Marrash v. United States

Citation168 F. 225
Decision Date16 February 1909
Docket Number233.
PartiesMARRASH et al. v. UNITED STATES.
CourtUnited States Courts of Appeals. United States Court of Appeals (2nd Circuit)

[Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Ernest E. Baldwin, for plaintiffs in error.

Henry L. Stimson, U.S. Atty. (Goldthwaite H. Dorr, Asst. U.S Atty., on the brief), for the United States.

Before LACOMBE, COXE, and NOYES, Circuit Judges.

COXE Circuit Judge.

The indictment charges that the defendants on and before October 9, 1906, in the Southern District of New York, did conspire with other persons unknown to defraud the United States of large sums of money, which the defendants should have paid on the importation at the port of New York of dutiable goods from foreign countries. The indictment alleges that the manner in which the said conspiracy was to be effected was in brief as follows:

The defendants were to cause said merchandise to be shipped to New York, consigned to the defendant Sara, or other persons unknown, upon false invoices containing false descriptions of the goods. The merchandise was to be falsely entered, as containing only crushed wheat, pistache nuts, etc., whereas in fact it contained laces and lace articles, the purpose being that these valuable articles should enter at the port of New York without paying duty. The indictment charges that the act done to effect the object of the conspiracy was as follows: On October 9, 1906, Sara caused to be entered at the port of New York, 12 cases of pistache nuts, crushed wheat etc., and 10 bags of crushed wheat imported by him from Syria. That the entry was made upon two invoices, describing the merchandise as aforesaid, whereas in fact one of the bags contained 50 dozen handmade Syrian lace handkerchiefs, and one of the cases contained one can and another case contained two cans of lace and lace articles.

The indictment was based upon section 5440 of the Revised Statutes (U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3676), which provides in substance that if two or more persons conspire to defraud the United States in any manner, and one or more of such parties do any act to effect the object of the conspiracy, all the parties thereto shall be liable to fine or imprisonment, or to both, in the discretion of the court. There can be no doubt as to the truth of the following propositions:

First. The October importations were made on false invoices, bills of lading, and entry, on none of which appeared any mention of the laces concealed in the crushed wheat and pistache nuts.

Second. The laces were so concealed that had the ordinary procedure in such cases been followed they might easily have escaped the observation of the custom officers.

Third. The disclosure that the importations contained concealed laces was not made until after Selim Marrash had been informed that, instead of the usual one package in ten, the entire importation had been ordered to the public stores for examination. Within an hour thereafter Selim had disclosed the presence of the contraband goods and had asked permission to amend the entry.

Fourth. The December and January entries of goods consigned to Petrakian and Marrash Bros., respectively, by the same importers at Damascus and Aleppo, were packed and started on their way before the discovery of the laces in the October entry was known to the shippers.

The December and January consignments had lace concealed in lentils, squash, and crushed wheat.

It cannot be denied that these facts were sufficient to cast suspicion strongly upon the defendants. One importation of nuts and wheat, with valuable laces carefully concealed therein and no suggestion of their presence on bills of lading, invoices, or entry, might have been made inadvertently and therefore with no criminal intent. When, however, five similar importations more or less directly connected with the defendants, shipped at different dates from exporters residing in cities separated from each other by several hundred miles of desert, arrive at the port of New York with the same contraband articles concealed in the same way, the presumption is persuasive that the consignees knew what goods they were receiving.

A letter discloses not only the character of the writer but also the character of the person to whom it is sent. A thief or a smuggler does not write to an honest man the details of his plans to steal and defraud. It is safe to assume that the recipient of such a letter is, if not a confederate, the same character of man as the writer. So, in the case before us, it is hardly conceivable, unless the exporters and importers were in accord, that so many packages of goods dishonestly packed and falsely billed would have been sent out. If the exporters had been honest, they would not have sent the goods under a false invoice and bill of lading. It is equally true that, if dishonest, they would not have sent the goods so packed and billed unless they knew the men with whom they were dealing.

Gellad at Aleppo and Debahi at Damascus knew that the moment the defendants discovered the hidden lace it would be their duty, on the assumption that they were not in the plot and were honest men, to denounce the fraud and sever all business relations. The importers, not the exporters, were to be benefited if the lace came in duty free, and it seems to us most improbable that the latter would have taken such a risk unless the situation was fully understood between them. In order words, the presumption is strong that both knew of the dishonest scheme and were acting in accordance therewith. The attempted explanation was discredited by the jury, and they were justified in disregarding it.

Selim Marrash testified that within an hour after he had been informed that the entire importation was to be sent to the public stores for examination, with a strong probability that the hidden lace would be discovered, he received a letter from Sara, mailed at Watertown, N. Y., October 6, 1906, which inclosed a letter from the exporters at Damascus, dated September 17, 1906, in which they say in substance that during their absence an employe took the liberty of sending bills of lading and a consular invoice from Beirut without disclosing the fact that the package of handkerchiefs and the two cans of needlework were concealed in the wheat and pistache nuts. How the employe of Debahi at Damascus succeeded in getting the handkerchiefs hidden in Gellad's crushed wheat at Aleppo, and how, in the absence of telepathic communication, he became familiar with the contents of Gellad's bill of...

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  • Jacobs v. Danciger
    • United States
    • Missouri Supreme Court
    • July 28, 1931
    ... ... Title II, National Prohibition Act, U. S. C., title 27, sec ... 30; Weinstein v. United States, 293 F. 388; ... Pattis v. United States, 17 F.2d 562; Anstess v ... United States, ... conspiracy." [12 C. J. 544; Lucadamo v. United ... States, 280 F. 653, l. c. 657; Marrash v. United ... States, 168 F. 225.] Defendants cite as sustaining this ... contention Jones v ... ...
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    • United States
    • Minnesota Supreme Court
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    ... ... to teach that men should not enlist in the military forces of ... the United States or aid in carrying on the war with Germany ... A combination for an unlawful purpose is ... State, 169 Ind. 488, 82 N.W. 1039; State v ... Caine, 134 Iowa 147, 111 N.W. 443; Marrash v ... U.S. 168 F. 225, 93 C.C.A. 511; Underhill, Crim. Ev ...          To ... ...
  • United States v. Perez
    • United States
    • U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit
    • January 2, 1974
    ...of direct proof. See, e. g., Krulewitch v. United States, 1949, 336 U.S. 440, 69 S. Ct. 716, 93 L.Ed. 790; Marrash v. United States, 2 Cir., 1909, 168 F. 225, 229. Thus, the existence of a conspiracy is usually proved in one or more of three ways—by circumstantial evidence, by the testimony......
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    • May 13, 1925
    ...supra. And whether the alleged overt act is such is a question of fact for the jury. U. S. v. Biggs (D. C.) 157 F. 264; Marrash v. U. S., 168 F. 225, 93 C. C. A. 511. It is not necessary to allege in the indictment what acts were done to effect the object of the conspiracy (U. S. v. Benson,......
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