Marriage of Angoco & San Nicolas, In re

• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: MILLER; KREMER, P.J., and BENKE
• Citation: Marriage of Angoco & San Nicolas, In re, 33 Cal.Rptr.2d 305, 27 Cal.App.4th 1527 (Cal. App. 1994)
• Decision Date: 03 August 1994
• Docket Number: No. D018047,D018047
• Parties: In re the Marriage of Marie P. ANGOCO and Priestly San Nicolas. Marie P. ANGOCO, Respondent, v. Priestly SAN NICOLAS, Appellant.

Page 305

33 Cal.Rptr.2d 305

27 Cal.App.4th 1527

In re the Marriage of Marie P. ANGOCO and Priestly San Nicolas Marie P. ANGOCO, Respondent, v. Priestly SAN NICOLAS, Appellant.

No. D018047.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.

Aug. 3, 1994.

[27 Cal.App.4th 1531] Mark Wright Rossi, for appellant.

Daniel E. Lungren, Atty. Gen., Roderick E. Walston, Chief Asst. Atty. Gen., Carol Ann White, Supervising Deputy Atty. Gen., and Mary A. Roth, Deputy Atty. Gen., for plaintiff and respondent.

MILLER, Associate Justice. ^*

Priestly San Nicolas appeals an order setting his child support obligation to his minor daughter at $433 per month after his former spouse Marie P. Angoco brought an action under the Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act (URESA). ¹ San Nicolas contends (1) the provisions of URESA do not apply here, (2) the certification of this matter under URESA was the result of misstatements of fact, (3) the court erred in finding a jurisdictional basis to make a child support order under URESA and (4) the prosecution of this matter by the district attorney was improper and barred by the existence of a valid child support order in another jurisdiction. We conclude none of these contentions has merit and accordingly affirm the order.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

San Nicolas and Angoco were married in the Territory of Guam in 1982 and divorced there in 1991. They have one daughter, Andrina, born on December 4, 1983. As part of the judgment of divorce, the parties agreed Angoco would have legal and physical custody of Andrina, San Nicolas would have reasonable visitation rights and he would pay child support of $300 per month during the months Andrina lived with Angoco. The parties further agreed they would periodically exchange financial information so that child support could be adjusted "according to the Child Support Regulations in force in Guam."

Angoco and Andrina continue to reside in Guam. San Nicolas is a member of the United States Navy and presently resides in California.

In September 1991, Angoco filed a petition in the Guam Superior Court under URESA, seeking to establish an order for child support and medical coverage. Specifically, Angoco checked the box on the pre-printed form requesting San Nicolas "pay an amount of current support for the dependent[ ] as required by law (guidelines) in the responding state." The court issued a certificate and order authorizing the submission of these pleadings to the California Department of Justice, Central Registry, for action based on the provisions of URESA. On April 30, 1992, the San Diego County District Attorney issued a summons and filed an order to show cause in the San Diego County Superior Court for enforcement of child support under Welfare and Institutions Code section 11475.1, as a result of the URESA action initiated by Angoco in Guam.

At the hearing on the order to show cause, the court found Angoco had the ability to earn net income of $976 per month, San Nicolas had an adjusted net income of $1,946 per month and San Nicolas's custodial share of time with Andrina was 15 percent. Based on these findings and the statutory support guidelines (see Civ.Code, § 4720 et seq.), the court ordered San Nicolas to pay child support in the amount of $433 per month, specifically ruling "this order modifies the amount of child support previously paid by [San Nicolas]." No arrearages were sought or ordered.

San Nicolas then filed a motion for reconsideration. ² After hearing, the court denied the motion, finding: "The laws of the State of California apply. This is not a modification of the Guam order, but the establishment of a new support order based on URESA. The Guam order still is in effect." A wage assignment issued on October 22, 1992.

DISCUSSION

I

San Nicolas contends the remedies of URESA are designed only for the enforcement of an unmet duty of support and thus do not apply here. He asserts his compliance with the valid child support order in Guam and the absence of any accrued arrearages preclude invoking URESA's enforcement provisions. ³ We disagree.

The purposes of URESA "are to improve and extend by reciprocal legislation the enforcement of duties of support and to make uniform the law with respect thereto." (§ 1652.) URESA itself "creates no duties of family support but leaves this to the legislatures of the several states. The Act is concerned solely with the enforcement of the already existing duties when the person to whom a duty is owed is in one state and the person owing the duty is in another state...." (9B West's U.Laws Ann. (1987) RURESA, prefatory note, p. 382.) Thus, the scope of the Act is expressly limited to determining entitlement to support already established and enforcing such duties of support. (See Moffat v. Moffat (1980) 27 Cal.3d 645, 659, 165 Cal.Rptr. 877, 612 P.2d 967.)

"Duty of support" is defined in URESA as a "duty of support whether imposed or imposable by law or by order, decree, or judgment of any court ... and includes the duty to pay arrearages of support past due and unpaid." (§ 1653, subd. (b); italics added.) "All duties of support, including the duty to pay arrearages, are enforceable by an action under [URESA]...." (§ 1672, italics added.) In interpreting this statutory language, we give effect to every word, clause and sentence so that no part will be inoperative or superfluous. (AFL-CIO v. Deukmejian (1989) 212 Cal.App.3d 425, 435, 260 Cal.Rptr. 479.) The words "include" and "including" in statutes are ordinarily words of enlargement and not of limitation. " 'The statutory definition of a thing as "including" certain things does not necessarily place thereon a meaning limited to the inclusions.' [Citations.]" (Paramount Gen. Hosp. Co. v. National Medical Enterprises, Inc. (1974) 42 Cal.App.3d 496, 501, 117 Cal.Rptr. 42; see also Smyers v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 36, 41, 203 Cal.Rptr. 521.) The Legislature's choice of the words "includes" and "including" when referring to the duty to pay arrearages necessarily means other duties of support are includable, thus encompassing situations where no arrearages exist, that is, where the obligor is not delinquent in payments.

Stated another way, San Nicolas is no less an "obligor" under the provisions of URESA simply because his support payments are current. The design of URESA legislation was such that all support orders, whether for sums presently due or past due and unpaid, whether final or modifiable, are to be enforced under that Act. (See Morris v. Cohen (1983) 149 Cal.App.3d 507, 513, 196 Cal.Rptr. 834.) Manifestly, this includes any duty existing under statutory law where (1) support is being currently paid, (2) arrearages exist, or (3) the duty to support has never been reduced to a judgment or order and is now the basis of litigation under URESA. (Scott v. Superior Court, supra, 156 Cal.App.3d at p. 584, 202 Cal.Rptr. 920; see also Banks v. McMorris (1975) 47 Cal.App.3d 723, 727, 121 Cal.Rptr. 185.) Thus, URESA was enacted to facilitate the enforcement of existing as well as past duties of support against persons presently legally liable for such support. (See Moffat v. Moffat, supra, 27 Cal.3d 645 at p. 659, 165 Cal.Rptr. 877, 612 P.2d 967.) Its provisions should be liberally construed with reference to the object to be obtained and every endeavor should be made to render the Act operable. (In re Marriage of Ryall (1984) 154 Cal.App.3d 743, 751, 201 Cal.Rptr. 504.)

In Scott v. Superior Court, supra, 156 Cal.App.3d 577, 202 Cal.Rptr. 920, a mentally disabled adult resident of New York sued her father, a California resident, for support under California law, alleging her disability rendered her unable to work to support herself and thus she was financially "in need" under Civil Code section 206. The law of New York did not recognize the claimed support obligation and presumably the father had never been required to pay support to his adult daughter. (Id. at pp. 579-580, 202 Cal.Rptr. 920.) The father unsuccessfully moved for summary judgment, arguing under California's "governmental interest approach" to choice of law questions, New York is the state having a true interest in applying its own law. (Ibid.)

On appeal, the court identified the issue as "whether choice of law principles require application of California law, which recognizes a parental obligation to support dependent adult children, or application of New York law, which negates such obligation for resident parents." (Scott v. Superior Court, supra, 156 Cal.App.3d at p. 579, 202 Cal.Rptr. 920.) The court held that URESA, adopted by California and New York, requires application of the law of the state where the obligor is present (§§ 1676, 1680) and thus the father was obligated to support his adult daughter. (Id. at p. 586, 202 Cal.Rptr. 920.) ⁴

Although the issue before us is not exclusively one of URESA's choice of law provisions as raised in Scott, that case illustrates the point that "all duties" of support are enforceable by an action under URESA, even where the obligor had no prior support obligation or where no arrearages exist. ⁵

A straightforward reading of URESA as enacted by the California Legislature supports the conclusion its provisions are properly invoked where, as here, there is an existing, nondelinquent support order. This interpretation furthers URESA's purpose of providing a means of enforcing all support obligations of obligors located outside the jurisdiction where the dependent spouses and children are present. (See Mehrstein v. Mehrstein (1966) 245 Cal.App.2d 646, 648, 54 Cal.Rptr. 65.)

II

San Nicolas contends the court in Guam improperly certified this matter to California under URESA based on Angoco's material misstatements of fact. He asserts as a result of these misstatements, the San Diego County Superior Court mistakenly believed it was establishing an initial order for child...