Marriage of Baltins, In re

• Decision Date: 18 July 1989
• Docket Number: No. A028993,A028993
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: In re the MARRIAGE OF Aldis BALTINS and Deanna J. Baltins. Aldis BALTINS, Appellant, v. Deanna J. BALTINS, Respondent.

Page 403

260 Cal.Rptr. 403

212 Cal.App.3d 66

In re the MARRIAGE OF Aldis BALTINS and Deanna J. Baltins.

Aldis BALTINS, Appellant, v. Deanna J. BALTINS, Respondent.

No. A028993.

Court of Appeal, First District, Division 3, California.

July 18, 1989.

Duncan M. James, Ukiah, Joseph A. Piasta II, O'Brien, Watters, Davis, Malisch & Piasta, Fountaingrove Corporate Center One, Santa Rosa, for appellant.

Robert A. Fowler, Fowler & Ball, Ukiah, for respondent.

BARRY-DEAL, Associate Justice.

Aldis Baltins (Husband) appeals from the order granting the motion of Deanna Baltins (Wife) to set aside the property and support provisions of the interlocutory and final judgments of dissolution of marriage on the grounds of duress and extrinsic fraud or mistake. ¹ He contends that the order was not supported by the evidence and was contrary to the law, and that the court erred in refusing to prepare a statement of decision. Husband also challenges a subsequent order granting Wife's motion for modification of support, claiming that the marital settlement agreement provided for nonmodifiable support and that trial court action was stayed under Code of Civil Procedure section 916 by his first notice of appeal. We affirm both orders.

I. Factual and Procedural History

Husband and Wife were married on June 7, 1969, and separated on January 7, 1982, a period of 12 years and 7 months; they had one adopted child, born October 31, 1978. At the time of their marriage, Husband was in his senior year in medical school, and Wife was working as a secretary; following Husband's internship, they moved several times while he completed his residency in orthopedics. In 1975, the couple moved to Ukiah, where Husband became board certified in orthopedic surgery and began his private practice. Until 1978 when their child was born, Wife worked at home for Husband's medical partnership, doing the payroll, making deposits, and paying the bills.

After the couple's separation in January 1982, Wife, represented by Attorney G. Scott Gaustad, filed a petition for dissolution of marriage in action No. 45543. She discharged Gaustad in March and dismissed the action in January of 1983. During April of 1982, Husband and Wife executed a marital settlement agreement, handwritten by Husband, providing for custody of their child, support, and a division of property. (This agreement was the basis for a later agreement incorporated into the interlocutory judgment of April 11, 1983, in action No. 47523, the subject of this appeal.)

On March 30, 1983, Husband, acting in propria persona, filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage in a new action, No. 47523, alleging that all community assets and obligations had been disposed of by written agreement and requesting that custody of the minor child be awarded to Wife. Husband prepared a summons and a notice and acknowledgment of receipt of summons, as well as an appearance, stipulation, and waivers. The latter provided that the cause could be tried as an uncontested matter without notice. Without advice of counsel, Wife signed the documents on April 9, 1983. Two days later, Husband had her default entered, and an uncontested hearing that same day resulted in the court's granting an interlocutory judgment of dissolution of marriage. The court approved and incorporated into the judgment a typed property settlement agreement, which had been executed by both parties on December 22, 1982; the agreement was substantially the same as the handwritten agreement executed by the parties in April 1982. Wife did not appear at the hearing. Six months later, on October 12, 1983, the court entered the final judgment on Husband's request.

On April 6, 1984, Wife filed her motion to set aside those portions of the interlocutory and final judgments dividing the community property of the parties and providing for support. The matter was heard over a two-day period in June, and on July 16, 1984, the court filed its "Ruling on Motion," setting aside the judgment. Husband requested a statement of decision on July 25, and Wife filed a timely objection.

On August 16, 1984, the court filed its order setting aside the interlocutory and final judgments, and declining to file a statement of decision on the ground that no request for a statement was made before submission of the "one-day" case as required by Code of Civil Procedure section 632. Husband appealed from this order.

Meanwhile, Wife noticed a motion to modify support which was heard on August 31. Her motion was granted, and the court filed its order increasing spousal and child support and awarding her fees and costs. Husband filed an amended notice of appeal to include this order.

II. Hearing on the Motion to Set Aside Judgments

At the full, evidentiary hearing on Wife's motion to set aside the judgments, the court took judicial notice of her prior action for dissolution of the marriage. (See Evid.Code, § 452, subd. (d).)

Wife testified in her own behalf about the history of the parties' relationship as set out above and her circumstances from the time she first consulted an attorney in April 1981. In addition, she presented the testimony of two friends and of three attorneys with whom she had consulted during the course of the proceedings. She also introduced into evidence financial statements and income tax returns of the parties. We view this evidence in the light most favorable to Wife. (In re Marriage of Gonzalez (1976) 57 Cal.App.3d 736, 745, 129 Cal.Rptr. 566.)

Wife first consulted with Attorney Scott Gaustad in April 1981 when Husband physically abused her and she was frightened about losing custody of their child if she left. The parties separated in January 1982, and Wife moved out of the family home. Gaustad represented her that month when she filed her petition for dissolution of the marriage in action No. 45543. Gaustad had issued an order to show cause for temporary restraining and support orders, which was set for hearing a short time later. The order to show cause was not heard because the parties were talking and Wife did not want anything to happen; she told Gaustad to take no action. In either March or April of 1982, Husband became furious with Gaustad for mentioning to another attorney in a public place that he had seen bruises on Wife which had been inflicted by Husband. Husband threatened to sue Gaustad and demanded that Wife fire him, which she did.

Gaustad testified that Husband called him at home on a Saturday morning, upset and angry about the conversation over Wife's bruises, and that Wife discharged him afterwards. (A substitution of attorney was not filed, however, until July 1982.)

After discharging Gaustad, Wife signed a property settlement agreement in Husband's handwriting dated April 25, 1982. Although Gaustad was still her attorney of record, she did not consult with him before signing. At the time, Wife believed she was getting less than 50 percent of the community property. She signed the agreement because for many years Husband had told her that she had not worked for it and was not entitled to one-half of the community property. He threatened that if she did not sign, he would declare bankruptcy and thereby avoid paying anything to her or their creditors. Husband further told Wife that his medical practice was his business and that she had nothing to do with it. "He was the one who was the doctor."

Wife admitted that she knew of all the parties' assets. She assisted Husband in preparing a financial statement in June 1981. This statement, showing total community assets of $1,306,515 and a net worth of $720,302, was admitted into evidence. Most of the assets and liabilities were acquired after the parties moved to Ukiah. Less than a year after this statement, under the April 1982 agreement, Wife received a rental residence, a 1977 Mercedes-Benz automobile, and some household furnishings, at a total net value of about $63,000. Husband received the balance of the assets, which included his medical practice, an interest in a medical building, a 30-acre ranch (with improvements including a remodeled ranch house, vineyard, and vineyard equipment), two condominiums at Lake Tahoe, his Keogh Plan, a 1977 Porsche, ranch machinery, household furnishings, miscellaneous bank accounts, and life insurance policies. He also assumed various unsecured debts of about $103,400, in addition to the secured debts on assets assigned to him. Thus Husband received community property with an approximate net value of $507,700.

Under the April 1982 agreement, Wife would receive $1,000 per month for 24 months and child support of $300 per month. Both spousal and child support would terminate if Wife cohabited with someone or remarried. Wife testified that the support provision was a compromise because Husband at first did not want to pay her anything. She said, "... I felt I just wanted to get enough money to get on my feet, to get a job and support myself." Husband's 1982 federal income tax return showed gross income from his medical practice was over $282,000. He testified that his net that year was $150,000.

In July 1982, Wife consulted with Attorney Susan Jordan, who filed a substitution of attorney so Gaustad was no longer attorney of record. Wife was told by Jordan that the handwritten agreement was unfair to her.

Attorney Jordan testified that Wife was in her office three or four times. Wife did not seem to hear what Jordan was saying and frequently cried. Wife was emotionally upset and incapable of asserting herself or of explaining why she would accept an unfair agreement. She expressed fears that Husband would not visit the child and that the child would be disrupted if she fought for any additional property. Jordan felt that Wife was acting under Husband's will and that she was "terrified," afraid of the power he held over the property, her life, and her daughter.

On August 3, 1982, the parties amended the handwritten agreement to increase...