Marriage of Biderman, In re
Decision Date | 09 April 1992 |
Docket Number | No. B057555,B057555 |
Citation | 5 Cal.App.4th 409,6 Cal.Rptr.2d 791 |
Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
Parties | In re the MARRIAGE OF Sharon M. and Lawrence J. BIDERMAN. Sharon M. BIDERMAN, Appellant, v. Lawrence J. BIDERMAN, Respondent. Civ. |
Taylor, McCord, Johnson, Conroy & Praver, A Professional Corp., and David L. Praver, Ventura, for appellant.
Loomis and Barrabee and Jan Loomis, Westlake Village, for respondent.
Sharon M. Biderman appeals from the order extending permanent spousal support beyond the termination date specified in the final judgment. She was ordered to pay $650 per month for an additional six months to Lawrence Biderman, her former husband, with a review date of July 24, 1991. At the July 24, 1991 hearing, appellant was ordered to continue making $650 per month support payments until we decide the instant appeal. Appellant meritoriously contends the trial court abused its discretion as a matter of law by modifying the support termination date because respondent failed to show a material change of circumstances.
After a 20 year marriage the parties separated in 1984. Appellant filed her petition for dissolution in 1985. The issue of marriage status was bifurcated and dissolution was granted in 1986. In January of 1990, following a contested trial before retired Judge Jerry Pacht, judge pro tem, judgment was entered on reserved property and support issues. Each party was awarded approximately $350,000 worth of assets, real property and cash. Appellant was ordered to pay respondent support in the sum of $650 per month for 12 months at which time it would "reduce to zero." Prior to trial, respondent had not requested pendente lite support and no order thereon was made during the five-year period.
The court retained jurisdiction to award spousal support to respondent but expressly determined that Respondent did not appeal from the judgment. As we shall explain, what he is really attempting to do is to collaterally attack the 1990 final judgment.
In his petition for modification and extension of spousal support filed in January of 1991, respondent claimed (1) he had been unable to live on the support awarded, (2) the $43,000 cash he received at the bifurcated property trial had been used to pay off debts, (3) he was still unable to work due to the depression, and (4) he had been so disabled since separation in 1984.
Respondent's financial declaration indicated he still owned all three pieces of real property awarded him in the dissolution, two of which were still being rented for an annual net amount of $3,176. Respondent lives in the third residence. His last salary as an engineer was $3,445 per month in 1984.
Appellant's financial declaration indicated her salary as a community college professor is lower than it had been as she was on one year sabbatical from fall of 1990 to the fall of 1991. Her net worth was substantially the same as at the time of the trial. She contended that respondent failed to show any material change in circumstance.
The hearing on the motion was based solely on declarations and documentary evidence. A trial court has discretion to permit or exclude live-witness testimony in deciding post-judgment family law motions and orders to show cause. (Reifler v. Superior Court (1974) 39 Cal.App.3d 479, 483, 114 Cal.Rptr. 356.) In the trial court, respondent's claim for further spousal support was premised solely upon his treating psychologist's opinion that respondent's disability continued since the original order. Respondent did not contend that he had imprudently managed his estate. The trial court determined that the continuing disability theory was meritorious and only found "... that there has been a change of circumstances and that change of circumstances is Mr. Biderman does still remain disabled."
(In re Marriage of Smith (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 469, 480, 274 Cal.Rptr. 911.)
Respondent contends there was a material change of circumstances because there was a "failed expectation" or "failed assumption" from the 1990 permanent spousal support order. "[I]n a subsequent order to show cause hearing for modification of support, [where] the assumption [in a prior order] is shown to have failed because ... [the supported spouse's] mental condition has not improved and continues to preclude employment in ... [the supported spouse's] profession, a change of circumstances is shown." (In re Marriage of Schaffer (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d 930, 934, 205 Cal.Rptr. 88; see also In re Marriage of Jacobs (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 990, 992-993, 162 Cal.Rptr. 649; In re Marriage of Andreen (1978) 76 Cal.App.3d 667, 673, 143 Cal.Rptr. 94.)
The issue then is whether respondent's failure to mentally recuperate is a "failed expectation" or "failed assumption" of the 1990 order constituting a material change of circumstance. If not, the court abused its discretion as a matter of law.
The original order is not reasonably susceptible to the meaning attached to it by respondent and the trial court, i.e., that respondent's disability was implicitly expected to change and permit him to resume employment. The order states the value and nature of the property awarded would alleviate the need for support after a one year period. The support was granted for one year to permit respondent, whose continued disability was presumed, to convert his assets so they...
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