Marrero-Rivera v. Dept. of Justice

• Citation: 800 F. Supp. 1024
• Decision Date: 23 July 1992
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 92-1172 (JAF).
• Parties: Martha MARRERO-RIVERA, Plaintiff, v. The DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OF the COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, Pedro Geronimo Goyco-Amador, and Iris Dolores Melendez-Vega, Individually and in Their Official Capacities, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico

800 F. Supp. 1024

Martha MARRERO-RIVERA, Plaintiff, v. The DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OF the COMMONWEALTH OF PUERTO RICO, Pedro Geronimo Goyco-Amador, and Iris Dolores Melendez-Vega, Individually and in Their Official Capacities, Defendants.

Civ. No. 92-1172 (JAF).

United States District Court, Puerto Rico.

July 23, 1992.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Francisco M. Dolz-Sánchez, San Juan, Puerto Rico, for plaintiff.

Kenneth Colón, Federal Litigation Division, Dept. of Justice, Com. of Puerto Rico, Jorge E. Perez-Diaz, Secretary of Justice, San Juan, Puerto Rico, for Dept. of Justice.

José G. Fagot-Díaz, Ramirez & Ramirez, San Juan, Puerto Rico, for remaining defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

FUSTE, District Judge.

Plaintiff has filed for relief under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e—2000e-17, and under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, for violation of rights guaranteed by the United States Constitution. The plaintiff has also filed pendent state claims under 29 L.P.R.A. § 146. Defendants have moved to dismiss under Fed. R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We dismiss plaintiff's claims under Title VII and under section 1983 without prejudice for failure to produce a proper right-to-sue letter.

I. Facts

Plaintiff began working for the Department of Justice as a secretary on February 1, 1986, and was assigned to the Centro Metropolitano de Investigaciones y Denuncias ("CMID") on November 16, 1987. She worked at the CMID without incident until September 1990, when Prosecutor Iris Meléndez-Vega was appointed as the director of the CMID. Shortly after her arrival, plaintiff alleges that Meléndez-Vega began to subject her to unwanted sexual advances. A pattern developed of unwanted comments about the plaintiff's physical appearance, her body and clothing; unwanted sexual insinuations and gestures; unwelcome physical advances, such as caressing the plaintiff's hair, touching her buttocks or otherwise imposing physical contact upon her. Plaintiff claims that when she explicitly rejected these advances, Meléndez-Vega threatened her with retaliation. From the time of her rejection onward, plaintiff states that Meléndez-Vega made her life at the CMID difficult: Meléndez-Vega made derogatory comments about plaintiff behind her back and let her know, directly and indirectly, that she was no longer welcome at the CMID.

On June 7, 1991, plaintiff alleges that Pedro Goyco-Amador, Meléndez-Vega's supervisor, called plaintiff into his office. Goyco-Amador allegedly told Marrero-Rivera that he had heard she was unhappy at the CMID. Plaintiff states that she saw a note on Goyco-Amador's desk from another CMID employee which she knew referred to incidents of sexual harassment at the CMID. From this meeting, plaintiff concluded that Goyco-Amador knew she was being harassed but chose not to comment on the subject. At their next meeting on July 19, 1991, plaintiff says that Goyco-Amador informed her that codefendant Meléndez-Vega wanted her out of the CMID because plaintiff was causing her personal problems. At this point, plaintiff alleges she explicitly informed Goyco-Amador that she had been sexually harassed by Meléndez-Vega. Upon hearing her complaints, Goyco-Amador allegedly told her she could not continue working at the CMID and must transfer. He also informed plaintiff that in view of her complaint against Meléndez-Vega, he could not recommend her favorably for an employment reclassification for which she had applied. Goyco-Amador allegedly informed plaintiff to request a transfer without putting her reasons for the transfer in writing. On August 5, 1991, plaintiff requested a transfer without stating the reasons. She was transferred to the San Juan District Office where she was to work as a reporter. Upon transfer, she discovered that in this new position she was subject to a probationary period of eight weeks and was required to take a qualifying test. Plaintiff asserts that this transfer amounted to a demotion. On August 17, 1991, plaintiff once again met with Goyco-Amador and asked to be moved back to her old position. She alleges Goyco-Amador mocked her and refused help.

On August 28, 1991, plaintiff went to the Anti-Discrimination Unit ("ADU") of the Puerto Rico Department of Labor, a deferral agency for the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") under Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(c). See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.74. She alleges having brought charges with the ADU against the Department of Justice, Goyco-Amador, and Meléndez-Vega. She was interviewed by an employee of the ADU, Maria Franco Soto, for two hours. After filing her complaint, the situation at the Department of Justice apparently took a turn for the worse. On September 27, 1991, plaintiff found out that her reclassification had been approved, but because she was no longer in her original position, it could not take effect. On October 1, 1991, plaintiff put the reasons for her request for a transfer in writing to Goyco-Amador and sent a copy to the ADU. On October 17, 1991, Goyco-Amador allegedly wrote back threatening to press criminal charges and directing a copy to the ADU as well. The ADU did not acknowledge receipt of the documents sent by the plaintiff until November 4, 1991, at which point they invited her to file a complaint under Puerto Rico law. Plaintiff then applied for benefits from the State Insurance Fund, which were denied on November 22, 1991. On January 3, 1992, she supplemented her charge with a sworn statement and a copy of the State Insurance Fund determination.¹

Plaintiff filed her complaint in this court on February 10, 1992, not quite 180 days after the date she claims to have made her initial filing of charges with the ADU and without having requested a right-to-sue letter from the agency. After defendants filed a motion to dismiss on April 6, 1992, arguing that plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed for lack of a right-to-sue letter, plaintiff requested a right-to-sue letter from the ADU. On April 15, 1992, plaintiff received a letter in which "permission to sue us sic authorized and granted." In this letter, the ADU stated they were closing their case file and would notify the EEOC of plaintiff's request for a right-to-sue letter. Plaintiff procured no letter from the EEOC or any other source.

II. Title VII

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act prohibits discrimination on the basis of sex. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2. Although the statute does not specifically address the issue of sexual harassment, it has been interpreted to prohibit such behavior. Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 106 S.Ct. 2399, 91 L.Ed.2d 49 (1986); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F.Supp. 654 (D.D.C.1976), rev'd. on other grounds, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C.Cir.1978). Since 1980, the regulations governing Title VII have explicitly included sexual harassment in the sphere of behavior prohibited by the statute. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11 (1980). Although the statute originally recognized and sought to combat the realities of a work force where women were generally employees of men — creating a confluence in the work situation of the power imbalance historically present between men and women, and the power imbalance between employer and employee — the statute has also been held to apply to same gender sexual harassment. Joyner v. AAA Cooper Transportation, 597 F.Supp. 537, 541 (M.D.Ala.1983), aff'd., 749 F.2d 732 (11th Cir.1984); see also Wright v. Methodist Youth Services, Inc., 511 F.Supp. 307 (N.D.Ill.1981).

To bring a court action under Title VII in federal court the complainant must first satisfy all the administrative procedures required by the statute. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 1822, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). Most important among these requirements are the timely filing of a charge with the EEOC and the request of a right-to-sue letter. See A. Conte, Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: Law and Practice at 131-32 (1990).

A. Right-to-Sue Letter

Defendants argue that plaintiff's complaint should be dismissed because she filed in federal court before obtaining a right-to-sue letter. After filing a charge with the EEOC or the appropriate deferral agency, if the agency has taken no action within 180 days, the complainant may request a right-to-sue letter regardless of the status of the administrative proceedings. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). While a plaintiff must have a right-to-sue letter, in order to bring suit in federal court under Title VII the right-to-sue letter is not a jurisdictional requirement. Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393, 102 S.Ct. 1127, 1132, 71 L.Ed.2d 234 (1982). Unlike the situation where a jurisdictional requirement is involved, courts have held that the issuance of a right-to-sue letter by the EEOC before a plaintiff brings suit in federal court may be subject to equitable adjustments. Gooding v. Warner-Lambert Co., 744 F.2d 354 (3rd Cir.1984); Wrighten v. Metropolitan Hospitals, Inc., 726 F.2d 1346 (9th Cir.1984); Williams v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority, 721 F.2d 1412 (D.C.Cir.1983); Fouche v. Jekyll Island-State Park Authority, 713 F.2d 1518 (11th Cir.1983); Perdue v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp., 690 F.2d 1091 (4th Cir.1982); Pinkard v. Pullman-Standard, Div. of Pullman, Inc., 678 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir.1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1105, 103 S.Ct. 729, 74 L.Ed.2d 954 (1983); Black v. Brown University, 555 F.Supp. 880 (D.R.I. 1983). Requiring the complainant to obtain a right-to-sue letter serves three very important policy considerations: An emphasis on private dispute resolution, an attempt to prevent concurrent court and agency action, and the regulation of the statute of limitations for private actions. Perdue v. Roy Stone Transfer Corp., 690 F.2d at 1094. Equitable considerations dictate that while plaintiff is required to request a right-to-sue letter, failure to do so should not damage the plaintiff's rights under the statute. Where, as in ...