Marro v. Daniels

• Decision Date: 21 November 1995
• Docket Number: No. 67752,67752
• Citation: Marro v. Daniels, 914 S.W.2d 16 (Mo. App. 1995)
• Parties: Fred MARRO, Deputy Receiver for Consumers United Insurance Company, Inc. in Rehabilitation, Plaintiff/Respondent, v. Leora DANIELS and J.V.L. Housing Corporation, Defendants/Appellant.
• Court: Missouri Court of Appeals

Page 16

914 S.W.2d 16

Fred MARRO, DeputyReceiver for Consumers United Insurance Company, Inc. in Rehabilitation, Plaintiff/Respondent, v.Leora DANIELS and J.V.L. Housing Corporation, Defendants/Appellant.

No. 67752.

Missouri Court of Appeals, Eastern District Division Four.

Nov. 21, 1995.

Motion for Rehearing and/or Transfer to

Supreme Court Denied Jan. 17, 1996.

Application to Transfer Denied

Feb. 20, 1996.

The Stolar Partnership, Charles Alan Seigel, John B. Greenberg, St. Louis, for appellants.

Jones, Korum, Waltrip & Jones, Clayton, for respondent.

PUDLOWSKI, Judge.

J.V.L. Housing Corporation(J.V.L. Housing) appeals from an adverse judgment awarding landlord, Consumers United Insurance Company, rents due from 1992 through 1994 and possession of its property pursuant to the landlord-tenant statues, chapter 535 RSMo.The trial court found in favor of Consumers United Insurance Company(Consumers) and awarded it possession of the property and damages in the amount of $63,987.95.Defendant Daniels did not appeal.J.V.L. Housing argues the trial court erred in entering judgment against it because plaintiff failed to establish a landlord-tenant relationship existed between the parties.We find no error.The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

The standard of review applicable is enunciated in Rule 73.01andMurphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32(Mo. banc 1976).Kiefer v. First Capitol Sports Center, Inc., 684 S.W.2d 483, 487(Mo.App.1984).In a case tried without a jury, the appellate court defers to the trial court's determination unless there is no substantial evidence to support it, it is against the weight of the evidence or it erroneously declares or applies the law.Murphy, 536 S.W.2d at 32.The reviewing court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party, giving that party the benefit of all reasonable inferences and disregarding the other party's evidence except as it supports the judgment.Morrison v. Jack Simpson Contractor, Inc., 748 S.W.2d 716, 718(Mo.App.1988).In addition, we defer to the trial court's determination of the credibility of witnesses.Id.We recite the facts with this standard in mind.

Consumers filed an action to recover possession of its property and rents due from April 1991 to April 1994.Consumers claimed J.V.L. Housing and Daniels occupied the property and owed rent from April 1991 through April 1994.Cross-claims and counterclaims were filed in the suit but were severed before trial began.Defendant Daniels did not present any evidence at trial.The trial was very brief and sparse evidence was presented by both parties but the following facts were established.J.V.L., Inc., a not-for-profit corporation, is a separate and distinct corporation from appellant, J.V.L. Housing, and was not a party to the litigation.Both corporations do have the same president, Macler Shepard and the same property manager, John Tyler. Consumers was not aware that J.V.L., Inc. and J.V.L. Housing were distinct corporations until trial.In 1985, J.V.L., Inc. entered into a written lease with Consumers.That lease expired in 1987.The only evidence that J.V.L., Inc. continued in possession after expiration of the lease was presented by J.V.L. Housing's witness, Mr. Tyler.In its pleading, Consumers relied on the 1985 lease between itself and J.V.L., Inc. in alleging a landlord-tenant relationship with J.V.L. Housing.The record is not clear as to when J.V.L. Housing went into possession of the premises, but in its answer it admitted it was occupying part of the premises and doing business at that address.Consumers' business records indicate monthly rent payments accrued on the property in the amount of $1,467.50 per month.Rent payments were made through 1993 but the record does not indicate who made the payments.J.V.L. Housing's witness, Mr. Tyler, offered the only evidence on this issue and he claimed J.V.L., Inc. paid the rent.No canceled checks or bank statements were presented to prove this point.

In 1992, Consumers sent J.V.L. Housing a letter demanding delinquent rent from years past, offering to sell it the property and referencing the terms of the 1985 lease.J.V.L. Housing did not respond to the letter but continued to occupy the property.

At trial, J.V.L. Housing asked the court to take judicial notice of statements made in Daniels' severed cross-claim.¹The trial court, over Consumers' objection, took judicial notice of the legal file and all pleadings contained in it.The legal file contained J.V.L. Housing's severed cross-claim against Daniels in which it admitted it had the right to exclusive possession and control of the premises and that it had subleased part of the premises to Daniels in 1990.

At the start of trial, J.V.L. Housing moved to dismiss the suit alleging Consumers failed to state a claim because the 1985 lease, referred to in Consumers' petition, was with J.V.L., Inc., not J.V.L. Housing.Therefore, J.V.L. Housing was not a tenant of Consumers and could not be subject to suit under Chapter 535, RSMo.The trial court did not rule on the motion.The court found in favor of Consumers and awarded damages of $63,987.95 and possession of the premises.J.V.L. Housing motioned for a new trial raising the same argument presented in the motion to dismiss.It was denied and this appeal followed.

In J.V.L. Housing's sole point on appeal, it argues the trial court erred in finding for Consumers under Chapter 535, RSMo because Consumers did not establish a landlord-tenant relationship between the parties, a prerequisite for prevailing under the landlord-tenant statute.We find the facts viewed most favorably to upholding the decision establish a landlord-tenant relationship between Consumers and J.V.L. Housing.Therefore, J.V.L. Housing's argument is denied.

Much of J.V.L. Housing's argument hinges on a 1985 lease.Consumers' pleading alleged it entered into the lease with J.V.L. Housing in 1985 but the actual party to the lease was J.V.L., Inc. J.V.L. Housing argues the landlord-tenant relationship created by the 1985 lease foreclosed the possibility of a landlord-tenant relationship between Consumers and J.V.L. Housing in 1991.We disagree.J.V.L. Housing offered the 1985 lease into evidence and it showed J.V.L., Inc. was the lessee but the lease also stated a term of two years, which means it expired in 1987.The favorable evidence does not show the 1985 lease was extended or even that J.V.L., Inc. continued to occupy the property in 1991.The only evidence that J.V.L., Inc. continued as a tenant was the testimony of John Tyler, the property manager for J.V.L. Housing and J.V.L., Inc.His position, as a manager for both corporations, casts doubt on his credibility and it was within the trial court's discretion to disbelieve his testimony.This action is for rents accruing from 1991 to 1994 and the favorable evidence...