Marriage of Cowan, In re
| Decision Date | 26 November 1996 |
| Docket Number | No. 96-083,96-083 |
| Citation | 279 Mont. 491,53 St.Rep. 1250,928 P.2d 214 |
| Parties | In re MARRIAGE OF Joyce S. COWAN, Petitioner and Respondent, and Arden R. Cowan, Respondent and Appellant. |
| Court | Montana Supreme Court |
Clinton H. Kammerer, Kammerer Law Offices, Missoula, for Petitioner and Respondent.
On April 4, 1995, Arden Cowan moved the District Court for the Twenty-First Judicial District in Ravalli County to modify his child support obligation. His former spouse, Joyce Cowan, opposed the motion and filed a motion to have Arden held in contempt for failure to pay past support. Following a hearing at which both motions were considered, the District Court increased Arden's child support obligation from $250 to $762 per month. The District Court refused to reduce Arden's arrearages by the amount recommended by the Child Support Enforcement Division (CSED), and refused to credit certain Social Security benefits against his past due obligation. The District Court also denied Joyce's motion to hold Arden in contempt. Arden appeals the District Court's order which modified his child support obligation and which refused to grant him credit against his arrearages. We affirm in part and reverse in part the order of the District Court and remand to that court for a determination of Arden's child support obligation consistent with this opinion and with the Uniform Child Support Guidelines.
We address five issues on appeal:
1. Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it modified Arden's child support obligation without considering the factors set forth in § 40-4-204, MCA, and the Uniform Child Support Guidelines?
2. Did the District Court err when it refused to apply the monthly Social Security disability payments made to Arden's children toward Arden's monthly child support obligation?
3. Did the District Court err when it refused to apply the monthly Social Security disability payments made to Arden's two children in excess of Arden's support obligation as a credit toward his accrued arrearages?
4. Did the District Court err when it refused to apply the Social Security lump sum disability payment made to Arden's two children as a credit toward his accrued arrearages?
5. Did the District Court err when it refused to reduce Arden's accrued arrearages by $1,593.20, as recommended by the Child Support Enforcement Division?
In 1982, the District Court for the Twenty-First Judicial District dissolved the marriage of Arden and Joyce Cowan and awarded Joyce monthly child support in the amount of $100 per child for each of the couple's two children. Joyce filed a petition In January 1994, Joyce filed a motion in the District Court to have Arden held in contempt for his failure to keep his child support obligation current. At that time, Arden's past due child support amounted to $17,700, and he owed an additional $800 for attorney fees. Following a hearing at which Joyce's motion was considered, the District Court adjudged Arden in contempt of court and entered a judgment against Arden in the amount of $18,550. However, based on its finding that Arden had been "beset with financial hardships attributable to health and unemployment," the court reduced Arden's child support obligation to $250 per month for both children.
for modification of child support on December 5, 1988, and the District Court increased Arden's child support obligation to $200 per month per child beginning June 15, 1989.
Arden filed a motion to further modify his child support obligation in April 1995. By that time, the Social Security Administration (SSA) had determined that he had been disabled since November 1992 and had awarded him monthly benefits in the amount of $924, retroactive to May 1993. The SSA had also awarded Arden's children $512 per month retroactive to the same date. Based on the Social Security payments, Arden alleged in his petition that his child support should be modified because of "changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms [of the decree] unconscionable," pursuant to § 40-4-208, MCA. Specifically, Arden maintained that (1) his child support obligation should be modified to conform to the Uniform Child Support Guidelines; (2) his support obligation should be modified to reflect a credit for Social Security disability benefits paid to the children; and (3) any Social Security disability benefits received by his children that exceeded his support obligation should be applied as a credit against his accrued arrearages.
Before Arden filed his motion for modification of his child support obligation, the SSA delivered to him two lump sum payments totaling $19,456.00 for Social Security benefits earned from the date of his entitlement to the date of payment. After Arden filed his motion, the SSA sent to Joyce a lump sum payment of $9,728.00 representing benefits to the children as a result of Arden's disability. In addition, the CSED determined that Arden's child support arrearages should be reduced by $1,593.20.
Following the distribution by the SSA of the lump sum payments, and the recommendation by CSED that Arden's arrearages be reduced, Arden filed a brief in support of modification of his child support obligation. In his brief, Arden contended that both the lump sum payment received by his children and the amount of monthly Social Security payments paid in excess of his child support obligation should be credited against his accrued arrearages. Arden further contended that those accrued arrearages should be reduced by the amount recommended by the CSED.
Following a hearing at which Arden's motion to modify his child support obligations and Joyce's motion for contempt were considered, the District Court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order. In its order, the court modified Arden's child support obligation from $250 per month to $762 per month. Although the court did not specifically address the reduction of Arden's arrearages by either the amount recommended by the CSED or by the amounts paid for Social Security benefits, the court stated that it "[found] generally for Joyce and against Arden on all issues not specifically addressed herein." The District Court denied Joyce's motion to hold Arden in contempt.
We review a district court's findings of fact and conclusions of law which underlie an order for the modification of child support to determine whether the court's findings of fact are clearly erroneous and whether its conclusions of law are correct. In re Marriage of Brandon (1995), 271 Mont. 149, 151-52, 894 P.2d 951, 952-53. We review the court's decision to modify child support to determine whether the court abused its discretion. In re Marriage of Kovash (1995), 270 Mont. 517, 521, 893 P.2d 860, 863.
Did the District Court abuse its discretion when it modified Arden's child support obligation without considering the factors set forth in § 40-4-204, MCA, and the Uniform Child Support Guidelines?
On April 4, 1995, Arden Cowan filed a motion for modification of his child support obligation. Arden maintained that his circumstances had changed substantially, as evidenced by the SSA's determination in January 1995 that he is totally disabled. Because his disability precludes meaningful employment, Arden asserted that his child support obligation of $250 per month was "unconscionable" and should be reduced to conform with the Montana Child Support Guidelines.
It is well established that "[w]henever the court issues or modifies an order relating to child support, the district court is required to determine the child support obligation on the basis of the factors set out in § 40-4-204(1) and (2), MCA, and the Uniform Child Support Guidelines." In re Marriage of Wackler (1993), 258 Mont. 12, 15, 850 P.2d 963, 965. In this case, the District Court's specific obligations with respect to Arden's child support determination are set forth in § 40-4-204, MCA (1993), which provides in pertinent part:
(2) The court shall consider all relevant factors, including:
(a) the financial resources of the child;
(b) the financial resources of the custodial parent;
(c) the standard of living that the child would have enjoyed had the marriage not been dissolved;
(d) the physical and emotional condition of the child and the child's educational and medical needs;
(e) the financial resources and needs of the noncustodial parent;
(f) the age of the child;
(g) the cost of day care for the child;
(h) any custody arrangement that is ordered or decided upon; and
(i) the needs of any person, other than the child, whom either parent is legally obligated to support.
(3)(a) Whenever a court issues or modifies an order concerning child support, the court shall determine the child support obligation by applying the standards in this section and the uniform child support guidelines adopted by the department of public health and human services pursuant to 40-5-209. The guidelines must be used in all cases.... The amount determined under the guidelines is presumed to be an adequate and reasonable support award, unless the court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the application of the standards and guidelines is unjust to the child or to any of the parties or is inappropriate in that particular case.
(b) If the court finds that the guideline amount is unjust or inappropriate in a particular case, it shall state its reasons for finding that the application of the standards and guidelines is unjust to the child or a party or is inappropriate in that particular case. Similar reasons must also be stated in a case in which the parties have agreed to a support amount that varies from the guideline amount. Findings that rebut and vary the guideline amount must include a statement...
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