Marriage of Carpel, In re

Decision Date30 July 1992
Docket NumberNo. 4-91-0268,4-91-0268
Parties, 173 Ill.Dec. 873 In re the MARRIAGE OF Ronald L. CARPEL, Petitioner-Appellee, and Susan K. Carpel, n/k/a Susan K. Kolinger, Respondent-Appellant.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Michael B. Metnick, Diana Cherry, Metnick, Barewin & Wise, Springfield, for respondent-appellant.

Robert G. Heckenkamp, Heckenkamp, Simhauser & LaBarre, P.C., Springfield, for petitioner-appellee.

Justice STEIGMANN delivered the opinion of the court:

In May 1986, the trial court entered a judgment of dissolution of the marriage of petitioner, Ronald Carpel, and respondent, Susan Carpel (now Kolinger). Since that date, Susan and Ronald have both filed numerous petitions to amend or modify that judgment. In April 1991, the trial court entered an order modifying the judgment of dissolution by increasing Ronald's child support payments, but also allowing Ronald longer, uninterrupted visitation with Russell, the parties' son. The court also fined Susan $1,000 for contempt of court, denied her request for extended maintenance, denied her request for attorney fees and other miscellaneous relief, and reaffirmed its order for Ronald's accounting for Susan's share of his attorney fees.

Susan appeals, arguing that the trial court (1) improperly set Ronald's child support too low, (2) incorrectly calculated her share of fees from Ronald's former legal practice in Decatur, (3) erroneously found her in contempt of court, (4) improperly denied her request for continued maintenance, (5) erroneously excluded evidence of her lifestyle during their marriage, (6) erroneously lifted the requirement that Ronald provide her with a copy of his tax returns, (7) erroneously denied her petition for attorney fees, and (8) improperly denied her visitation during the summer months when Russell stays with Ronald.

We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand with directions.

I. BACKGROUND

Ronald and Susan married in 1969 in Florida. They were living in Decatur, Illinois when, after 17 years of marriage, their marriage ended in 1986. Ronald, a 46-year-old attorney, moved back to Florida just before the 1986 judgment of dissolution. In that judgment, the court awarded Susan, a 45-year-old homemaker, custody of their three children: Leslie, born in August 1970; Ryan, born in February 1973; and Russell, born in January 1981. The court awarded Ronald visitation rights with the children over school breaks as follows: one week during winter break, the entirety of their spring break, and six weeks during their summer break. The court ordered Susan to choose the Christmas visitation week in even-numbered years and Ronald to choose the Christmas visitation week in odd-numbered years, with the selecting parent notifying the other by the first of October preceding the vacation period. Conversely, Ronald would choose the summer visitation period in even-numbered years and Susan would choose in odd-numbered years. The court ordered Ronald to pay the children's travel expenses.

The court expressly found that "rehabilitative maintenance to [Susan] is appropriate and proper" and awarded Susan $750 per month in maintenance for four years and ordered Ronald to pay $250 per month per child in child support. Upon Susan's remarriage or the end of the four-year period, the court ordered that Susan's maintenance would cease and the child support would increase to $375 per month per child. The court specifically stated that "[t]his maintenance and support award is based upon Mr. Carpel's present income status," but did not indicate whether the court retained jurisdiction to modify the maintenance or support award at the end of or during the maintenance period. Ronald was also ordered to provide health insurance for the minor children.

The court awarded Susan the marital residence in Decatur, some vacant land in Hickory Point Estates, $25,000 from Ronald's pension fund, all the household furniture, her jewelry, crystal, art work, a grand piano, a mink coat, and a Buick station wagon. The court awarded Ronald a Cadillac, a Dodge Van, the full ownership interest in a certificate of deposit held by his disbanded Decatur law firm, the entire interest in certain oil investments, a $37,000 promissory note due him, certain stocks the court described as nonmarital property, all his clothes, his jewelry, a silver service, and some other personal items. The court evenly divided the parties' municipal bonds, their 1984 joint income-tax refund, and their interest in a real estate partnership known as Meadowridge Partnership. The court also ordered Ronald to pay all indebtedness of the parties incurred while married, including Susan's attorney fees.

Finally, the court awarded Susan 30% of Ronald's interest in pending cases he referred to other law firms when he moved to Florida and 50% of Ronald's contingent fee from a million-dollar judgment affirmed in Lancaster v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co. (7th Cir.1985), 773 F.2d 807, which was pending on appeal at the time of the 1986 judgment of dissolution. Ronald submitted a sealed list of the cases he referred to other firms, and the court ordered him to provide Susan with an accounting of them every six months. The court concluded its order by "expressly retain[ing] jurisdiction of this cause for the purpose of enforcing all the terms of this [j]udgment of [d]issolution of [m]arriage."

In November 1987, Susan filed a petition for modification, alleging that Ronald had testified that his 1986 income was about $50,000, when it actually was $208,443. (Ronald reported his gross income as $155,852 on his 1986 income-tax form.) In December 1987, Ronald filed his own petition for modification as well as a response to Susan's petition, claiming that he had incurred substantial debt when he opened his own law practice and could neither afford an increase in support and maintenance, nor continue to pay the then-existing support and maintenance awards. In January 1988, Ronald filed a motion requesting the court to reduce those awards retroactively if the court were to grant his petition to reduce them.

Although the trial court set a hearing on these petitions for February 19, 1988, no docket entry appears for this date, and the trial court entered no written order or memo. Thus, although it appears that the parties settled this particular dispute out of court, the record contains no documentation of such a settlement.

In July 1988, Ronald filed another petition for modification, requesting the court to order custody of Ryan transferred to Ronald. The petition alleged that turmoil in Susan's home, her general instability, and her interference with Ronald's relations with the children had upset Ryan tremendously, making him want to live with his father. Later that month, Ronald filed a motion to terminate child support for Leslie, who would turn 18 in August 1988. In response, Susan filed a petition to modify the judgment of dissolution that basically restated the allegations in her November 1987 petition for modification. Susan also filed a petition to enforce the judgment of dissolution, claiming that Ronald had incorrectly calculated the taxes due on the fees he earned from cases he referred to other law firms, thereby causing Susan to receive less than her share of those fees.

In August 1988, the court conducted a hearing on this round of petitions and motions and awarded temporary custody of Ryan to Ronald. The court also appointed a guardian ad litem for both Russell and Ryan. At this hearing, Ronald filed a petition for rule to show cause, requesting the court to find Susan in indirect contempt of court for not using her best efforts to foster the respect, love, and affection of the children for him as required by the judgment of dissolution. The record does not indicate that the court ever ruled on this petition. In September 1988, before the full hearing on custody of Ryan, Ronald filed an additional petition that requested the court to award custody of Russell to Ronald if it also awarded him custody of Ryan.

In November 1988, the trial court issued a memorandum opinion requiring Ronald to pay for Leslie's college education. The court based its order on the cost of attending a State university ($7,726 plus expenses), not on the cost of attending the private school Leslie actually attended ($9,500 plus expenses) because Ronald was not consulted before Leslie and Susan chose a private school. The court then set Ronald's obligation at $5,794.50 for the remaining 1988-89 school year and $7,726 for the following three years.

In December 1988, Ronald filed a motion for rehearing on his obligation to pay Leslie's college expenses, alleging that he had incurred an additional $20,000 in debt from his law practice and developed a cardiac condition ("left ventricular hypertrophy and mitral regurgitation") that caused hypertension and forced him to reduce his workload. The docket sheet shows no action on this motion or on other pending petitions until June 1989, when Leslie (then 18 years old) filed a petition to recover property from Susan. This petition was notarized in Florida and drafted in perfect form without any attorney of record shown thereon. Ronald concurrently filed a petition for the return of property, requesting that, in addition to the property listed in Leslie's petition, the court also ordered Susan to return Leslie's mouth retainer to her. Apparently, this round of petitions arose when--according to a September 1989 filing by Ronald--Susan had chastised Leslie for wanting to visit her father and tried to prevent her from doing so. In June 1989, Leslie allegedly had to sneak out of Susan's house without her belongings in order to travel to Florida.

In July 1989, after a hearing on the custody of the children, the court ordered Russell and Ryan to stay with Ronald from July 7 to August 16, whereupon they...

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