Marsh v. Mutual Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 14 June 1917
• Docket Number: 4 Div. 715
• Citation: 200 Ala. 438,76 So. 370
• Parties: MARSH v. MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

76 So. 370

200 Ala. 438

MARSH v. MUTUAL LIFE INS. CO.

4 Div. 715

Supreme Court of Alabama

June 14, 1917

Appeal from Circuit Court, Coffee County; A.B. Foster, Judge.

Suit by the Elba Bank & Trust Company against the Mutual Life Insurance Company, in which Eva C. Marsh was interpleaded. Defendant Marsh appealed from an order overruling her motion to set aside the judgment requiring her to interplead, and as an alternative asked for a writ of mandamus in case appeal did not lie. Affirmed.

M.A Owen, of Elba, and J.A. Carnley, of Enterprise, for appellant.

W.O Mulkey, of Geneva, for appellee.

THOMAS J.

The two causes, appeal in main cause and petition for mandamus were submitted as one.

The facts are, that on February 26, 1916, the Elba Bank & Trust Company sued the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York on a certain policy of insurance, numbered 1861904, whereby the defendant, on the 25th day of August, 1910, insured the life of Tavner Marsh, such policy being payable to Eva C. Marsh. The defendant company filed, under section 6050 of the Code its interpleader, praying that said Marsh be required to propound her claim to the moneys, the proceeds of the policy sued on, and litigate in said suit with defendant her right thereto. Prior to the suit (on February 4, 1916) the Mutual Life Insurance Company, on receipt of proof of the death of insured, delivered its check to Eva C. Marsh for the amount due thereunder, marking paid the policy, but, on notice of claim of the assignment of the policy to the Elba Bank &amp Trust Company, stopped payment of this check. The circuit court required said Marsh to become a party defendant, as prayed in defendant company's interpleader, and from this judgment she appealed. Defendant, Marsh, then moved to set aside the judgment requiring her to interplead, and, the motion being overruled, applied for mandamus to compel the circuit court to vacate the order requiring her so to interplead. As an exhibit to the interpleader, there was filed an affidavit of said Marsh, of date March 20, 1916, containing the following recitals:

"That she is the widow of T. Marsh, deceased, whose full name was Tavner Marsh; that at the time of his death her said husband owned policy No. 1861904, in the Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York, for the sum of $2,000, which was made payable to affiant as the widow of said T. Marsh, in the event of his death before that of affiant. Affiant further says on oath that she had never transferred, assigned, conveyed, or hypothecated her interest in or rights to said policy to the Elba Bank & Trust Company, of Elba, Ala., nor to any other person, firm, or corporation, and she says that if the said Elba Bank & Trust Company holds any such transfer or assignment executed by her, that the same was obtained from her by fraud and misrepresentations on the part of said Bank & Trust Company, its officers, agents, or employés, and was without her knowledge or consent, and therefore fraudulent and void."

Another exhibit filed to the interpleader was the following letter:

"New Brockton, Alabama, 3/7/1916. The Mutual Life Insurance Company of New York--Dear Sirs: I am writing you in regards to policy No. 1861904 on the life of Tavner Marsh, as you know the check has been held up. I have not signed any of my rights away and will start legal proceedings if it cannot be settled without it. Will advise you to settle with no one else. Yours res., Mrs. Eva C. Marsh."

By these exhibits it is shown that defendant Marsh claimed an interest in and right to the proceeds of the policy in question, on their respective dates, March 7, and 20, 1916, after suit was brought on the policy, as the beneficiary therein. This fact is further shown by her answer. The fact of delivery of the check for the balance of the company's indebtedness under said policy to the beneficiary, from the company's general office in New York, notwithstanding notification of the claim of an alleged assignee made to the company's local agent in Alabama, would not prevent the company (the rights of no innocent third parties intervening) from stopping the payment of the check by its New York bank and requiring the beneficiary under the policy and the Elba Bank & Trust Company, the alleged assignee, to litigate the bona fides of their respective claims.

The interpleader was within the provisions of the statute as construed by this court. Code of 1907, § 6050; Johnson v. Maxey, 43 Ala. 521, 541; Stewart v. Sample, 168 Ala. 270, 274, 53 So. 182; Coleman v. Chambers, 127 Ala. 615, 29 So. 58; Sherman v. Patridge, 11 How.Prac. (N.Y.) 154, 158.

From the current of all the authorities, the equitable rule of interpleader depends upon the existence of the four elements regarded as its essential conditions:

"(1) The same thing, debt, or duty must be claimed by both or all the parties against whom the relief is demanded. (2) All their adverse titles or claims must be dependent, or be derived from a common source. (3) The person asking the relief--the plaintiff [petitioner for interpleader]--must not have nor claim any interest in the subject-matter. (4) He must have incurred no independent liability to either of the claimants; that is, he must stand perfectly indifferent between them, in the position merely of a stakeholder." 4 Pom.Eq.Jur. §§ 1323-1326.

Was the giving of the check by the insurance company to Mrs. Marsh under the circumstances set...