Marriage of Taylor, In re

Decision Date29 July 1981
Citation122 Cal.App.3d 209,175 Cal.Rptr. 716
CourtCalifornia Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
PartiesIn re the Marriage of Nancy Y. TAYLOR, Petitioner, Respondent and Cross- Appellant, v. Joel E. TAYLOR, Respondent, Appellant and Cross-Respondent. Civ. 61286.

Julian B. Fensten, Los Angeles, and Bruce Gelber, Beverly Hills, for respondent, appellant and cross-respondent.

Turner, Gerstenfeld, Wilk & Tigerman, and Stanley M. Clark, Beverly Hills, for petitioner, respondent and cross-appellant.

BEACH, Associate Justice.

NATURE OF CASE :

Husband appeals from judgment adjudicating amount of arrearage of child support upon foreign judgment. We affirm.

ISSUE :

The issue presented by this appeal is whether the termination date for support payments as to each of the four minor children is age 18 under California law or age 21 under Missouri law.

FACTS :

Wife (respondent) obtained a divorce in Missouri in 1972. The Missouri judgment ordered husband to pay "$112.50 per month as and for the support of each of said minor children, making a total of $450.00 per month for child support." Husband is now a California resident and wife is a resident of Virginia.

In April 1979, wife "registered" the Missouri judgment in California as permitted under the provisions of California Code of Civil Procedure section 1698.3, a part of the Revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act of 1968 (Code of Civ.Proc. §§ 1650-1699) as amended (hereinafter, the act). Husband filed his "obligee's objections" to the statement of registration filed by wife. Thereafter, wife noticed a motion to compute arrearage of the child support and request for attorney's fees. Husband filed his response. He claimed that he was not obligated to pay for any child over the age of 18 years and that any such payment made by him should be credited against any remaining obligation of child support. Husband also claimed credit for certain loans.

After husband's response was filed, a hearing was held and thereafter the court confirmed the Missouri judgment as a California judgment and ordered husband to pay the arrearage of $5,625 and to continue to pay support for the children who remained minors. The amount determined due included payment of support for two of the minors who had reached age 18 but were under 21. It denied wife's request for attorney's fees. On appeal the mathematical computation of the amount of arrearage is not contested by husband. Only the issue of age of majority is presented. Husband's obligation would be accordingly reduced if the age of majority were found to be 18 years.

HUSBAND'S CONTENTIONS :

Husband contends that because for nearly all of the time since the Missouri divorce, he has been and now is a California resident, his duty of support is governed by the California law and the duty to support his minor children ends when any such child reaches 18 years of age.

DISCUSSION :

I

Basically we are dealing with a judgment of a sister state. That judgment must be given full faith and credit by California. (U.S.Const., art. IV, § 1.)

The matter at bench involves the same factual and legal issues presented to the court in Biewend v. Biewend (1941) 17 Cal.2d 108, 109 P.2d 701. There the divorced wife sought to enforce in California a Missouri judgment which awarded her alimony and child support payments. That part of the support order constituting her alimony would have been terminated under California law because of her subsequent remarriage, if the support order had been a California judgment. In expressly upholding the trial court's order enforcing the entire judgment, including wife's support, the Supreme Court in Biewend said: "An order for the payment of (support) rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction in one state must be recognized by all other states under the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution (Art. IV § 1) as to all accrued installments not subject to modification by the court rendering the original order.... (Citations.) (P) "Only if such accrued payments are still subject to modification may recovery be denied. " (Id. at pp. 110-111, 109 P.2d 701; see also Elkind v. Byck (1968) 68 Cal.2d 453, 67 Cal.Rptr. 404, 439 P.2d 316.)

At bench, analyzing Missouri law with respect to the Missouri judgment, the law of that state provides that: "(T)he provisions of any decree respecting support may be modified only as to installments accruing subsequent to the motion for modification and only upon a showing of changed circumstances so substantial and continuing as to make the terms unreasonable." (Vernon's Annotated Missouri Statutes § 452.370(1). See also Brown v. Brown (Mo.App.1976) 537 S.W.2d 434, 437 and compare California Civil Code § 4700(a).)

Under Missouri law, arrearage accrued under a judgment for the support of minors which has accrued after they are 18 or over but before the age of 21 is unmodifiable by the courts of that state. As to such accrued part of any judgment, it must be granted full faith and credit by the courts of this state. The support of minor children ordered by a court of the state of Missouri, under the law thereof, must be paid until age 21 or emancipation under the common law rule. (See Martin v. Martin (Mo.App.1976) 539 S.W.2d 756.)

The record at bench discloses no emancipation and no modification of the Missouri judgment. Nor is failure to modify in the present action an issue at bench. Husband has expressly disclaimed any issue of modification. He contends only that the law of California describing minors should be applied rather than the law of Missouri. But as we have explained above, under the federal constitutional demand for full faith and credit that must be accorded to the Missouri judgment, his contention is untenable.

It is significant that we are dealing exclusively with the accrued payments and not with future payments under the support order. As indicated, no issue for modification which would affect future payments has been presented to us. Therefore, we are not concerned with any different rule which might possibly apply under the doctrine of comity and which would allow the court of California to enforce the sister state support order with respect to future payment, but also permits the local California court to modify the support order under appropriate factual circumstances presented to the trial court. (Biewend v. Biewend, supra, 17 Cal.2d 108, 109 P.2d 701.

Husband nonetheless contends that the rule or at least the effect of Biewend v. Biewend, supra, has been modified if not replaced by the revised Uniform Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, enacted subsequent to the Biewend case. At bench wife registered her Missouri judgment as permitted by sections 1697-1698.3 inclusive of the act. Thus, seemingly the action is one to enforce a duty of support through the various procedures described in the act; and husband contends the duty of support sought to be enforced is that duty described by the act in Code of Civil Procedure section 1670. That section reads, "Duties of support applicable under this title are those imposed under the laws of any state where the obligor was present for the period during which support is sought. The obligor is presumed to have been present in the responding state during the period for which...

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11 cases
  • Marriage of Lurie, In re, B079163
    • United States
    • California Court of Appeals
    • February 28, 1995
    ...payments to the husband's children. The final decision which the trial court relied on here was In re Marriage of Taylor (1981) 122 Cal.App.3d 209, 175 Cal.Rptr. 716 (hereafter "Taylor"). Taylor arose from similar facts and Barbara contends that the trial court misinterpreted the decision a......
  • Weekley v. Weekley, No. 20844
    • United States
    • Supreme Court of South Dakota
    • December 29, 1999
    ...URESA recognizes the entry of more than one valid child support judgment throughout the several states. See In re Marriage of Taylor, 122 Cal.App.3d 209, 175 Cal.Rptr. 716, 719-20(1981) (URESA's purpose is not to minimize or curtail effects of valid judgment of the several states even thoug......
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    • October 19, 1982
    ...... our determination are as follows: On June 16, 1961, a final judgment of divorce was filed in the State of California which dissolved the marriage of William F. Deinhard, Jr. (appellant) and Marjorie Ann Deinhard (appellee). The judgment incorporated the terms of an interlocutory decree which ...Cohen, 158 Fla. 802, 30 So.2d 307 (1947); Biewend v. Biewend, 17 Cal.2d 108, 109 P.2d 701 (1941); Taylor v. Taylor, 122 Cal.App.3d 209, 175 Cal.Rptr. 716 (1981). Nor is this rule changed simply because the rendering state has not adjudicated the amount ......
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    • United States
    • Court of Appeal of Missouri (US)
    • November 16, 1982
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