.2d 327 (2000). Our review is based solely upon the record developed at the suppression hearing, and we review that record in the lig......
  • Ashford v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • September 12, 2002
    ......Once again, Judge Spellbring found Sergeant Miller's testimony to have been fully credible. Judge Spellbring's findings of first-level facts, fully supported by Sergeant Miller's testimony, are accepted for purposes of this review as gospel. Marr v. State, 134 Md.App. 152, 163, 759 A.2d 327 (2000) . .         When the issue is voluntariness, rather than Miranda compliance, moreover, the failure of a defendant to testify almost forecloses any chance of prevailing. If the issue is Miranda compliance, by contrast, the testimony ......
  • Williams v. State
    • United States
    • Court of Special Appeals of Maryland
    • October 1, 2014
    ...is brought about by the combination of custody and interrogation [that] is crucial for the attachment of Miranda. ” Marr v. State, 134 Md.App. 152, 173, 759 A.2d 327 (2000) (citation omitted), cert. denied, 362 Md. 623, 766 A.2d 147 (2001). Indeed, in Marr, a case discussing whether a perso......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT