Marroquin v. Mutual Ben. Ins. Co.

• Citation: 404 Pa.Super. 444,591 A.2d 290
• Parties: Jose Luis MARROQUIN, Appellant, v. MUTUAL BENEFIT INSURANCE COMPANY.
• Decision Date: 14 June 1991
• Court: Superior Court of Pennsylvania

Page 290

591 A.2d 290

404 Pa.Super. 444

Jose Luis MARROQUIN, Appellant, v. MUTUAL BENEFIT INSURANCE COMPANY.

Superior Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued May 22, 1990.

Filed April 11, 1991.

Reargument Denied June 14, 1991.

Jonathan M. Crist, Harrisburg, for appellant.

Peter J. Speaker, Harrisburg, for appellee.

Before OLSZEWSKI, MONTEMURO and FORD ELLIOTT, JJ.

FORD ELLIOTT, Judge:

This is an appeal from the order of January 17, 1990, granting appellee's motion for summary judgment. Appellant argues that the trial court erred in finding that the "Family Car Exclusion" in a family member's underinsurance motorist policy prohibits recovery by a resident family member where the tortfeasor is another resident family member covered by his own policy of liability insurance separate and distinct from the policy under which the underinsurance motorist benefits are claimed. We reverse and remand.

On January 19, 1989, appellant, Jose Luis Marroquin, was injured when he was struck by an automobile owned and operated by his brother, Jorge Marroquin. At the time of the accident, both appellant and his brother resided with their parents. The parent's automobile policy was issued by appellee. This policy specifically covered two of their vehicles and provided liability coverage for family members. "Family member" was defined by the policy as any relative that lived in the same household as the named insured. Therefore, it is not disputed that appellant was insured under his parent's policy. The policy also included one hundred thousand dollars in underinsured motorist benefits.

In addition, at the time of the accident, Jorge Marroquin, the tortfeasor, was the named insured on a separate policy, also issued by appellee, which covered only the vehicle that was involved in the accident. The policy issued to Jorge Marroquin contained the following "Family Liability Limitation":

We do not provide Liability Coverage for any person, for 'bodily injury' to you or any 'family member,' to the extent that the limits of liability for this coverage exceed the limits of liability required by the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law of 1984.

Appellant made demand on appellee for thirty-five thousand dollars, such amount being the stated liability limit of the policy issued to Jorge Marroquin. Appellee refused, asserting the above liability limitation. Appellant then executed a limited release for fifteen thousand dollars, the limit of liability required by the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law, 75 Pa.C.S. § 1701 et al. (Hereinafter MVFRL).

Appellant thereafter attempted to collect on the underinsured driver coverage in his parents insurance policy. The underinsured motorist section of the policy contained the following language: ¹

I

We will pay damages which an "insured" is legally entitled to recover from the owner or operator of either an "uninsured motor vehicle" or "underinsured motor vehicle," but not both, because of 'bodily injury:'

1. Sustained by an 'insured,' and

2. Caused by an accident

II

'Insured' as used in this endorsement means:

1. 'You or any family member.'

2. 'Any other person' 'occupying' 'your covered auto.'

3. Any person for damages that person is entitled to recover because of 'bodily injury' to which this coverage applies sustained by a person described in 1. or 2. above.

'Underinsured motor vehicle' means a land motor vehicle or trailer of any type to which a bodily injury liability bond or policy applies at the time of the accident but the amount paid for 'bodily injury' under that bond or policy to an 'insured' is not enough to pay the full amount that the 'insured' is legally entitled to recover as damages.

III

In addition, neither 'uninsured motor vehicle' nor 'underinsured motor vehicle' includes any vehicle or equipment:

1. Owned by or furnished or available for the regular use of you or any 'family member.'

2. Owned by any governmental unit or agency.

3. Operated on rails or crawler treads.

4. Designed mainly for use off public roads while not on public roads.

5. While located for use as residence or premises.

The "Definitions" section of the policy further defined the terms "you" and "family member":

IV

Throughout this policy, 'you' and 'your' refer to:

1. The 'named insured' shown in the Declarations; and

2. The spouse if a resident of the same household.

V.

'Family member' means a person related to you by blood, marriage or adoption who is a resident of your household. This includes a ward or foster child.

On the basis of the above language, appellee denied appellant's request for underinsured motorist benefits. Appellee asserted that the "Family Car Exclusion" clause (See III, 1) specifically excludes appellant's brother's automobile from the definition of an underinsured motor vehicle. Appellant filed this Declaratory Judgment action seeking a declaration that the "Family Car Exclusion" is void as against public policy and contrary to the express provisions as well as the intent of the Pennsylvania Motor Vehicle Financial Responsibility Law. In the alternative, appellant argues that under the provisions of the MVFRL the "Family Car Exclusion" shall not apply to the extent that the owner and/or vehicle or equipment owned by or furnished for the regular use of the insured or any "family member" is covered by a policy of liability insurance separate and distinct from the policy under which Underinsured Motorist Benefits are claimed. Appellant and appellee filed motions for the grant of summary judgment. On January 17, 1990, the trial court issued an opinion and order which determined that the "Family Car Exclusion" was neither in derogation of legislative intent in enacting the MVFRL nor a violation of public policy, thereby granting summary judgment in appellee's favor. Most importantly, the trial court found that there existed no case law that dealt with the exact situation involved in this case. In so doing, the trial court distinguished between the rights of a "named insured" and the rights of family members who are protected under the policy but who pay no premiums. This appeal followed.

This court has often set forth the rules to be followed in deciding a motion for summary judgment:

On motions for summary judgment, the Court must consider the entire setting of the case and all of the papers that are included in the record. One who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact. The Court must consider both the record actually presented and the record potentially possible at the time of trial. A hearing on the motion for summary judgment is not a trial on the merits, and the Court on such motion should not attempt to resolve conflicting contentions of fact. The Court is to accept as true all well pleaded facts in the plaintiff's pleadings as well as the admissions on file, giving to the plaintiff the benefit of all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. The record must be examined in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. In passing upon a motion for summary judgment it is not part of the court's function to decide issues of fact, but solely to determine whether there is an issue of fact to be tried. All doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue as to material fact must be resolved against the party moving for summary judgment. A party should not be deprived of an adequate opportunity to fully develop his case by witnesses and a trial, when the issues involved make such procedure the appropriate one. It is often the case that although the basic facts are not in dispute, the parties in good faith may nevertheless disagree about the inferences to be drawn from these facts, what the intention of the parties was as shown by the facts. [sic.] Under such circumstances the case is not to be one to be decided by the Trial Judge on a motion for summary judgment.

Hess v. Fuellgraf Electric Company, 350 Pa.Super. 235, 237-238, 504 A.2d 332, 333-334 (1986) (citations omitted) quoting Schacter v. Albert, 212 Pa.Super. 58, 61-62, 239 A.2d 841, 843 (1968). "On appeal from an order entering summary judgment, this court will reverse the trial court upon a showing of an error at law or a clear abuse of discretion." Jones v. Keystone Insurance Company, 364 Pa.Super. 318, 528 A.2d 177 (1987) allocatur denied 518 Pa. 613, 540 A.2d 535 (1988) quoting Miller v. Federal Kemper Insurance Company, 352 Pa.Super. 581, 585-586, 508 A.2d 1222, 1225 (1986).

Appellant presents three arguments on appeal. First appellant argues that the "Family Car Exclusion" is invalid under Pennsylvania law as against the public interest under the circumstances as presented in this case. Second, appellant claims that the application of the "Family Car Exclusion" to benefits from a separate policy on which appellant is insured violates legislative intent. ² Third, appellant claims that the lower court erred in denying underinsurance benefits to appellant under his parents' policy since he was an insured as defined by the MVFRL and the definitions of the policy itself.

Appellant first argues that the "Family Car Exclusion" as applied to underinsured motorist benefits in the instant case is void as against the public policy expressed by the language of the MVFRL and interpreted by the case law of Pennsylvania and Minnesota. In explaining the relevance of Minnesota case law, appellant cites the similarity of that state's motor vehicle insurance legislation, asserting that Pennsylvania courts have often relied upon Minnesota law for guidance in this field. ³ As set out by one author, the public policy considerations that were taken into account when including underinsured motorist provisions in the MVFRL were as follows.

The Financial Responsibility Law has a number of related policy goals. Chief among them is the establishment of a liberally compensatory scheme of uninsured and underinsured...