Marriage of Perlmutter, In re
| Court | Appellate Court of Illinois |
| Writing for the Court | BOWMAN |
| Citation | Marriage of Perlmutter, In re, 587 N.E.2d 609, 225 Ill.App.3d 362, 167 Ill.Dec. 340 (Ill. App. 1992) |
| Decision Date | 10 February 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 2-91-0254,2-91-0254 |
| Parties | , 167 Ill.Dec. 340 In re MARRIAGE OF Kathryn PERLMUTTER, Petitioner-Appellee, and Norman Perlmutter, Respondent-Appellant. |
Rehearing Denied March 19, 1992.
Mary Ellen Dienes, Chicago, Roger A. White, Roger A. White & Associates, Ltd., Lake Bluff, and Don H. Reuben, argued, Winston & Strawm, Chicago, for Norman Perlmutter.
Sarane C. Siewerth, Donald C. Schiller, argued, Arnold B. Stein, Schiller, DuCanto & Fleck, Ltd., Chicago, Timothy M. Daw and Stephen H. Katz, Schiller, DuCanto & Fleck, Ltd., Lake Forest, for Kathryn Perlmutter.
Respondent, Norman Perlmutter (Norman), appeals from several orders entered by the circuit court of Lake County relating to issues surrounding the dissolution of his marriage to petitioner, Kathryn Perlmutter (Kathryn). Norman alleges the following instances of error: (1) the trial court's classification and valuation of marital and nonmarital property was improper; (2) the court's distribution of marital property was improper; (3) the court's child support award was excessive and therefore improper; and (4) the court, as evidenced by various acts and orders, was biased and prejudiced against Norman.
The parties were married on January 20, 1978, and had two children during their marriage. Kathryn filed her petition for dissolution of marriage on October 21, 1987. After a lengthy trial, the trial court rendered a written letter opinion on July 27, 1990, and entered a written judgment of dissolution in conformity with the letter opinion on September 12, 1990. The court in its September 12 order also granted leave to the parties to file petitions for attorney fees. On October 10, 1990, the trial court amended its September 12 order and otherwise denied the parties' post-trial motions to reconsider. On October 12, 1991, Norman filed a notice of appeal from the orders of September 12 and October 10. This court, on October 30, 1990, dismissed Norman's appeal for want of a final and appealable order. On February 28, 1991, pursuant to and in conformance with a written letter opinion, the trial court entered an additional money judgment against Norman for attorney fees and sanctions. Norman filed his notice of appeal on the same day. Kathryn also filed a notice of cross-appeal, but she has not pursued the matter.
The total value of the property involved in this case appears to be well over $20 million. The record on appeal fills eight boxes. Due to the nature of the case, and due also to the fact that Norman has provided us with an argumentative statement of facts (see 134 Ill.2d R. 341(e)(6)), we will summarize those facts necessary to resolve the issues presented as those issues are addressed.
We first consider Norman's contention that the trial court's classification and valuation of certain marital and nonmarital property was improper. Section 503 of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act (Act) (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 40, par. 503) sets forth the guidelines to be consulted in determining whether property is classified as marital or nonmarital. In this regard, section 503 provides in pertinent part as follows:
" § 503. Disposition of property. (a) For purposes of this Act, 'marital property' means all property acquired by either spouse subsequent to the marriage, except the following, which is known as 'non-marital property':
(1) property acquired by gift, legacy or descent;
(2) property acquired in exchange for property acquired before the marriage or in exchange for property acquired by gift, legacy or descent;
(3) property acquired by a spouse after a judgment of legal separation;
(4) property excluded by valid agreement of the parties;
(5) any judgment or property obtained by judgment awarded to a spouse from the other spouse;
(6) property acquired before the marriage;
(7) the increase in value of property acquired by a method listed in paragraphs (1) through (6) of this subsection, irrespective of whether the increase results from a contribution of marital property, non-marital property, the personal effort of a spouse, or otherwise, subject to the right of reimbursement provided in subsection (c) of this Section; and
(8) income from property acquired by a method listed in paragraphs (1) through (7) of this subsection if the income is not attributable to the personal effort of a spouse.
(b) For purposes of distribution of property pursuant to this Section, all property acquired by either spouse after the marriage and before a judgment of dissolution of marriage or declaration of invalidity of marriage, including non-marital property transferred into some form of co-ownership between the spouses, is presumed to be marital property, regardless of whether title is held individually or by the spouses in some form of co-ownership such as joint tenancy, tenancy in common, tenancy by the entirety, or community property. The presumption of marital property is overcome by a showing that the property was acquired by a method listed in subsection (a) of this Section." (Ill.Rev.Stat.1989, ch. 40, pars. 503(a), (b).)
A trial court's classification of property as marital or nonmarital will not be disturbed unless contrary to the manifest weight of the evidence. In re Marriage of Landfield (1991), 209 Ill.App.3d 678, 689, 153 Ill.Dec. 834, 567 N.E.2d 1061.
The trial court, in its July 27, 1990, letter opinion and September 12, 1990, judgment of dissolution, classified and distributed the parties' property as follows:
ITEM
Classified Nonmarital VALUE AWARDED TO
Finley Company Stock Proceeds $ 2,309,799 Kathryn
(less $28,000
reimbursement to
marital estate)
Sumac Residence No assigned value Kathryn
Jewelry No assigned value Kathryn
Egandale Residence $ 2,800,000 Norman
Wau Account $ 475,000 Norman
Sikes Account $ 515,000 Norman
(less $427,000
reimbursement to
marital estate)
Sikes Partnership Interest $ 131,000 Norman
La Salle Lake Investors Partnership $ 33,000 Norman
Ferrari Automobiles $ 325,000 Norman
Artwork $ 49,500 Norman
Chris Craft Stock $ 251,770 Norman
ITEM
Classified Marital VALUE AWARDED TO
Scott Street Residence (and forgiveness $ 1,150,000 Kathryn
from $911,000 note)
Snowmass Residence (subject to $987,000 $ 2,200,000 Kathryn
mortgage)
Midtown Bank Account $ 175,213 Kathryn
Midtown Bank Account $ 560,060 Kathryn
Mayfair Investment Account $ 543,000 Kathryn
Certain artwork $ 65,000 Kathryn
Forgiveness of obligation to reimburse $ 28,000 Kathryn
marital estate
Various automobiles No assigned value Kathryn
Slope 103 $ 13,000 Norman
UTV Stock $ 70,000 Norman
Certain artwork $ 44,000 Norman
B. Perlmutter loan $ 35,000 Norman
Interest in Heitman Financial, Ltd. $ 4,420,000 Norman
Interest in Mayfair Regent Hotel (New York) $ 6,350,000 Norman
Interest in remaining assets of HC No assigned value Norman
Partnership
Forgiveness of obligation to reimburse $ 1,127,193 Norman
marital estate for dissipation
Forgiveness of obligation to reimburse $ 427,000 Norman
marital estate from Sikes account
Forgiveness of obligation to reimburse $ 1,633,569 Norman
marital estate for improvements to
Egandale residence
Sheridan Road Condominium No assigned value Norman
Interest in sailboat No assigned value Norman
Various automobiles No assigned value Norman
The trial court, in order to achieve a 40% distribution of marital assets to Kathryn, then ordered Norman to pay to Kathryn the sum of $3,415,000, plus interest at the rate of 9% per annum. The court stated that Kathryn would be responsible for the mortgage on the Snowmass condominium. In its October 10, 1990, order, however, the trial court amended its September 12 judgment order to the effect that Norman would be responsible for the Snowmass mortgage and further that the $3,415,000 due to Kathryn from Norman would be reduced accordingly to $2,415,000.
Specifically, Norman contends that the trial court erred in the classification and valuation of certain property when it (1) found that his interest in H.C. Partnership was marital property; (2) found that, even if Norman's interest in H.C. Partnership was nonmarital, the individual assets of the partnership would qualify as marital property; (3) accepted Kathryn's experts' appraisal values for Heitman Financial, Ltd., and the New York Mayfair Regent Hotel; and (4) found that funds in various investment accounts were Kathryn's nonmarital property.
Norman first contends that H.C. Partnership was...
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