Marriage of Landry, In re, No. 51141-1

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Washington
• Writing for the Court: BRACHTENBACH; DOLLIVER
• Citation: 103 Wn.2d 807,699 P.2d 214
• Decision Date: 09 May 1985
• Docket Number: No. 51141-1
• Parties: In re the MARRIAGE OF Nancy M. LANDRY, Appellant, and William F. Landry, Respondent.

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103 Wn.2d 807 699 P.2d 214 In re the MARRIAGE OF Nancy M. LANDRY, Appellant,
and
William F. Landry, Respondent. No. 51141-1. Supreme Court of Washington,
En Banc. May 9, 1985.

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[699 P.2d 215] Marcia A. Mellinger, Seattle, for appellant.

Hennings, Maltman, Weber & Reed, Douglass A. North, Seattle, for respondent.

BRACHTENBACH, Justice.

This case involves the division of a military pension in an action to modify a final decree of dissolution. The wife appeals; the husband has not cross-appealed. We affirm.

The court in the original dissolution action entered findings of fact and conclusions of law on February 1, 1982. At that time, the parties had a negative net worth; the trial court in effect divided their debts. The husband was then a career officer in the Coast Guard. The wife worked. The trial court awarded maintenance and child support to the wife. Those matters are not in issue.

The husband was only a few months short of retirement. In thorough findings, the court refused to divide the husband's potential military pension; the court believed it was bound by the decision of McCarty v. McCarty, 453 U.S. 210, 101 S.Ct. 2728, 69 L.Ed.2d 589 (1981). The court went on to hold that if it were not bound by McCarty, it would have found 30 percent of the pension to be community property and 70 percent to be the husband's separate property. This finding was based upon evidence that the Landrys were domiciled in noncommunity property jurisdictions during 70 percent of the husband's military duty periods. The court stated that it would have awarded half of the community portion of the military pension to the wife and would also have considered the husband's separate property interest as divisible. However, it concluded that McCarty barred it from making any distribution of the

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pension to the wife. No appeal was taken from that decree.

After Congress passed the Uniformed Services Former Spouses' Protection Act (USFSPA), 10 U.S.C. § 1408 (1982), the wife moved, pursuant to CR 60(b), to reopen the decree of dissolution. Her motion was granted.

After a hearing, the court reopened the decree and applied the USFSPA. The pension had now become operative as the husband was retired and unemployed. The court again found a 30 percent/70 percent division between the community and separate property interests and awarded the wife one-half of the 30 percent community interest in the pension. The wife appealed.

The wife assigns no error to any finding of fact or any conclusion of law. Rather she contends that the trial court (1) failed to consider the relevant factors of RCW 26.09.080; (2) made a distribution which was not fair and equitable; and (3) failed to apply Washington law when it characterized the military pension.

We first make clear what is not before us in this case. The trial court's decision to reopen the decree is not before us. Application of the USFSPA to a decree entered before its passage is not before us. These issues are not before us because (1) the appellant assigned no error to any findings of fact or conclusions of law and (2) the respondent did not cross-appeal and thus raised no issues.

This leaves only two questions. First, did the trial court abuse its discretion in dividing the pension?

We once again repeat the rule that trial court decisions in a dissolution action will seldom be changed upon appeal. Such decisions are difficult at best. Appellate courts should not encourage appeals by...