Marriage of Stephenson, In re

Decision Date19 December 1984
Citation209 Cal.Rptr. 383,162 Cal.App.3d 1057
PartiesIn re the Marriage of Beth and Roy E. STEPHENSON. Beth STEPHENSON, Appellant, v. Roy E. STEPHENSON, Appellant; Ronald Stephenson, Appellant; Pamela Stephenson, et al., Respondents. Civ. 67623.
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Jaffe & Clemens, Daniel J. Jaffe and Honey Kessler Amado, Beverly Hills, for respondent and appellant Roy E. Stephenson.

M.S. Rose, Los Angeles, for respondent and appellant Ronald Stephenson, and for claimants and respondents Ronald and Pamela Stephenson, Richard and Janet Brunson, and Lori Stephenson.

McCLOSKY, Associate Justice.

Petitioner Beth Stephenson (Beth) appeals and respondent Roy Stephenson (Roy) and claimant Ron Stephenson (Ron) cross-appeal from the further judgment of dissolution of marriage.

Roy and Beth were married on August 23, 1948. On April 27, 1979, they separated. 1 Thereafter, Beth filed a petition for the dissolution of their marriage and also filed complaints to quiet title to community property in name of joined parties.

Through these complaints Beth claimed the community had an interest in properties which Roy had purported to transfer to the named claimants. 2 Those claimants were the couple's children and the children's spouses. All claimants filed answers.

The trial court initially rendered an interlocutory judgment of dissolution and a final judgment of dissolution of marriage each of which provided that "[t]he sole issue determined by this Judgment is dissolution of the marriage. The Court reserves jurisdiction to determine all issues except the dissolution of marriage issue." (See In re Marriage of Lusk (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 228, 234-235, 150 Cal.Rptr. 63.)

Acting pursuant to a stipulation of the parties, the trial court appointed Judge Parks Stillwell, retired, to act as referee over the remaining issues of the petition for dissolution. (Code Civ.Proc., § 638.) After trial, the referee issued his findings of facts and conclusions of law which findings the trial court adopted in rendering its "Further Judgment Upon Reserved Issues After Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage Following Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law of Referee." From this judgment Beth appeals and Roy and Ron each cross-appeal.

BETH'S APPEAL
CONTENTIONS

Beth raises the following contentions: 3

1. "The uncontroverted facts disclose an absence of donative intent to make a gift accompanied by irrevocable divesture of control.

2. "The absence of written consent by appellant entitled her to set aside the "gifts" to respondent-claimants.

3. "Funds in the two (2) First Federal accounts awarded to respondent-claimants are not traceable to the custodial accounts.

4. "The sum of $123,830.62 was erroneously awarded to claimants.

5. "The award to respondent-claimant Cathy Sonnenberg is inconsistent with the record.

6. "Equalizing distribution of UGMA funds was erroneous."

I

Beth first contends that "the uncontroverted facts disclose an absence of donative intent to make a gift accompanied by irrevocable divesture of control."

In the period commencing on April 5, 1967, and ending on December 9, 1979, Beth and Roy opened up 16 "custodial savings accounts" on behalf of their then minor children. 4

The referee found that these accounts "were opened for the children of Petitioner [Beth] and Respondent [Roy] under the California Uniform Gift[s] to Minors Act (UGMA), utilizing, in each instance, community funds.... [Beth] was aware of, consented to, and to the extent indicated, participated in the opening of said accounts." Those findings traced funds withdrawn from the custodial accounts to the purchases of stock in the "Mountain Mushroom Company," to loans to Janet, to loans to relatives of petitioner and to certificates of deposit. The referee also found that "it was the intent of [Beth and Roy] when opening the UGMA accounts, to benefit each of their four (4) children equally."

Based upon these findings, the trial court in its further judgment provided that the above gifts "conveyed to [the claimants] indefeasibly vested legal title" to that community property in equal shares.

Because the trial court's award to the claimants is premised upon the character of the original custodial savings account, the validity of the award depends upon whether those accounts created indefeasibly vested title in the claimants.

The California version of the Uniform Gifts to Minors Act (UGMA) is embodied in Civil Code section 1154, et seq. 5 The purpose of this act is to provide a simple, inexpensive and nonexclusive method for making gifts to minors. (See 3 Witkin, Summary of Cal.Law (8th ed. 1973) Personal Property, § 97, p. 1694; § 1163, subd. (b).)

Section 1156, subdivision (a)(3), provides in pertinent part: "An adult person may, during his lifetime, make a gift of ... money, ... to a person who is a minor on the date of the gift: [p] ... by paying or delivering it to a broker or a financial institution, for credit to an account in the name of the donor, ... followed, in substance, by the words: 'as custodian for ______ (Name of minor) under the California Uniform Gifts to Minors Act.' "

Section 1157, subdivision (a) provides: "A gift made in a manner prescribed in this article is irrevocable and conveys to the minor indefeasibly vested legal title to the custodial property given, but no guardian of the minor has any right, power, duty or authority with respect to the custodial property except as provided in this article."

Beth first urges that several of the subject custodial accounts do not comport with the requirements for opening up a UGMA account.

Three of the accounts were not originally designated under the UGMA. 6 Those three accounts all essentially provided "Roy E. Stephenson custodian for: Lori Stephenson." Those accounts were later designated as "Roy E. Stephenson as custodian for Lori Stephenson, under California Uniform Gifts to Minors account [sic]." This comports with the requirements for creating a UGMA account and we therefore Beth next urges that the accounts which are designated under the UGMA could not validly divest her of her community property interest because: (1) the controlling factor in opening them up was to obtain advantageous tax treatment, (2) the evidence demonstrates a lack of donative intent and (3) the uncontested findings of the referee establish that Roy never relinquished control of the funds placed in the accounts.

reject Beth Stephenson's assertion to the contrary.

The two basic elements of a gift made by a means other than the UGMA are (1) the intention of the donor to make a voluntary transfer to the donee, and (2) a delivery, actual or constructive, by the donor to the donee or to someone on his behalf. (Berl v. Rosenberg (1959) 169 Cal.App.2d 125, 130, 336 P.2d 975.) The UGMA eliminated the requirement of a transfer. ( § 1156, subd. (c).) The donor must still, however, have a donative intent.

In Gordon v. Gordon (1979) 70 A.D.2d 86, 419 N.Y.S.2d 684, affd. 52 N.Y.2d 773, 436 N.Y.S.2d 621, 417 N.E.2d 1009, the court determined that the opening of a bank account pursuant to the UGMA was prima facie evidence of the donor's donative intent, which evidence could be rebutted by extrinsic evidence. The court further determined that the provision in the act which states that "a gift made in the manner so prescribed is 'irrevocable and conveys to the minor indefeasibly vested legal title to' the property" (see § 1157, subd. (a)), presupposes that there was a gift in the first instance.

Following similar reasoning, the court in In re Marriage of Jacobs (1982) 128 Cal.App.3d 273, 180 Cal.Rptr. 234, upheld the trial court's factual determination that the husband lacked donative intent in purportedly setting up UGMA accounts for the couple's children. The evidence upon which the court based its determination was that the husband had placed the money into the accounts to avoid adverse tax consequences and that the parties treated the money in the account as their own.

Beth too urges that the evidence in the case at bench proves that Roy had no donative intent, referring to evidence that Roy opened up the subject accounts to avoid adverse tax consequences and that Roy treated the funds in the accounts as his own prior to the dissolution proceedings. " '[I]ntent' and 'purpose' [, however,] are ordinarily questions of fact to be determined by the trial court." (Platt v. Wells Fargo Bank (1963) 222 Cal.App.2d 658, 664, 35 Cal.Rptr. 377.)

While in Jacobs similar evidence was held sufficient to affirm the trial court's factual determination that there was an absence of donative intent, it did not establish as a matter of law that no such intent existed. We adopt the reasoning of the Gordon court that the opening up of a bank account pursuant to the UGMA is prima facie evidence of donative intent. Accordingly, that evidence is sufficient to support the trial court's factual determination.

Beth next urges that "the findings of the trial court render erroneous its conclusions and order that the transfers were gifts."

"Where the findings are contradictory on material issues, and the correct determination of such issues is necessary to sustain the judgment, the inconsistency is reversible error." (4 Witkin, Cal.Procedure (2d ed. 1971) Trial, § 344, p. 3145.)

Beth focuses on the finding of the referee that "[u]ntil the separation of Petitioner and Respondent, all dividends from the Castle & Cooke, Inc. stock as well as the principal of and interest from all of the UGMA accounts, were spent, lent, and reinvested by Petitioner and Respondent. The share certificates, passbooks evidencing the accounts in savings institutions, and the promissory notes were, at all times, until separation, in the custody of Respondent."

Beth urges that this finding is irreconcilably inconsistent with the...

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