Marsh v. State
| Decision Date | 23 February 1955 |
| Docket Number | No. 12830,12830 |
| Citation | 276 S.W.2d 852 |
| Parties | T. G. MARSH et al., Appellants, v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Moursund, Ball, Bergstron & Barrow, San Antonio, for appellants.
Austin F. Anderson, Dist. Atty., Walter W. Toxey, J. Bruce Aycock, John F. Onion, Jr., San Antonio, for appellee.
This is a condemnation proceeding to take, for highway purposes, 15.322 acres of land along the new right-of-way of the Austin Highway. The Commissioners' Court of Bexar County, acting on behalf of the State of Texas, on April 29, 1954, instituted the proceedings against T. G. Marsh, his wife, Effie Caldwell Marsh, and Morningside Builders, Inc. The only question raised relates to the reasonable market value of the 15.322 acres involved. The owners contended and offered evidence tending to establish the market value of such land at the time it was taken at $2,000 per acre, or a total sum of $30,644. A jury trial resulted in a judgment fixing the value at $8,044.05, from which judgment T. G. Marsh, Effie Caldwell Marsh and Morningside Builders, Inc., have prosecuted this appeal.
Appellants first contend that the trial court committed reversible error in permitting the witness Linda Mohlenhoff, over their objection, to testify that she and her sister owned a tract of land adjoining the tract in question, and that they sold a strip lying across their tract to appellee for right-of-way purposes, on March 16, 1954, at the rate of $400 per acre. Appellants nowhere set forth what their objection was to this testimony as made in the trial court. They do set out about four pages of Q. and A., from which it appears that the only objection they made was that the evidence was inadmissible, irrelevant, immaterial and highly prejudicial. This is a general rather than a specific objection and does not in any way state the reasons for their objecting to the admission of the evidence. Where only a general objection to evidence is made in the trial court, such as is here shown, and no specific reason or reasons are given for such objection, reversible error is not shown. McCormick and Ray, Texas Law of Evidence, § 16, p. 21; McCullom v. McClain, Tex.Civ.App. 277 S.W.2d 333; Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co. v. Davis, Tex.Civ.App., 196 S.W.2d 35; Alpine Tel. Corp. v. McCall, Tex.Civ.App., 195 S.W.2d 585; Housing Authority of the City of Dallas v. Hubbard, Tex.Civ.App., 274 S.W.2d 165. Ordinarily, in passing on the correctness of a trial court's ruling in admitting evidence, the appellate court will consider the ruling in the light of the objection made in the trial court, and the complaining party will not be heard to present reasons for excluding the evidence other than those made in the trial court. Ferguson v. Coleman, Tex.Civ.App., 208 S.W. 571. The evidence was not irrelevant and immaterial and it was no more prejudicial than is any other testimony that is unfavorable to a party.
Appellants now contend that the testimony should have been excluded because the price paid for this land was in the nature of a commpromise, made where condemnation proceedings have been filed or where there is a threat of such proceedings, and the price accepted for the land was to avoid the expense and uncertainty of the litigation. If we consider this reason, made for the first time in this Court, we would still find that the trial court did not commit reversible error in admitting the testimony, because the record shows that the sale was not made to avoid condemnation proceedings nor the threat thereof, but was made freely and voluntarily. The witness so testified and appellants did not even ask for a voir dire examination of her on this point. Housing Authority of the City of Dallas v. Hubbard, supra.
Appellants next complain because the witness J. Adams, who qualified as an expert on real estate values in the vicinity of the land in question, was permitted to testify to several sales of real estate located in the immediate vicinity of the land in question over their objection. Appellants were contending that the land in question had a market value of as high as $2,000 per acre, and offered expert witnesses who so testified. The witness J. Adams placed a value of $515 per acre on the land, and testified that in arriving at this value he had taken into consideration other sales to the county and to some on else. Adams was then asked this Question: 'What were some of these sales?' whereupon counsel for appellants made the following objection:
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