Marrero v. Ives
Decision Date | 19 June 2012 |
Docket Number | No. 09–16053.,09–16053. |
Citation | 12 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6731,12 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 6779,2012 Daily Journal D.A.R. 8229,682 F.3d 1190 |
Parties | Edwin MARRERO, Petitioner–Appellant, v. Richard B. IVES, Warden; Jonathan King, Prosecutor; Paul Delacourt, FBI Agent, Respondents–Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Quin Denvir, Davis, CA, for the petitioner-appellant.
Mark J. McKeon, Assistant United States Attorney, Fresno, CA, for the respondents-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, Frank C. Damrell, Senior District Judge, Presiding. D.C. No. 2:08–cv–01853–FCD–DAD.
Before: MARY M. SCHROEDER, SIDNEY R. THOMAS, and SUSAN P. GRABER, Circuit Judges.
Petitioner Edwin Marrero filed a petition for habeas corpus, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241, in the Eastern District of California. The district court construed the petition as a motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 and dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. We affirm.
The government charged Petitioner, in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Illinois, with two counts of interference with interstate commerce by threat or violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1951, and use of a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924. The jury convicted him on all counts. After classifying Petitioner as a career offender under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, the court sentenced him to 240 months' imprisonment on counts 1 and 2 and an additional 84 months' imprisonment for the firearm charge.
Petitioner appealed to the Seventh Circuit, which affirmed the convictions and sentence in 2002. The United States Supreme Court denied certiorari. Petitioner then filed a motion under § 2255 to vacate or set aside his sentence, which the District Court for the Northern District of Illinois denied. According to Petitioner, he did not receive notice of that denial until almost a year later. He then filed a Notice of Appeal with respect to the § 2255 proceeding, which the court dismissed as untimely.
Several months after that dismissal, in 2008, Petitioner filed a pro se habeas petition under § 2241 in the Eastern District of California, the jurisdiction in which he was then incarcerated. Concluding that Petitioner had failed to make an adequate claim of actual innocence, the district court construed the petition as a § 2255 motion and dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner timely appeals. We review de novo the dismissal of a habeas petition. Ivy v. Pontesso, 328 F.3d 1057, 1059 (9th Cir.2003).
A federal prisoner who seeks to challenge the legality of confinement must generally rely on a § 2255 motion to do so. See Stephens v. Herrera, 464 F.3d 895, 897 (9th Cir.2006) . There is, however, an exception to that general rule. Under the “escape hatch” of § 2255, a federal prisoner may file a § 2241 petition if, and only if, the remedy under § 2255 is “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of his detention.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). We have held that a prisoner may file a § 2241 petition under the escape hatch when the prisoner “(1) makes a claim of actual innocence, and (2) has not had an unobstructed procedural shot at presenting that claim.” Id. at 898 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Petitioner makes two separate claims of “actual innocence.” First, Petitioner uses the phrase “actual innocence” in his petition and seems to suggest that he was wrongly convicted. Construing his pro se filing liberally, Thomas v. Ponder, 611 F.3d 1144, 1150 (9th Cir.2010), Petitioner may have intended to raise the claim that he was factually innocent of his crimes of conviction. But he introduced no evidence tending to show that he did not commit the robberies underlying his convictions. Thus, even if Petitioner raised a claim of factual innocence, he failed to demonstrate that, “in light of all the evidence, it is more likely than not that no reasonable juror would have convicted him.” Stephens, 464 F.3d at 898 (internal quotation marks omitted). Furthermore, Petitioner has not demonstrated that he never had an “unobstructed procedural shot” at presenting the claim that he was factually innocent of his crimes. Although he asserts that he did not receive timely notice of the Illinois district court's dismissal of his § 2255 motion, he fails to argue that “the legal basis for [his] claim did not arise until after he had exhausted his direct appeal and first § 2255 motion.” Alaimalo v. United States, 645 F.3d 1042, 1047 (9th Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). He therefore fails to meet either requirement for filing a § 2241 petition under the escape hatch.
Second, Petitioner argues that he is “actually innocent” of being a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines. He argues that, under the 2007 amendments to the Sentencing Guidelines, two of his prior convictions are now considered “related” offenses, because he was sentenced for them on the same day, and that he therefore would not qualify as a career offender. CompareU.S.S.G. § 4A1.2 cmt. n. 3 (2000) withU.S.S.G. § 4A1.2(a)(2) (2007).
Whatever the merits of Petitioner's argument that he would not qualify as a career offender were he to be sentenced under the post–2007 Guidelines, his claim is not one of actual innocence. “In this circuit, a claim of actual innocence for purposes of the escape hatch of § 2255 is tested by the standard articulated by the Supreme Court in Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614[, 623], 118 S.Ct. 1604, 140 L.Ed.2d 828 (1998).” Stephens, 464 F.3d at 898. “ ‘[A]ctual innocence’ means factual innocence, not mere legal insufficiency.” Bousley, 523 U.S. at 623, 118 S.Ct. 1604. We have not yet resolved the question whether a petitioner may ever be actually innocent of a noncapital sentence for the purpose of qualifying for the escape hatch. It is clear, however, that Petitioner's claim that two of his prior offenses should no longer be considered “related,” and that he was therefore incorrectly treated as a career offender, is a purely legal claim that has nothing to do with factual innocence. Accordingly, it is not a cognizable claim of “actual innocence” for the purposes of qualifying to bring a § 2241 petition under the escape hatch.
Our sister circuits are in accord that a petitioner generally cannot assert a cognizable claim of actual innocence of a noncapital sentencing enhancement. See Bradford v. Tamez ( In re Bradford ), 660 F.3d 226, 230 (5th Cir.2011) (per curiam) (); Gilbert v. United States, 640 F.3d 1293, 1323 (11th Cir.2011) (en banc) (), cert. denied,––– U.S. ––––, 132 S.Ct. 1001, 181 L.Ed.2d 743 (2012); Unthank v. Jett, 549 F.3d 534, 536 (7th Cir.2008) ( ); Trenkler v. United States, 536 F.3d 85, 99 (1st Cir.2008) ( ); Poindexter v. Nash, 333 F.3d 372, 382 (2d Cir.2003) (); Okereke v. United States, 307 F.3d 117, 120–21 (3d Cir.2002) ( ); United States v. Peterman, 249 F.3d 458, 462 (6th Cir.2001) ( ).
Nonetheless, Petitioner argues that we previously have held that sentencing claims may be brought under the escape hatch. He relies on Harrison v. Ollison, 519 F.3d 952 (9th Cir.2008), and Hernandez v. Campbell, 204 F.3d 861 (9th Cir.2000) (per curiam), for that proposition. His reliance is misplaced. In Harrison, the petitioner claimed that a subsequent clarification of the statute under which he was convicted rendered him actually innocent of the crime of conviction. See Harrison, 519 F.3d at 959 ().
In Hernandez, we held only that the district court must answer the threshold jurisdictional question whether a petition is properly brought under § 2241 or is, instead, a disguised § 2255 motion, before it can proceed to the merits of the claim. 204 F.3d at 866. Because the district court had failed to decide...
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