Marriage of Vomacka, In re

• Citation: 36 Cal.3d 459,204 Cal.Rptr. 568,683 P.2d 248
• Decision Date: 16 July 1984
• Docket Number: S.F. 24672
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: , 683 P.2d 248 In re the MARRIAGE OF Joyce and William VOMACKA. William VOMACKA, Appellant, v. Joyce VOMACKA, Respondent.

Page 568

204 Cal.Rptr. 568

36 Cal.3d 459, 683 P.2d 248

In re the MARRIAGE OF Joyce and William VOMACKA William VOMACKA, Appellant, v. Joyce VOMACKA, Respondent.

S.F. 24672.

Supreme Court of California In Bank.

July 16, 1984.

Robert Vatuone, San Jose, J.C. Borgman, Walnut Creek, for appellant.

R. Kent Brewer, Hyde & Brewer, Walnut Creek, for respondent.

REYNOSO, Justice.

Does a trial court have jurisdiction to extend spousal support payments past a date it has specified as the last opportunity the supported spouse may request such payments? Specifically, we are asked to determine whether the trial court in this case had jurisdiction to modify its interlocutory judgment of dissolution of the parties' marriage to extend spousal support past September 1, 1984, pursuant to the following language of the interlocutory decree: "The Court shall retain jurisdiction regarding spousal support until September 1, 1984, at which time [wife's] right to request spousal support from [husband] shall terminate forever." For the reasons discussed below, we conclude that the trial court did have jurisdiction to extend spousal support beyond the specified date.

I

William and Joyce Vomacka, in a proceeding held on August 24, 1979 and with the advice of counsel, stipulated in open court to the provisions and entry of an interlocutory judgment of dissolution of marriage. The interlocutory decree, filed by the court on October 11, 1979, divided their community property, provided for the custody and support of their children, and awarded spousal support as follows: "[William] shall pay to [Joyce], as and for spousal support, the sum of Two Hundred Seventy-five Dollars ($275.00), ... commencing September 1, 1979 to continue each month thereafter until further order from the Court, the death of either party, the remarriage of [Joyce], or August 1, 1982, whichever first occurs. The Court shall retain jurisdiction regarding spousal support until September 1, 1984, at which time [Joyce's] right to request spousal support from [William] shall terminate forever." (Emphasis added.)

On June 29, 1982, Joyce obtained an order to show cause seeking, inter alia, to modify the spousal support provision in the interlocutory decree. William filed a responsive declaration on August 27, 1982, following a July 29, 1982 stipulation of the parties that William would pay Joyce support pending the hearing, retroactive to August 1, 1982. The matter was heard on September 3, 1982 before a second judge who filed his notice of intended decision on October 7, 1982. That notice provided that William would be required to continue paying Joyce spousal support, increased to $600 per month, "... until the death of either party, remarriage of [Joyce], or until further order of the court." Since this intended decision would permit Joyce to receive spousal support beyond the date specified as her last opportunity to request such support, the notice of intended decision made the following explanation: "To find from an agreement that there is a termination of spousal support, the Court must find explicit language of such termination. The alleged termination provision herein is not sufficiently explicit to find such termination (purports to terminate respondent's right to ask for additional support; does not address itself explicitly to the termination of support). Thus, the Court finds that there is no absolute termination herein on September 1, 1984. (See In re the Marriage of Moore (198 ) 113 Cal.App.3d 22, 169 Cal.Rptr. 619.)"

On March 3, 1983, the trial court issued its order modifying spousal support and other provisions of the interlocutory decree. William appeals from that portion of the order which states: "That paragraph 2 of the Interlocutory Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage is modified to state: [p] [William] shall pay to [Joyce], as and for spousal support, the sum of Six Hundred Dollars ($600.00) per month, ... and, pursuant to the stipulation filed July 27, 1982, commencing August 1, 1982. Said support shall continue until the death of either party, remarriage of [Joyce], or until further order of the Court." (Emphasis added.)

II

William contends that the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction in modifying the interlocutory judgment to extend spousal support payments beyond September 1, 1984. He argues that this decision was contrary to the parties' agreement and, therefore, in violation of Civil Code section 4811, subdivision (b) ¹, which permits the parties to agree that the provisions of any agreement or order for the support of either party shall not be subject to subsequent modification or revocation by court order. To uphold the trial court's modification order, William asserts, would frustrate the policy of the law favoring settlements and would generate the uncertainty for which section 4801, subdivision (d), discussed below, was enacted to prevent. Since the trial court was without jurisdiction over the subject matter of spousal support after September 1, 1984, William continues, its decision extending support past that date violated constitutional due process standards. William also argues that the trial court's reliance on In re Marriage of Moore (1980), 113 Cal.App.3d 22, 169 Cal.Rptr. 619, is misplaced.

Joyce responds that the interlocutory decree permitted an extension of spousal support beyond September 1, 1984, if requested before that date, and is consistent with the parties' desire to see if Joyce could become self-supporting. She argues that where, as here, an order regarding the period of time for which a court can extend spousal support is vague, it is to be construed in favor of the fundamental jurisdiction of the court to act. She therefore asserts that the modification order properly extends her support beyond September 1, 1984 since she made a timely request for such modification pursuant to the interlocutory decree.

William's first argument that the trial court's modification order is contrary to the parties' agreement, is based in part on his assertion that the language of the interlocutory decree evidences a clear intent of the parties that both the court's jurisdiction to extend spousal support, and Joyce's right to request such support, terminate absolutely on September 1, 1984. He maintains that the concluding clause of the original decree's jurisdictional provision--"at which time respondent's right to request spousal support from petitioner shall terminate forever"--merely states an obvious consequence of terminating the trial court's jurisdiction on September 1, 1984. William claims that by construing the interlocutory decree to permit the court to extend spousal support beyond September 1, 1984, the trial court impermissibly departed from the plain meaning of the parties' stipulated agreement and inserted a term not found therein (citing Apra v. Aureguy (1961) 55 Cal.2d 827, 830, 13 Cal.Rptr. 177, 361 P.2d 897 [pronouncing general rule that " 'courts are not empowered under the guise of construction or explanation to depart from the plain meaning of the writing and insert a term or limitation not found therein.' " (Citation omitted.) ] ) He relies on the well-established legal principle that " 'in the absence of fraud or mistake, the intention of the parties as expressed in the agreement is controlling' " (ibid.), and on "the law's general policy favoring settlements" (Fletcher v. A.J. Industries, Inc. (1968) 266 Cal.App.2d 313, 325, 72 Cal.Rptr. 146), particularly property and family settlements (Adams v. Adams (1947) 29 Cal.2d 621, 624, 177 P.2d 265; McClure v. McClure (1893) 100 Cal. 339, 343, 34 P. 822). As discussed below, William's argument is not supported by the record.

In lieu of a court award of spousal support, a property settlement agreement providing for such support may be entered into by a husband and wife. Such agreements are favored, subject to the scrutiny and approval of the court and, if approved, will be incorporated into the interlocutory judgment. (6 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (8th ed. 1974) Husband and Wife, § 189, p. 5057.) Section 4811, subdivision (b) provides in pertinent part that such court-approved spousal support agreements are subject to subsequent modification by court order "except to the extent that any written agreement, or, if there is no written agreement, any oral agreement entered into in open court between the parties, specifically provides to the contrary." (Emphasis added.) ²

Essentially, it is William's position that the modification order impermissibly modified the parties' written spousal support agreement as set forth in the interlocutory decree, as well as their oral agreement entered into in open court that the court's jurisdiction regarding spousal support terminate absolutely on September 1, 1984. However, as the trial court properly concluded, apparently in light of section 4811, subdivision (b), "to find from an agreement that there is a termination of spousal support, the Court must find explicit language of such termination. The alleged termination provision herein is not sufficiently explicit to find such termination ..." (See In re Marriage of Hufford (1984) 152 Cal.App.3d 825, 834-835, 199 Cal.Rptr. 726.) Contrary to William's assertions, the modification order may be viewed consistently with the language of the decree, and William has proffered no evidence to negate this consistency. ³ Moreover, the record on appeal does not contain a transcript of the trial court proceedings, presumably waived by the parties, and therefore contains no reference to the oral statements of the parties during any of the dissolution proceedings. (Cf. In re Marriage of Wright (1976) 54 Cal.App.3d 1115, 126 Cal.Rptr. 894 [holding that § 4811, subd. (b) precludes the admission of extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent that their spousal support agreement be nonmodifiable, in the absence of a written agreement to that effect or an oral agreement entered...