Marsh v. Birmingham Bd. of Ed.
Decision Date | 26 August 1977 |
Citation | 349 So.2d 34 |
Parties | Joyce Moseley MARSH v. BIRMINGHAM BOARD OF EDUCATION et al. SC 2051. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
G. Gordon Pate of Hare, Wynn, Newell & Newton, Birmingham, for appellant.
James E. Simpson, Birmingham, for appellees.
This case is before us by way of summary judgment granted in favor of appellee, Birmingham Board of Education (defendant below). We affirm.
The facts are not in dispute. The appellant, Joyce Moseley Marsh (plaintiff below) accepted a contract on March 24, 1975, to teach for the Birmingham school system from April 1, 1975, until the end of the school term, May 30, 1975. The contract was signed by Dr. William Cody, the superintendent of schools for Birmingham. On April 8, 1975, the appellant was nominated by Dr. Cody for appointment by the Birmingham Board of Education. The Board deferred action pending further information as to why she had previously resigned from the Mountain Brook school system. Later, at the Board's June 10, 1975, meeting, it rejected the appellant's appointment. In the meantime, the appellant had fully completed her contract.
Appellant contends (1) that Tit. 52, § 361(2), Code of Alabama 1940, Recompiled 1958, controls and she has been automatically reemployed, or, alternatively, (2) that the Birmingham Board of Education is estopped to deny that appellant has been reemployed.
Whether the appellant was automatically reemployed is controlled by Tit. 52, §§ 187 and 361(2), Code, which read as follows:
See also Tit. 52, §§ 158 and 182.
The appellee's position, with which we agree, is that the initial employment of the appellant took the joint action of the superintendent of education, who "nominates" teachers to the board of education for appointment, and of the board of education, which "appoints" the teaches to their positions. § 187 does not give the superintendent of education the power to employ a teacher without the concurrence of the board. In this case the appellant's appointment was denied. The reemployment provision of Tit. 52, § 361(2) does not apply.
This conclusion is consistent with the other provisions in § 187. The superintendent of education similarly is not given the power to promote or to dismiss employees; he can only recommend them to the board of education for promotion or dismissal.
Furthermore, § 361(2) on which appellee relies refers to the "employing board of education." The superintendent of education is not the employing body; the board of education is.
Board of Education of Escambia County v. Watts, 19 Ala.App. 7, 95 So. 498 (1922), a case dealing with a similar statute, provides the following example and conclusion:
In Roberts v. State, 228 Ala. 222, 153 So. 432 (1934), the outgoing superintendent of education nominated a statistical and stenographic clerk the day before he left office and the board of education elected him. The court held that the clerk did not legally hold office because he was not nominated by the superintendent then in office. While the policy reasons for the decision may not be applicable in this case, as the court viewed the relationship between the superintendent and the clerk as personal, the court's interpretation of § 169, School Code 1927, which required election by the board of education upon "nomination of the County Superintendent of Education" is relevant:
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...concepts of estoppel and waiver, upon which Raley and Sharpley rely, do not operate against the State. See, e.g., Marsh v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 349 So.2d 34, 36 (Ala.1977). The fact that State officials, therefore, did not provide to Raley a copy of the Fund guidelines any sooner than t......
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Perkins v. Shelby County
...of equitable estoppel is only infrequently applied against a municipality or other governmental entity, Marsh v. Birmingham Board of Education, 349 So.2d 34, 36 (Ala.1977), it will `apply against a municipal corporation when justice and fair play demand it.' City of Guntersville v. Alred, 4......
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Perkins v. Shelby County, No. 2060313 (Ala. Civ. App. 7/20/2007)
...of equitable estoppel is only infrequently applied against a municipality or other governmental entity, Marsh v. Birmingham Board of Education, 349 So. 2d 34, 36 (Ala. 1977), it will `apply against a municipal corporation when justice and fair play demand it.' City of Guntersville v. Alred,......
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