Marriage of Harmon, In re

Citation133 Ill.App.3d 673,479 N.E.2d 422,88 Ill.Dec. 809
Decision Date30 May 1985
Docket NumberNo. 5-84-0676,5-84-0676
Parties, 88 Ill.Dec. 809 In re the MARRIAGE OF Martin Doyle HARMON, Petitioner-Appellant, and Terrie Lee Harmon, Respondent-Appellee.
CourtUnited States Appellate Court of Illinois

Gary W. Finch, Endicott & Finch, Carmi, H. Carroll Bayler, Louisville, for petitioner-appellant.

Brent D. Holmes, Harlan Heller, Ltd., Mattoon, for respondent-appellee.

KARNS, Justice:

Martin Harmon appeals from the judgment of the circuit court of Clay County which distributed property and fixed child support following dissolution of marriage to Terrie Harmon. Martin contends that the trial court erred when it failed to follow the substantive changes in the law of property disposition brought about by the amendments to section 503 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act, which were in effect when this cause was tried. Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 40, par. 503.

Effective August 19, 1983, section 503 of the Act was amended by Public Act 83-129, which enacted substantial changes which were ignored in the classification and disposition of property in the judgment of dissolution as initially entered. When the amendments to the Act were brought to the attention of the trial court, it conformed the judgment to the scheme of the Act as amended, but did not, in our opinion, follow the substantive requirements of section 503, as amended. See Ill.Ann.Stat., ch. 40, par. 503, Supp. to Historical and Practice Notes, at 46. (Smith-Hurd 1984).

The parties were married in 1977. They have two children, and Martin has custody of a child from a previous marriage. Martin owned extensive assets, consisting of real estate, cattle, farm and sawmill equipment, a home and bank accounts and personal items prior to the marriage. At the time of the marriage, Martin was indebted on contracts to purchase real estate. Terrie's non-marital property included a car, $200-$300 in a checking account, clothing and other personal items.

During their six year marriage, the parties acquired real estate approximating 255 acres, and incurred substantial additional debts. Improvements were made to marital and non-marital real estate. During the marriage many items of personal property and equipment were acquired by Martin or his corporation, M.D. Harmon, Inc. Both spouses contributed significantly to the successful operation of the corporate business. The record contains extensive and conflicting testimony, accounting reports and appraisals concerning the value of most marital and non-marital property. Many items of personal property do not appear to have been assigned a value. The parties invite us to enter an appropriate disposition under the power granted us by Supreme Court Rule 366(a)(5) (87 Ill.2d R. 366(a)(5)); however, we believe that this record presents a far too complex and contested matter to permit us either to affirm the judgment of the trial court or to make what we might consider appropriate adjustments thereto.

In its original judgment the trial court awarded Terrie $150,000 "in adjustment of her marital rights and contributions." This was based upon a specific finding that all property held by either party became marital property because of transmutation. (See Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 40, par. 503(c).) Following further argument on Martin's petition to modify or vacate judgment, the trial court's only action was to withdraw its finding of transmutation and affirm the award of $150,000 "as being based upon the wife's share of the marital property accumulated during the marriage and as fair reimbursement of the wife's share of the marital contributions made to the husband's non-marital property during the marriage." This we believe was an abuse of discretion, in that the amended act unequivocally requires that reimbursement for marital contributions must be traceable by clear and convincing evidence. Ill.Rev.Stat.1983, ch. 40, par. 503(c)(2).

The trial court was guided by our decision in In Re Marriage of Brown (5th Dist.1982), 110 Ill.App.3d 782, 66 Ill.Dec. 488, 443 N.E.2d 11, and in following Brown misapplied the law in effect at the time of the property disposition. Our court in Brown relied heavily on In Re Marriage of Smith (1981), 86 Ill.2d 518, 56 Ill.Dec. 693, 427 N.E.2d 1239 and In Re Marriage of Lee (1981), 87 Ill.2d 64, 58 Ill.Dec. 779, 430 N.E.2d 1030, in holding that the husband's one-half interest in partnership property acquired by gift, although non-marital property, was transmuted into marital property by commingling with marital property. In an opinion in a second appeal in the same case, however (which was filed after the original judgment in this case, but before the trial court's amended property disposition order), we recognized that Public Act 83-129 constitutes a legislative rejection of the rationale espoused in Smith and Lee. (In Re Marriage of Brown (5th Dist.1984), 127 Ill.App.3d 831, 833, 83 Ill.Dec. 5, 7, 469 N.E.2d 612, 614.) Even before the effective date of the amendments to section 503 of the Act, in In Re Marriage of Olson (1983), 96 Ill.2d 432, 71 Ill.Dec. 671, 451 N.E.2d 825, the supreme court said that Smith should not be read so strictly as to render the concept of non-marital property illusory. Every act of commingling or every use of marital funds for the maintenance of non-marital property should not work a transmutation. (96 Ill.2d 432, 440, 71 Ill.Dec. 671, 675, 451 N.E.2d 825, 829.) The amendments to the Act require a rejection of the concept of transmutation as set forth in Smith and Olson. See generally Feldman & Fleck, Taming Transmutation: A Guide to Illinois' New Rules on Property Classification and Division upon Dissolution of Marriage, 72 Ill.B.J. 336 (1984).

Feldman and Fleck in their authoritative article note that the new legislation was designed to provide workable standards to lend predictability and consistency to property dispositions following dissolution:

"It prevents the otherwise unavoidable transmutation of most nonmarital property by providing that, when marital funds are contributed to nonmarital property, the nonmarital property retains its...

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8 cases
  • Marriage of Jelinek, In re
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • April 12, 1993
    ... ... See Bentley v. Bentley, 84 Ill.2d at 97, 49 Ill.Dec. 295, 417 N.E.2d 1309; In re ... Page 1293 ... [184 Ill.Dec. 701] Marriage of Harmon (1985), 133 Ill.App.3d 673, 88 Ill.Dec. 809, 479 N.E.2d 422 ...         As to the trial judge's valuation of the other marital assets, such a decision will not be disturbed on appeal if the determination falls within the range testified to by the experts. (In re Marriage of Weinberg[244 ... ...
  • Marriage of Thacker, In re
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • June 28, 1989
    ... ... See Guerra, 153 Ill.App.3d at 559, 106 Ill.Dec. at 207, 505 N.E.2d at 754; In re Marriage of Harmon (1985), 133 Ill.App.3d 673, 676-77, 88 Ill.Dec. 809, 812, 479 N.E.2d 422, 425. See also In re Marriage of Clearman (1980), 85 Ill.App.3d 584, 588, 40 Ill.Dec. 958, 961, 407 N.E.2d 189, 192, appeal after remand (1981), 97 Ill.App.3d 641, 53 Ill.Dec. 91, 423 N.E.2d 283 ...         For the ... ...
  • Yeldell v. Yeldell, 87-351.
    • United States
    • D.C. Court of Appeals
    • December 22, 1988
    ... ... Mr. Yeldell made most of the mortgage payments during the marriage, from 1974 until 1986, but Mrs. Yeldell had owned the house since 1967, long before she was married. Mrs. Yeldell argues that because she owned the ... See In re Marriage of Thornton, 138 Ill.App.3d 906, 917-18, 486 N.E.2d 1288, 1296, 93 Ill.Dec. 453, 461 (1985); In re Marriage of Harmon, 133 Ill. App.3d 673, 675, 479 N.E.2d 422, 424, 88 Ill.Dec. 809, 811 (1985) ... 10. I.e., the wife's equity in the property as of the date of the ... ...
  • In re Marriage of Henke
    • United States
    • United States Appellate Court of Illinois
    • April 26, 2000
    ... ... Smith, 86 Ill.2d at 529, 56 Ill.Dec. 693, 427 N.E.2d 1239 ... In amending section 503(c) of the Act, the legislature rejected the presumption that commingled property always was transmuted to marital property. In re Marriage of Harmon, 133 Ill.App.3d 673, 675, 88 Ill.Dec. 809, 479 N.E.2d 422 (1985) ...         The instant case presents the opposite situation of that sought to be ameliorated by the amendment to section 503(c) of the Act, where a small amount of marital property was contributed to a large amount of ... ...
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