Marriage of Krause, In re

• Decision Date: 09 December 1982
• Docket Number: No. 82-20,82-20
• Citation: 200 Mont. 368,654 P.2d 963,39 St.Rep. 1809
• Parties: In re the MARRIAGE OF Barbara J. KRAUSE, Petitioner and Appellant, and Larry Krause, Respondent and Respondent.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

Page 963

654 P.2d 963

200 Mont. 368

In re the MARRIAGE OF Barbara J. KRAUSE, Petitioner and Appellant and Larry Krause, Respondent and Respondent.

No. 82-20.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs June 24, 1982.

Decided Sept. 23, 1982.

Rehearing Denied Dec. 9, 1982.

Stephens & Cole, Billings, for petitioner and appellant.

Gary L. Beiswanger, Billings, for respondent and respondent.

HARRISON, Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment of the District Court of the Thirteenth Judicial District, State of Montana, in and for the County of Yellowstone, dividing the marital assets of the parties. The wife appeals.

The parties were married on October 18, 1974, at Billings, Montana. It was the second marriage for both parties. There were no children born of the marriage, however, each of the parties has children from their previous marriage. Barbara Krause was trained to be a registered nurse but has not worked in that capacity since 1970. Larry Krause presently works as a petroleum engineer. In February of 1977, Barbara petitioned for a divorce. A decree of dissolution was signed by the District Judge on May 17, 1978. The decree did not make a property disposition, rather the District Court expressly reserved jurisdiction to make the disposition at a later date.

During the marriage the parties pooled their assets and made investments. Principally, they invested in oil and gas properties, three kinds of common stock, and real property located on the Boulder River. Only the above-mentioned assets were disputed at the trial; the parties having previously agreed on a division of the balance of the property.

By stipulation of the parties the District Court appointed a Special Master, a certified public accountant, for purposes of reporting to the Court on the following issues:

1. Ascertaining the net worth of the respective parties including a determination of all assets owned or acquired by the respective parties;

2. Determining those assets of the parties that were acquired during the course of the marriage and tracing the application of the premarital assets of the respective parties and their application for acquisition of marital assets or post-marital assets;

3. Providing a written report to the Court specifically determining the sources or derivation of the assets of the respective parties.

The Special Master completed his report on January 31, 1981. The report set out the original acquisition cost of the various properties and the contribution of each party. Also, the fair market value at or near the time of divorce is indicated and divided between the parties proportionate to the amount of their contribution at the time of acquisition. The pertinent part of the report is set out below:

                                                          Larry    Barbara
                                               Total     Krause     Krause
                                         ---------------------------------
                2000 shares Energy
                  Resources Stock        $  4,109.85   2,339.81   1,770.04
                Value 5/17/78              18,000.00  10,247.40   7,752.60
                300 Shares Continenatal
                  Group Stock               8,599.68   2,010.89   6,588.79
                Value 5/17/78               9,375.00   2,191.88   7,183.12
                100 Shares Simplicity
                  Pattern                   1,639.50     383.37   1,251.63
                Value 5/17/78               1,375.00     321.48   1,053.52
                Boulder Property           15,000.00   7,500.00   7,500.00
                Value 5/17/78              18,000.00   9,000.00   9,000.00
                Oil Properties             36,847.63  29,088.49   7,759.14
                Value 1/1/79               72,414.00  57,163.61  15,250.39
                Total Cost Values          66,169.66  41,322.56  24,869.60
                Total Fair Market
                Value @ 5/31/78          $119.164.00  78,924.37  40,239.63
                

On March 3, 1981, the property distribution part of their case was heard before the District Court. The court made findings of fact and conclusions of law on June 22 and entered its judgment on September 16.

The court awarded 65 percent of the interest in the oil and gas properties to Larry Krause and the balance to Barbara Krause; each was awarded 50 percent of the Boulder River property; and two of the common stocks, Energy Resources and Continental Group, were split 65 percent and 35 percent to Larry and Barbara respectively. The remaining stock, Simplicity Pattern, was awarded to Barbara. The petitioner, Barbara Krause, was unsatisfied with this distribution and appeals to this Court.

The appellant raises three issues: (1) whether the District Court erred in its consideration of non-monetary contributions; (2) whether the District Court erred by failing to value assets at the time of the dispositional hearing; and (3) whether there was a want of candor and disclosure regarding financial information relating to the oil and gas interests?

In relation to the first issue, the appellant contends that: (1) her husband's non-monetary contributions were wrongly considered as monetary contributions, and (2) that her non-monetary contributions were not considered. We do not agree with either assertion.

Regarding her first assertion she points to her husband's contribution to the oil and gas interests. During the marriage, Larry Krause was given the option to take a decrease in earnings in return for the opportunity to participate in working oil and gas interests. In 1975 he took a cut of $6.25 from his hourly consultants fee. Then in 1977 he took another cut of $2.90 per hour. These foregone earnings of the husband coupled with a cash contribution of the wife resulted in the acquisition of the oil and gas interests. The District Court found that the cost of acquiring these interests was $36,847; with $29,088 attributable to the husband's foregone earnings and $7,759 attributable to the wife's cash contribution.

The appellant/wife contends it is error to "give any monetary weight to non-monetary contributions..." In other words, she argues that the foregone earnings were non-monetary contributions and the District Court improperly assigned to them a dollar value.

In all of our previous cases when we spoke of non-monetary contributions we were referring to those contributions which are difficult to quantify in dollars and cents. For example, in Eschenburg v. Eschenburg (1976), 171 Mont. 247, 557 P.2d 1014, we noted that a marriage is much more than a business relationship, thus contributions to the 32-year marriage included raising four children, managing the household, entertaining at social activities, and volunteering services to activities related to the husband's career. In the case of Biegalke v. Biegalke (1977), 172 Mont. 311, 316, 564 P.2d 987, 990, non-monetary contributions of the wife included "wearing out her wedding band chopping wood, turning bales in the field, [and] chasing cattle on foot..." Again, in In Re Marriage of Kaasa (1979), 181 Mont. 18, 23, 591 P.2d 1110, 1113 non-monetary contributions were described as follows: "she helped move cattle out to pasture, hauled cattle by trucks, helped with branding, cooked for the crews raised chickens and was responsible for the family garden."

We believe it is these kinds of contributions that the legislature had in mind when they enacted section 40-4-202, MCA, which mandates consideration of "contribution[s] of a spouse as a homemaker or to the family unit." We do not intend to precisely define non-monetary contributions. Such determinations are the province of the District Court. We hold that the District Court properly considered the respondent's foregone earnings as monetary contributions toward the acquisition of the oil and gas interests. Indeed, they are measured accurately in dollars and cents and it is difficult to conceive of them as anything but monetary.

The appellant further contends that her non-monetary contributions were not considered. At the trial the appellant testified that during the term of the marriage she maintained the house, kept it clean, provided meals, did the shopping, cared for the children, did ironing, helped with lawn care, and was active in social functions related to the husband's business. Obviously these contributions are substantial. However, we find no error. This Court has stated innumerable times that the District Court had broad discretion in dividing the marital estate. "The test for reviewing the District Court's discretion is: Did the District Court in the exercise of its discretion act arbitrarily without employment of conscientious judgment, or exceed the bounds of reason in view of all the circumstances?" Converse v. Converse (1982), Mont., 645 P.2d 413, 415, 39 St.Rep. 887, 889; Levandowski v. Levandowski (1981), Mont., 630 P.2d 239, 38 St.Rep. 1002; In Re Marriage of Brown (1978), 179 Mont. 417, 587 P.2d 361; Zell v. Zell (1977), 174 Mont. 216, 570 P.2d 33. We find no error with the District Court in its evaluation of the various contributions to the marriage.

The appellant further contends "the court's findings did not address itself to the effect or the weight that was to be given Barbara's non-monetary contributions." Presumably the appellant considers such an omission as reversible error. We do not agree.

" 'Findings of fact and conclusions of law provide a foundation for the court's judgment. Marriage of Barron (1978), 177 Mont. 161, 580 P.2d 936. This foundation need not consist of a multitude of evidentiary facts, but the findings of fact must set forth a recordation of the essential and determining facts upon which the court rested its conclusions of law and without which the judgment would lack support. Jones v. Jones (1980), Mont., 620 P.2d 850, 37 St.Rep. 1973.' "

Converse, supra, 645 P.2d at 416, 39 St.Rep. at 890.

As the second issue, the appellant alleges error by the District Court in failing to consider the oil and gas interests properly. Error is alleged through a two-pronged argument, first, "for failure to consider the income that was derived from the marital oil and gas properties and, second; that the court erred in...