Marriage of Meeks, In re

• Decision Date: 16 May 1996
• Docket Number: No. 95-154,95-154
• Citation: 53 St. Rep. 365,915 P.2d 831,276 Mont. 237
• Parties: In re the MARRIAGE OF Linda B. MEEKS, Petitioner and Appellant, and Alan R. Meeks, Respondent and Respondent.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

Page 831

915 P.2d 831

276 Mont. 237

In re the MARRIAGE OF Linda B. MEEKS, Petitioner and Appellant and Alan R. Meeks, Respondent and Respondent.

No. 95-154.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs Aug. 17, 1995.

Decided April 23, 1996.

Rehearing Denied May 16, 1996.

[276 Mont. 240] District Court of the Eighth Judicial District, In and for the County of Cascade; The Honorable Joel G. Roth, Judge Presiding.

Don A. LaBar, Church, Harris, Johnson & Williams, Great Falls, for Appellant.

J. Kim Schulke, Linnell, Newhall & Martin, Great Falls, for Respondent.

HUNT, Justice.

Appellant Linda B. Meeks (Linda) appeals the order of the Eighth Judicial District Court, Cascade County, which dissolved her marriage to Respondent Alan R. Meeks (Alan) and divided the marital property between the two parties.

Affirmed in part, reversed in part and remanded.

ISSUES

Linda alleged twenty-five separate errors in the District Court's division of the marital estate. The following restated issues are dispositive of this appeal:

1. Did the District Court err in granting Alan's motion for partial summary judgment, which excluded from the marital estate Alan's interest in a testamentary trust established by his father?

2. Did the District Court err in excluding from the marital estate the value of Alan's accrued vacation and sick leave?

3. Did the District Court err in adopting the farm appraisal offered by Alan's expert?

4. Did the District Court abuse its discretion by refusing to allow the record to remain open for the testimony of a rebuttal witness?

5. Did the District Court err by not including in the marital estate an additional thrift plan contribution made by Alan between September 30, 1994, and November 17, 1994, the date of trial?

6. Did the District Court err in ordering that the parties' legal fees and costs be paid out of the marital estate before division?

7. Did the District Court err in allocating the Meeks' farm to Alan, rather than dividing the farm between the parties?

8. Was the District Court's distribution of the marital property in this case clearly erroneous?

FACTS

Linda and Alan were married in 1968 and have one adult son. For the past 22 years, Alan has worked as a farm appraiser, while Linda has worked as a legal secretary, bookkeeper, tax preparer, and in several banks. Over the course of their 26-year marriage, the parties generated a marital estate worth approximately $1,000,000.

In 1994, Linda filed a petition to dissolve the marriage. Alan moved for partial summary judgment, asking the District Court to exclude from the marital estate his interest in a testamentary trust established by his father. This motion was granted.

After a further hearing in late 1994, the District Court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order dissolving the marriage and dividing the marital estate. Linda appealed the District Court's grant of summary judgment on the issue of the testamentary trust, as well as its division of the marital estate. Other facts will be provided as necessary.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The distribution of marital property in a dissolution action is governed by § 40-4-202, MCA, which provides in part:

In a proceeding for dissolution of a marriage, legal separation, or division of property following a decree of dissolution ... the court [shall], without regard to marital misconduct, finally equitably apportion between the parties the property and assets belonging to either or both, however and whenever acquired and whether the title thereto is in the name of husband or wife or both....

Section 40-4-202(1), MCA.

A district court's findings of fact regarding the division of marital property will be upheld unless the findings on which the division are based are clearly erroneous. In re Marriage of DeWitt (1995), 273 Mont. 513, ----, 905 P.2d 1084, 1087. If a district court's judgment is supported by substantial credible evidence, it will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion. In re Marriage of Griffin (1996), 275 Mont. 37, ----, 909 P.2d 707, 708 (citing In re Marriage of Maedje (1994), 263 Mont. 262, 868 P.2d 580).

The test for abuse of discretion is "whether the trial court acted arbitrarily without employment of conscientious judgment or exceeded the bounds of reason resulting in substantial injustice." In re Marriage of Tonne (1987), 226 Mont. 1, 3, 733 P.2d 1280, 1282 (quoting In re Marriage of Rolfe (1985), 216 Mont. 39, 45, 699 P.2d 79, 83). Moreover,

A District Court has broad discretion in determining the value of property in a In re Marriage of Robinson (1994), 269 Mont. 293, 296, 888 P.2d 895, 897 (citations omitted).

dissolution. Its valuation can be premised on expert testimony, lay testimony, documentary evidence, or any combination thereof. The court is free to adopt any reasonable valuation of [276 Mont. 243] marital property which is supported by the record. As long as the valuation of property in a dissolution is reasonable in light of the evidence submitted, we will not disturb the finding on appeal.

While the above is the general standard of review in marital estate division cases, other standards of review will be set out as is necessary to address the issues raised.

DISCUSSION

1. Did the District Court err in granting Alan's motion for partial summary judgment, which excluded from the marital estate Alan's interest in a testamentary trust established by his father?

Alan's father William A. Meeks, Sr. died in 1986, leaving a will which established a testamentary trust for the benefit of his wife (Alan's mother), and which named Alan and his brother as co-trustees. According to the terms of the will, the trustees have the power to invade the corpus only "if there are no other sources of funds reasonably available" for the maintenance of Alan's mother, and then only to the extent necessary "for her care, maintenance and support." Upon the death of Alan's mother, the trust will terminate and will be distributed in equal shares to Alan, his brother, and his sister.

The will also contains a spendthrift clause regarding the trust, which provides:

No title in the trust or trusts created in and by this will, or in the income therefrom, shall vest in any beneficiary, and neither the principal nor the income of any such trust estate shall be liable for the debts of any beneficiary, and no beneficiary shall have any power to sell, assign, transfer, encumber or in any other manner to anticipate or dispose of his or her interest in any such trust estate created by the terms of this will or the income produced thereby by the Co-Trustees to said beneficiary.

Based on the foregoing language, Alan moved for partial summary judgment, claiming that he has only a contingent remainder in the trust, and his interest therefore should not be considered part of the marital estate. The District Court agreed and granted the motion, excluding Alan's remainder interest in the trust from the marital estate.

Summary judgment is proper if no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Rule 56(c), M.R.Civ.P.; Vincelette v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. (1995), 273 Mont. 408, 903 P.2d 1374. In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court's standard of review is identical to that of the trial court and, in determining whether summary judgment was appropriate, we will use the same criteria employed by the trial court. Vincelette, 903 P.2d at 1376 (citations omitted).

Linda contends the grant of partial summary judgment in this case was in error. While she does not argue that a genuine issue of material fact exists, she contends the District Court erred as a matter of law in concluding that Alan's remainder in the trust is contingent. Linda maintains that Alan has a vested remainder in the testamentary trust which should be considered part of the marital estate and divided accordingly.

A contingent remainder is a right to property which may or may not vest in possession at some future date. Generally, a remainder will be considered contingent if the recipient is unknown or if the interest will only vest upon the occurrence of an event which is not certain to happen. A remainder will not be considered contingent if it can fairly be construed to be vested. 23 Thompson on Real Property, Thomas Edition (David A. Thomas, ed., 1994), 314 (citations omitted).

[A] vested remainder is one which is limited to an ascertained person in being, whose right to the estate is fixed and certain, and does not depend on the happening of any future event, but whose enjoyment and possession is postponed to some future time.... [A] vested remainder is not rendered contingent by the fact that it may never vest in possession.

23 Thompson on Real Property, 325-26 (citations omitted).

Alan is an ascertainable person in being whose right to a share of the remainder of the testamentary trust is not dependent upon the occurrence of some future event. Rather, he is sure to inherit so long as two given events do not occur. Alan will lose his remainder interest if he dies before his mother, or if the entire trust corpus is used for his mother's maintenance and care before her death. Only these events will serve to divest him of his remainder interest.

It therefore follows that, absent additional conditions, Alan's interest in the testamentary trust would be classified as a vested remainder, subject to divestment. Such classifications, however, are not necessarily controlling regarding how a remainder interest should be treated. When such interests are created by a will, the testator's intent also must be considered.

When construing a will, the cardinal rule is that the intent of the testator must be effected if it is not contrary to the law or to public policy. Matter of Estate of Bennett (Colo.App.1989), 789 P.2d 446. See also Allen v. Shea (1983), 105 Idaho 31, 665 P.2d 1041; In re Estate of Larsen (Utah 1982), ...