Marriage of Gonzalez, In re

• Decision Date: 31 May 1985
• Citation: 214 Cal.Rptr. 634,168 Cal.App.3d 1021
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 54 A.L.R.4th 1195 In re the MARRIAGE OF Minerva GONZALEZ and Ernesto W. Gonzalez. Minerva GONZALEZ, Appellant and Cross-Respondent, v. Ernesto W. GONZALEZ, Respondent and Cross-Appellant. G000032.

Page 634

214 Cal.Rptr. 634

168 Cal.App.3d 1021, 54 A.L.R.4th 1195

In re the MARRIAGE OF Minerva GONZALEZ and Ernesto W. Gonzalez.

Minerva GONZALEZ, Appellant and Cross-Respondent, v. Ernesto W. GONZALEZ, Respondent and Cross-Appellant.

G000032.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 3, California.

May 31, 1985.

Certified for Partial Publication. ^*

[168 Cal.App.3d 1022] W. Michael Hayes, Orange, for appellant and cross-respondent.

Frank Moss, Costa Mesa, for respondent and cross-appellant.

OPINION

CROSBY, Associate Justice.

Both parties appeal from the interlocutory judgment dissolving their 22-year marriage and dividing the community property. In the published portion of our opinion, we examine and reject husband's claim that the court improperly awarded a term life insurance policy on his life to wife as her separate property.

I-II ¹

III

The court divided four life insurance policies. Each spouse received the whole life policy covering the other. In addition, the court determined two term policies on husband's life had no cash value but awarded one to each spouse. The term policy awarded to husband was described as a Veterans' Group Life Insurance Policy. The Prudential policy awarded to wife was originally a military policy but had been converted to an individual policy when husband retired and while the parties were still married. ² Although the record is silent on the point, we presume conversion was effected pursuant to 38 U.S.C. section 777(e). ³ Husband questions only the award of the Prudential policy to wife.

Husband first urges preemptive federal law mandates a finding the policy was his separate property. But the decisions on which he relies, Ridgway v. Ridgway (1981) 454 U.S. 46, 102 S.Ct. 49, 70 L.Ed.2d 39 and Wissner v. Wissner (1950) 339 U.S. 926, 70 S.Ct. 619, 94 L.Ed. 1348, are distinguishable. At the time the marriages in those cases were dissolved, the insured service members had not, as here, converted the group military policies to individual policies. Husband does not cite, nor have we found, any authority for the notion that converted service policies retain their separate character. Thus, in our view, the court properly determined the individual Prudential policy, concededly purchased during the couple's marriage with community funds, was community property.

Husband next argues the term life insurance policy should have been awarded to him, without an offsetting award of assets to wife, because it had no cash surrender value. The question is of some novelty. We have found little authority in this state treating with the divisibility of term life insurance policies in dissolution actions.

In the case of In re Marriage of Lorenz (1983) 146 Cal.App.3d 464, 194 Cal.Rptr. 237, the Court of Appeal confirmed husband's term life insurance policy and accrued vacation time, both acquired during marriage, as his separate property because the assets had no discernible "monetary value." The court did acknowledge "that certain intangible assets are property under community property statutes. (See for example, In re Marriage of Brown (1976) 15 Cal.3d 838 [126 Cal.Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561]: nonvested pension rights; In re Marriage of Forest (1979) 97 Cal.App.3d 850, 852 : contingent retirement benefits; In re Marriage of Mantor (1980) 104 Cal.App.3d 981 : ERISA retirement benefits.) However, each of those assets, although intangible, was acknowledged to have economical [sic ] monetary value. In order to qualify as property, within the meaning of our community property laws, an asset must be 'of such a character that a monetary value for division with the other spouse can ... be placed upon it.' (Todd v. Todd (1969) 272 Cal.App.2d 786, 791 .) [p] No such monetary value can be placed upon the assets claimed here by wife. The mere fact that these assets are of benefit to husband does not compel the conclusion that [they] must, or can, be divided." (Id., 146 Cal.App.3d at p. 467, 194 Cal.Rptr. 237.)

Lorenz is simply incorrect in the assertion that assets such as term life insurance and accrued vacation time have no economic value, particularly if the test is the amenability of the asset to valuation. For example, the Supreme Court has specifically held to the contrary in another context in the case of vacation time "When considering the meaning of the phrase 'vested vacation time' ... it is important to keep in mind the nature of vacation pay. It is established that vacation pay is not a gratuity or a gift, but is, in effect, additional wages for services performed. [Citations.]" (Suastez v. Plastic Dress-Up Co. (1982) 31 Cal.3d 774, 779, 183 Cal.Rptr. 846, 647 P.2d 122.) The court concluded, "The right to a paid vacation, when offered in an employer's policy or contract of employment, constitutes deferred wages for services rendered." (Id., at p. 784, 183 Cal.Rptr. 846, 647 P.2d 122.) There is no reason deferred wages cannot be commuted to present value and divided.

Similarly, pension rights "represent a form of deferred compensation for services rendered [citation], [and] the employee's right to such benefits is a contractual right, derived from the terms of the employment contract. Since a contractual right is not an expectancy but a chose in action, a form of property [citations] ... an employee acquires a property right to pension benefits when he enters upon the performance of his employment contract." (In re Marriage of Brown, supra, 15 Cal.3d 838, 845, 126 Cal.Rptr. 633, 544 P.2d 561.) Thus, pension benefits earned during the marriage, whether vested or not, comprise a community asset subject to division upon dissolution.

Why, then, should term life insurance be labeled a mere expectancy rather than property divisible upon dissolution? If ease of valuation has something to do with the definition of divisible community property, as Lorenz suggests, the Mona Lisa could not qualify because it is literally priceless. Yet it would be ludicrous to suggest such property should be awarded to one spouse without a corresponding credit to the other, however arbitrarily determined. But, apart from Lorenz, no California case appears to have examined the question of term life insurance directly. However, in Markey, California Family Law, Practice and Procedure, section 24.45[e], pages 24-55 and 24-56, the author notes. "Although there are no cases on the subject, it could be argued that policies are worth more than their cash surrender value, or in the case of term insurance, more than nothing, based on their replacement value. Replacement value may be significantly higher than cash surrender value in situations where the insurability of the insured is lessened because of advancing age or declining health, and the existing policy cannot be cancelled or contains a guaranty of insurability." (Id., at pp. 24-55 and 24-56.) Now there is a case on point, for we concur in Markey's view.

The issue did arise, albeit obliquely, in Biltoft v. Wootten (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 58, 157 Cal.Rptr. 581. There, premiums for husband's term insurance were deducted from his salary. The parties separated, and husband changed the beneficiary designation from his wife to his children. He died while the dissolution action was pending. One child claimed wife had no community interest in the proceeds of the policy because (1) "term insurance only provides insurance for each premium period and that therefore each premium payment is a new contract and purchases a new policy of insurance" (id., at p. 60, 157 Cal.Rptr. 581) and (2) "no person has an interest in a term life insurance policy beyond the date a premium is due, and ... if decedent had permitted the policy to lapse, [wife] would have no claim because no property right arises until the insured dies." (Id., at p. 61, 157 Cal.Rptr. 581.) The court disagreed, noting, "if the decedent had waited until separation to purchase the ... policy, it is unlikely that he would have been able to obtain coverage for the same premium on the same terms of eligibility. The rights of the beneficiaries with respect to this policy were dependent on the fact that the decedent secured the policy during the marriage. The decedent's community efforts for the 20 years prior to the separation maintained the policy in force." (Ibid.) Accordingly, wife was given a proportionate share of the proceeds based on the percentage of premiums paid from community earnings.

Concededly, the issue in Biltoft was whether wife, upon husband's death, was entitled to a share of the policy proceeds. But in dictum, the court also addressed the issue of division of a term life insurance policy in dissolution proceedings: "There is no reason, as daughter contends, for a trial court to retain jurisdiction until the policy owner dies. ...