Marsh v. State

Decision Date04 May 1937
Docket Number15835.
Citation8 N.E.2d 121,104 Ind.App. 377
PartiesMARSH v. STATE.
CourtIndiana Appellate Court

Henning & Youngblood, of Evansville, for appellant.

Philip Lutz, Jr., Atty. Gen., and Henry R. Wilson, Jr., Asst. Atty Gen., for the State.

LAYMON Judge.

Appellant was charged by affidavit in two counts with contributing to the delinquency of a female child under the age of eighteen years. The first count of the affidavit charged that appellant encouraged and permitted a female child under the age of eighteen years to enter and remain in a house of prostitution, appellant then and there knowing said house of prostitution to be such. The second count of said affidavit charged that appellant encouraged and permitted the said female child under the age of eighteen years to be guilty of vicious and immoral conduct, to wit, to practice prostitution. Appellant entered her plea of not guilty to each count of said affidavit and filed a special plea of former jeopardy. Upon the issues thus joined, the cause was submitted to the court for trial without the intervention of a jury. A trial was had, and the court found appellant guilty, assessed a fine of $100 and costs, and imposed a sentence of 120 days. Thereupon appellant filed her motion for a new trial, which motion was overruled, and this appeal was then perfected. The errors assigned by appellant are: (1) That the court erred in setting aside on its own motion its finding that appellant was guilty on the original affidavit and then requiring appellant to submit to a second trial for the same offense on an amended affidavit in two counts; (2) that the court erred in permitting the appellee, the State of Indiana, to file an amended affidavit in two counts after the appellant had been found guilty on the original affidavit (3) that the decision of the juvenile court is contrary to law. Under our statute, the last assignment is sufficient to present both the sufficiency of the facts found to sustain the judgment and the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the findings.

It appears from the record that an affidavit was filed in the court below on June 24, 1936, in substance charging that appellant on or about the 1st day of June, 1936, unlawfully and knowingly caused and encouraged a female child under the age of eighteen years to be sent to a house of prostitution that appellant entered her plea of not guilty to this affidavit, and a trial was had on July 2, 1936, by the court and appellant found guilty. Sentence and judgment were deferred by the court until July 7, 1936. On July 8, 1936, the court of its own motion set aside its finding in said cause and over appellant's objection permitted the appellee, the State of Indiana, to file an affidavit in two counts, the substance of which have heretofore been set out. A trial was had on this affidavit and judgment rendered. It is from this judgment the appeal is taken.

The section of the statute under which the first and second affidavits were drawn is section 9-2804, Burns' 1933 (section 5698, Baldwin's Ind.St.1934), which statute, so far as applicable, provides:

"It shall be unlawful for any person to cause or encourage * * * any girl under the full age of eighteen (18) years, to commit any act of delinquency as defined and specified in section one (§ 9-2803) of this act;
"Or, for any person to send, or cause to be sent, any such child to, or permit any such child to enter or remain in, any house of prostitution, or any saloon or wine-room where intoxicating liquor is sold, or any policy shop, or gambling place, or any pool-room or bucket-shop, knowing them to be such; * * *
"Or to knowingly encourage, contribute to or in any way cause any such child to be guilty of any vicious or immoral conduct."

It is clearly obvious that the first affidavit upon which the court proceeded...

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