Marriage of Dodds, In re

• Decision Date: 04 December 1991
• Docket Number: No. 2-90-1372,2-90-1372
• Citation: 222 Ill.App.3d 99,164 Ill.Dec. 692,583 N.E.2d 608
• Parties: , 164 Ill.Dec. 692 In re MARRIAGE OF Nancy DODDS, Petitioner-Appellee, and Terry Dodds, Respondent-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 608

583 N.E.2d 608

222 Ill.App.3d 99, 164 Ill.Dec. 692

In re MARRIAGE OF Nancy DODDS, Petitioner-Appellee and Terry Dodds, Respondent-Appellant.

No. 2-90-1372.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

Second District.

Dec. 4, 1991.

Daniel A. Cwynar, Rockton, for Terry Dodds.

Norman R. Wheeler, Vella, Sparkman & Altamore, P.C., Rockford, for Nancy E. Dodds.

Justice BOWMAN delivered the opinion of the court:

Respondent, Terry Dodds, appeals from an order of the circuit court of Winnebago County modifying a child support order. Respondent contends that the trial court erred in determining that the lump-sum settlement of respondent's worker's compensation claim, for an injury which occurred after the dissolution of marriage, was income and, thus, was available to be apportioned for child support.

Respondent and petitioner, Nancy Dodds, were married and had three children. Following a divorce, they were remarried in 1984. In April 1985, Nancy filed a petition for dissolution of the marriage, and on July 2, 1985, a judgment of dissolution was entered. As part of the judgment, Terry was ordered to pay $210 per week in child support. Terry has since remarried, and he has three stepchildren. In April 1986, the original child support order was modified, and the payments were reduced to $150 per week.

During 1987, Terry suffered a work-related back injury, and he filed a worker's compensation claim. The claim was settled in January 1989, for a lump-sum payment of $135,000. After fees and costs were deducted, Terry's net award was $108,544.18. The back injury apparently disabled Terry, and he became eligible for social security disability income. As such, he receives $900 per month; his current wife receives $100; his stepchildren receive $302; and his own children receive $248.

In March 1990, Terry filed a petition to modify child support; he asked the court to reduce his payments by the amount his children were receiving from social security. Nancy filed her own petition to modify; she asked the court to allocate part of Terry's lump-sum worker's compensation settlement as child support.

In determining whether the worker's compensation settlement was income, the trial court noted that section 706.1(A)(4) of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (the Marriage Act) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 40, par. 706.1(A)(4)) defines "income" as "any form of periodic payment to an individual, regardless of source, including, but not limited to: wages, salary, * * * [and] workers' compensation." The court concluded that Terry could have taken his settlement in periodic payments but had "transformed his right to receive periodic payments into a lump sum present day cash value." The trial court ordered Terry to pay 21% of the settlement, or $23,439, to his children. Terry appeals from that part of the order.

Terry concedes that a percentage of his income must go to child support; his only argument on appeal is that his worker's compensation settlement is not "income." He argues that, if the legislature had intended that all worker's compensation payments were to fall within the definition of "income" set out in section 706.1(A)(4) of the Marriage Act, then the legislature would not have specified "periodic" payments. He argues that his payment was "a one time thing" and not "periodic." He also urges that the lump-sum settlement would not fall within the definitions of "income" found in the Principal and Income Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 30, par. 504) and the Senior Citizens and Disabled Persons Property Tax Relief and Pharmaceutical Assistance Act (Senior Citizens Act) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 67 1/2, par. 403.07). He further notes that, under section 104(a)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code, gross income specifically excludes "amounts received under workmen's compensation acts as compensation for personal injuries or sickness" (26 U.S.C.A. § 104(a)(1) (West 1988)).

Initially, we note that section 706.1 of the Marriage Act governs the withholding of income in order to secure payment of support. The definition of income found therein is intended to define the term for the purposes of that section only; there is no indication that it is intended to define the term for any other purpose of the Marriage Act.

As for respondent's argument that we should look to the definitions of "income" contained in other Illinois statutes and the Internal Revenue Code, we do not find these authorities persuasive regarding the issue before us. "[S]eparate acts with separate purposes need not define similar terms in the same way, but, rather, the same words may mean one thing in one statute and something different in another, depending upon the connection in which the word is used, the object or purpose of the statute and the consequences which probably will result from the proposed construction." (Mack v. Seaman (1983), 113 Ill.App.3d 151, 154, 68 Ill.Dec. 820, 446 N.E.2d 1217.) Review of the statutes cited by respondent reveals that their purposes are widely divergent from the purposes of the Marriage Act.

Section 3 of the Principal and Income Act provides that that act governs the ascertainment of income and principal in cases where a trust is established. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 30, par. 503.) The purpose of the Senior Citizens Act, as set forth in section 2, is to provide incentives to senior citizens and disabled persons in the areas of the acquisition and retention of private housing and to ease their property tax burden. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 67 1/2, par. 402.) With regard to the Internal Revenue Code, we consider it plainly evident that that Federal statute has a purpose different from the purpose of the Illinois Marriage Act. Not only do these statutes have different purposes, but, in addition, we cannot find in them any statements to indicate that their scope extends to the issues before us. In summary, it is clear that the aforesaid acts relied upon by respondent each have a purpose separate and distinct from each other and from the Marriage Act. Accordingly, they provide no assistance to us in revealing the meaning of "income" as utilized by the legislature in the Marriage Act. We find the statutory definitions invoked by respondent to be irrelevant to the issues before us.

Section 510(a) of the Marriage Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 40, par. 510(a)) allows for modification of a child support order upon a showing of a substantial change in circumstances. In deciding whether to modify a support order, the court must consider the same factors it weighs under section 505 of the Marriage Act (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 40, par. 505) when it formulates an original support order. (In re Marriage of Lyons (1987), 155 Ill.App.3d 300, 305, 108 Ill.Dec. 297, 508 N.E.2d 458.) Section 505 establishes a right of the court, incident to a marital dissolution, to impose on parents the obligation of child support and establishes various guidelines for determining the amount of child support. One of these guidelines provides that the court should determine a supporting parent's "net income," which is defined in section 505(a)(3) as "the total of all income from all sources," minus certain specified deductions. (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 40, par. 505(a)(3).) Resolution of the issue raised by respondent requires us to determine whether his worker's compensation award falls within the scope of this statutory definition of net income.

The rules of statutory construction require this court to determine and follow the intent of the legislature's acts. It is a cardinal rule of construction that the intent and meaning of a statute are to be determined from the entire statute, and all its sections are to...