Marriage of Beardslee, Matter of
Decision Date | 16 August 1996 |
Docket Number | No. 74375,74375 |
Citation | 22 Kan.App.2d 787,922 P.2d 1128 |
Parties | In the MATTER OF the MARRIAGE OF Margery A. BEARDSLEE, Appellee, and Clarence Ernest Beardslee, Appellant. |
Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Syllabus by the Court
1. Relief from a final judgment under K.S.A. 60-260(b) rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.
2. A motion brought under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(1), (2), or (3) must be filed within a reasonable time and not more than 1 year after the date the order or final judgment was entered.
3. The automatic stay in bankruptcy provided by 11 U.S.C. § 362 (1994) tolls the 1-year statute of limitations in K.S.A. 60-260(b).
4. In a divorce action, the district court has the authority to order that the homestead be sold and that any debts owed by the parties be paid from the proceeds of the sale.
5. Where the parties to a divorce action are joint debtors and one of the parties has been discharged from the debt in bankruptcy, the district court has the authority to order payment of the debt from the assets of the marital estate.
Roger L. Sherman, Overland Park, for appellant.
Jo Ann Butaud, of Evans & Mullinix, P.A., Lenexa, for appellee.
Before BRAZIL, C.J., MARQUARDT, J., and GENE B. PENLAND, District Judge Retired, Assigned.
Clarence Ernest Beardslee appeals from the journal entry of the district court which reformed the divorce decree. Clarence argues that (1) the district court did not have the power to reform or modify the divorce decree under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(6); (2) the district court's order requiring Clarence to sell his residence to pay the mortgages and the joint marital debts violates the homestead exemption to the Kansas Constitution, Art. 15, § 9; and (3) the district court's order requiring Clarence to pay the joint marital debts is void because these debts were discharged by the bankruptcy court.
Margery A. Beardslee filed a petition for divorce on January 19, 1993. Clarence filed a proposed division of assets and liabilities wherein he would assume all joint debts "contingent upon [his] being awarded the marital residence." If the real estate was set aside to Margery, Clarence proposed to "equally divide the joint liability."
On August 16, 1993, the divorce decree was filed. The decree states in part:
Margery filed a motion for reconsideration of the division of assets and assignment of debts. In response, Clarence filed a motion to restore possession of the marital residence and to deny Margery's motion for reconsideration. The district court held a hearing on August 27, 1993, and Clarence was given possession of the marital residence; however, he was ordered "to refinance the subject real estate on or before January 1, 1994, or in the alternative, to arrange for the release of all obligations of the petitioner on said first and second mortgages on or before said date."
Clarence filed a petition for bankruptcy on August 15, 1994, 1 day short of a year from the filing of the divorce decree. Margery filed a motion to lift the automatic stay, which was granted by the bankruptcy court.
On December 15, 1994, Margery filed a motion to reform the decree of divorce, requesting that the district court revise the division of property and indebtedness. In her motion, Margery alleged that the division of property had become inequitable since she remained obligated on all of the joint indebtedness that Clarence had discharged in bankruptcy. In her brief, Margery also contends that she remained liable on the first and second mortgages on the marital residence.
A hearing was held on the motion, and the district court found "[t]hat the Respondent was discharged from all individual indebtedness and all joint marital indebtedness on February 27, 1995." However, there is nothing in the record to identify the individual debts that were discharged.
In its April 19, 1995, journal entry, the district court characterized the property division of the divorce decree as follows:
Based upon these findings, the district court ordered that the marital residence be sold and:
Margery's motion to reform the divorce decree was filed "pursuant to K.S.A. 60-260(b)(6)." In ordering the reformation of the divorce decree, the district court reasoned that it was being done "because the facts existing now, if known by the Court at the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce, would have created a different result and therefore Petitioner is entitled to the relief requested."
"As a general rule, a ruling on a motion for relief from a final judgment filed pursuant to K.S.A. 60-260(b) rests within the sound discretion of the trial court and will not be reversed absent a showing of abuse of discretion." Bethany Medical Center v. Niyazi, 18 Kan.App.2d 80, 81, 847 P.2d 1341 (1993). "The burden of showing abuse of discretion lies with the party alleging abuse." In re Marriage of Larson, 257 Kan. 456, 463-64, 894 P.2d 809 (1995).
Clarence fails to state the standard of review for any of the issues, which is in violation of Supreme Court Rule 6.02(e) (1995 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 29).
Clarence points to Flannery v. Flannery, 203 Kan. 239, 243-45, 452 P.2d 846 (1969), where the court applied the general rule that the district court does not retain statutory authority to modify a division of property once it is part of a divorce decree. Flannery, however, does not address K.S.A. 60-260(b). It should also be noted that the facts in Flannery are very different from the instant case.
K.S.A. 60-260(b) provides:
(Emphasis added.)
Although the district court referred to K.S.A. 60-260(b)(6) in its journal entry reforming the divorce decree, Clarence does not discuss that statute or argue that it was inappropriately applied. Clarencedoes not cite any cases interpreting K.S.A. 60-260(b)(6) or similar laws of other jurisdictions. Clarence has not met his burden of showing an abuse of discretion.
Wilson v. Wilson, 16 Kan.App.2d 651, 659, 827 P.2d 788, rev. denied 250 Kan. 808 (1992).
Clarence filed his bankruptcy petition on August 15, 1994. On October 18, 1994, the bankruptcy court entered an order granting Margery relief from the automatic stay. On December 15, 1994, Margery filed her motion to reform the decree of divorce.
A motion brought under K.S.A. 60-260(b)(1), (2), or (3) must be filed within a reasonable time and not more than 1 year from the date the...
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