Marriage of Burns, Matter of

Decision Date15 May 1991
PartiesIn the Matter of the MARRIAGE OF Vonetta Ruth BURNS,Respondent, and Russell Lee Burns, Appellant. 88-3480; CA A65331.
CourtOregon Court of Appeals

Michael A. Yates, Portland, argued the cause for appellant. With him on the brief were Mark A. Johnson and Gevurtz, Menashe, Hergert, Larson & Kurshner, P.C., Portland.

Stephen D. Petersen, Rainier, argued the cause for respondent. On the brief were Steven B. Reed and Petersen & Reed, P.C., Rainier.

Before RICHARDSON, P.J., and NEWMAN and DEITS, JJ.

DEITS, Judge.

Husband appeals a dissolution judgment. He assigns error to the trial court's property division giving the long half to wife, to the award of spousal support, to the visitation schedule and to the failure to suspend child support during extended summer visitation.

The parties were married in December, 1980, and separated in June, 1988. They have two children, ages 8 and 4. Husband, 32, is a supervisor for Boise Cascade Corporation and earns $4,500 per month. He earned a master's degree during the marriage. Wife, 37, has three children from a previous marriage. The youngest, age 13, lives with her. The father of those children is deceased, and wife receives Social Security benefits of $860 per month on behalf of the child living with her. She received her GED in 1977. Her only work experience before the parties' marriage was in child care and three months in a mill, where she earned approximately $9 per hour. She was laid off when the mill closed shortly before the parties' marriage. At the time of trial, she was cleaning houses and earning approximately $500 per month. The trial court awarded her $400 per month spousal support for two years, so that she would be able to "retrain for a job." Husband contends that the court erred in awarding any support, because she was already working and was capable of supporting herself. He claims that she could work at a higher wage than she earns cleaning houses, such as at the mill where she worked before their marriage.

A court may award spousal support that is just and equitable under all the circumstances. ORS 107.105(1)(d). Both parties are entitled to the "opportunity to achieve a standard of living not overly disproportionate to that enjoyed during the marriage." Grove and Grove, 280 Or. 341, 347, 571 P.2d 477, mod. 280 Or. 769, 572 P.2d 1320 (1977). In determining the amount to be awarded, the court may consider the need for retraining and education to allow each person to achieve that standard of living. ORS 107.105(1)(d)(E).

Wife was primarily a homemaker during the eight-year marriage. When she did work outside the home, she chose part-time employment that would allow her to care for her children while working. She has few skills, and her experience is in low-paying jobs. The support that the trial court awarded will allow her to obtain training, which can give her the opportunity to obtain a standard of living not overly disproportionate to that enjoyed during the marriage. We will not disturb the trial court's award of spousal support.

Husband also assigns error to the property division. Before the marriage, wife owned a house in Netarts worth approximately $50,000, with a $15,000 equity. The house was a rental for most of the marriage. During the marriage, the parties received between $33,000 and $36,000 in rental payments and paid approximately $55,000 toward the mortgage, upkeep and expenses on the house. Due primarily to a decrease in property values and high interest rates, the house now has approximately the same value and equity as it had when the parties married.

The trial court awarded the house to wife and divided the rest of the property equally, which resulted in wife receiving assets worth $40,334 and husband receiving $23,604 in assets. The court explained:

"The petitioner will be awarded the 'long half' for the reason that she is to be the custodial parent, is some 5 years older than respondent, has a minimum of educational background upon which to rely, and did bring some $15,000 in assets into the marriage."

Husband contends that the court erred in dividing the assets unequally. He argues that the parties' finances were completely commingled and that it was inappropriate to treat the house as wife's separate asset. Further, he asserts that there is no justification for awarding wife the long half of the property.

We conclude that the Netarts house should not be treated as wife's separate asset, even though she did bring it to the marriage, because, during the marriage, she conveyed it to husband and herself as tenants by the entirety. Consequently, the property became a marital asset, for which there is a statutory presumption of equal contribution. ORS 107.105(1)(f); See Stice and Stice, 308 Or. 316, 325, 779 P.2d 1020 (1989). Wife did not overcome that presumption here. Although she had $15,000 in equity in the house at the time of the marriage, substantial amounts were paid toward the property during the marriage from joint funds. We hold that the parties have equal interests in the property and that husband's interest should be considered in the distribution.

Nonetheless, we conclude that an unequal distribution of the marital assets is justified. ORS 107.105(1)(f) provides that the trial court must distribute the property in a manner "as may be just and proper in all the circumstances." Special circumstances may justify an unequal distribution of property. Stice and Stice, supra, 308 Or. at 326, 779 P.2d 1020; Dull and Dull, 104 Or.App. 275, 800 P.2d 306 (1990); Tannler and Tannler, 68 Or.App. 432, 683 P.2d 110, rev. den. 297 Or. 547, 685 P.2d 998 (1984). Husband is well educated and his income, even after paying child support payments, is over six times wife's. Wife is five years older than husband, has few job skills, little employment experience and only a GED. The two-year spousal support award provides her at best a limited opportunity to obtain a standard of living not overly disproportionate to that enjoyed during the marriage. In awarding the house to her, the trial court appropriately gave her the option of living in it with the children or using it to bolster her income. Olinger and Olinger, 75 Or.App. 351, 707 P.2d 64, rev. den. 300 Or. 367, 712 P.2d 109 (1985).

We hold...

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7 cases
  • Lightburn v. Lightburn
    • United States
    • Virginia Court of Appeals
    • June 25, 1996
    ... ... Wife had a private counseling practice in Blacksburg prior to the marriage. The parties [22 Va.App. 615] agreed that wife would move to Madison County to live with husband, ... 709, 714, 636 N.E.2d 1141, 1146 (1994); In re Burns, 107 Or.App. 167, 811 P.2d 654, 656 (1991) ...         The trial court in the case at bar ... 2 ... Attorneys' Fees ...         "An award of attorney's fees is a matter submitted to the trial court's sound discretion and is reviewable on appeal only for an abuse of ... ...
  • Marriage of Rossi, Matter of
    • United States
    • Oregon Court of Appeals
    • June 22, 1994
    ... ... She also argues that her obligations to provide housing, clothing, medical care and the like will continue throughout the six-week period of visitation and that those considerations led us to refuse to allow a credit against a noncustodial parent's child support obligations in Burns and Burns, 107 Or.App. 167, 811 P.2d 654, mod. 108 Or.App. 568, 816 P.2d 695 (1991). Husband argues that we allowed just such an adjustment in Doty and Doty, 101 Or.App. 320, 790 P.2d 1167 (1990), and that Burns and Burns, supra, is distinguishable because of the relatively short period of summer ... ...
  • Plymale v. Donnelly
    • United States
    • Wyoming Supreme Court
    • May 11, 2007
    ... ...         2. Is the issue of proper abatement in this matter barred by collateral estoppel and as such should this appeal be dismissed? ...         3 ... marriage. They resided in Laramie, Wyoming. Unhappy with the marriage, Mother moved to Casper with the ...         (quoting In re Marriage of Burns ... ...
  • Flanagan v. Flanagan
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Civil Appeals
    • March 17, 1995
    ... ... in the Schedule of Basic Child Support Obligations." One of those assumptions concerns the matter of "Visitation." Under that heading, the Rule 32 Comment states: ...         "The ... See, e.g., Marmaduke v. Marmaduke, 640 N.E.2d 441 (Ind.App.1994); In re Marriage of Toedter, 473 N.W.2d 233, 235 (Iowa App.1991); Beals v. Beals, 517 N.W.2d 413 (N.D.1994); In re Marriage of Burns, 107 Or.App. 167, 811 P.2d 654 (1991). See generally K. Getman, Changing Formulas for Changing ... ...
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1 books & journal articles
  • § 11.01 Transmutation by Title
    • United States
    • Full Court Press Divorce, Separation and the Distribution of Property Title CHAPTER 11 Transmutation - A Change in the Character of Property After Acquisition
    • Invalid date
    ...Chastain v. Posey, 665 P.2d 1179 (Okla. 1983); Murphy v. Murphy, 225 P.3d 820 (Okla. App. 2009). Oregon: In re Marriage of Burns, 811 P.2d 654 (Ore. App. 1991). Rhode Island: Quinn v. Quinn, 512 A.2d 848 (R.I. 1986). South Carolina: Trimnal v. Trimnal, 287 S.C. 495, 339 S.E.2d 869 (1986); S......

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