Marshall Justice v. Mine Safety & Health Admin.

• Decision Date: 23 January 2015
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 2:14-14438
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia
• Parties: MARSHALL JUSTICE, Plaintiff, v. MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, Defendant.

MARSHALL JUSTICE, Plaintiff, v. MINE SAFETY AND HEALTH ADMINISTRATION, Defendant.

Civil Action No. 2:14-14438

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF WEST VIRGINIA AT CHARLESTON

January 23, 2015

MEMORANDUM OPINION & ORDER

Pending is a motion to dismiss Count II of the complaint, filed by the Mine Safety and Health Administration ("MSHA") on July 31, 2014.

I. Background

The plaintiff, Marshall Justice, is a coal miner who lives in Madison, West Virginia, Compl. ¶ 3, and was at one time employed by the Gateway Eagle Coal Company, see Defendant's Reply to Plaintiff's Response in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss Count II ("Def.'s Reply"), Ex. A at 1.¹ InNovember 2013, Marshall filed a complaint with MSHA (the "MSHA complaint"), alleging that he had been discriminated or retaliated against in violation of the Mine Safety and Health Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 801-966 (2012) (the "Mine Act"). See Compl. ¶ 11 (stating that plaintiff was discriminated against under § 815(c)(1) of the Mine Act, which provides, among other things, that no person shall discharge or in any manner discriminate against any miner because such miner has filed or made a complaint under the Mine Act concerning an alleged danger or safety or health violation). On December 5, 2013, Justice asked MSHA, under the Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (the "FOIA"), for a copy of all non-privileged portions of the completed investigative file relating to his complaint, presumably against his employer. Compl. ¶ 12.

On December 30, 2013, MSHA wrote to Justice, and explained that it had investigated his allegations, but decided not to "issue a violation."² Compl. ¶ 13. The complaint in this action does not say so, but it appears that Justice thereafter invoked his right, under 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(3), to pursue theMSHA complaint on his own behalf before the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission. See Compl. ¶ 10 (citing § 815(c)(3) ("If the Secretary, upon investigation determines that the provisions of this subsection have not been violated, the complainant shall have the right, within 30 days of notice of the Secretary's determination, to file an action in his own behalf before the Commission[.]")); see also Def.'s Reply, Ex. A at 1 (containing an order from the Commission's Office of Administrative Law Judges, dated August 22, 2014, in Justice v. Gateway Eagle Coal Co., WEVA 2014-559).

By letter dated January 24, 2014, MSHA acknowledged Justice's FOIA request for the investigative file relating to his MSHA complaint. Compl. ¶ 14. According to the letter, there were "unusual circumstances surrounding the records [Justice was] seeking," and "a need to search for and collect records from separate offices." Id. As a result, the defendant stated that the twenty-day "statutory time limits for processing [the] request [could not] be met," and estimated that it would take ninety working days to provide a response. Id. By the time this action was initiated on April 10, 2014, the plaintiff asserts that the defendant had still not produced the requested materials. Compl. ¶ 16.

Justice claims that MSHA has "developed a pattern and practice of unreasonably delaying the production of the administrative record in response to requests by anti-retaliation complainants who make time-sensitive requests for these records during the pendency of complaints filed under [§ 815(c)(3)] of the Mine Act, thus systemically depriving miners of their right to pursue these claims." Compl. ¶ 17. In Count I, he charges MSHA with violating the FOIA by "failing to respond substantively, and by failing to release the requested records, within twenty working days of [his] request for records." He seeks "the release of the records which [MSHA] is now withholding." Compl. ¶¶ 19-21. In Count II, Justice requests an order, pursuant to the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202, declaring that MSHA

is in violation of FOIA and frustrates miners' rights to pursue health and safety related complaints under [the Mine Act], and that consequently [MSHA] is required [to] provide all documents and materials relevant to a miner's complaint promptly upon the miner's request, and at most within the statutory period of 20 working days, to enable miners to meaningfully pursue their complaints concerning unlawful retaliatory violations of the Mine Act.

Compl. ¶ 25(a).

MSHA answered the complaint in this action on July 10, 2014, denying most, though not all, of the factual allegations as stated in the complaint. Of greatest significance, thedefendant denied failing to respond to Justice's FOIA request, instead asserting that it "responded fully . . . and provided all records required to be disclosed," on May 2, 2014. See Answer ¶¶ 16, 21. Three weeks later, on July 31, 2014, MSHA filed the pending motion to dismiss Count II of the plaintiff's complaint. The defendant asserts that Count II should be dismissed under Rule 12(b)(1) because the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, under Rule 12(b)(3) in that venue in this district is improper, and under Rule 12(b)(6) because Count II fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.³

Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss Count II ("Def.'s Mem.") at 1.

II. Discussion

The defendant primarily objects to the scope of Count II as it is framed in the plaintiff's complaint, noting that the requested declaration appears so broadly worded as to implicate MSHA's FOIA practices with respect to "miners" generally, rather than Justice, specifically. See, e.g., Def.'s Mem. at 1-2 ("Count II is an unsolicited request on behalf of other miners for documents[.] . . . To the extent [Justice] disagrees with MSHA's disclosure practices with respect to other miners, the other miners' [sic] can pursue relief via the discovery process before administrative judicial officers."). MSHA argues that Justice has no constitutional, prudential, or statutory standing to pursue a declaration of the rights of other miners, or to challenge the legality of MSHA's handling of FOIA requests by other miners. See Def.'s Mem. at 6-9 (requesting dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) because the speculative nature of the relief requested precludes constitutional and prudential standing), 9-10 (requesting dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) because theplaintiff lacks statutory standing to request relief on behalf of other miners).

Although the wording of Count II is broad, see Compl. ¶ 25(a) (requesting a declaration that MSHA "is in violation of FOIA and frustrates miners' rights to pursue health and safety related complaints under [the Mine Act]" (emphasis added)), the plaintiff's response to the motion to dismiss effectively narrows the scope of the relief requested. Specifically, the plaintiff states that he is only seeking a "declaration of his own rights as a miner complainant under the Mine Act." Plaintiff's Memorandum of Law in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss Count II ("Pl.'s Opp'n") at 6. Applying the plaintiff's limitation, the court construes Count II, quoted at page 4, supra, to request a declaration that MSHA:

violat[ed] . . . FOIA and frustrate[d] [Justice's] rights to pursue [a] health and safety related complaint[] under [the Mine Act], and that . . .[MSHA] [wa]s required [to] provide all documents and materials relevant to [Justice's] complaint promptly upon [his] request, and at most within the statutory period of 20 working days, to enable [Justice] to meaningfully pursue [his] complaint[] concerning unlawful retaliatory violations of the Mine Act.

Or, in the plaintiff's words, "Count II seeks a declaratory judgment that . . . [p]laintiff has a right under the [FOIA] . . . to access certain records of the government's investigationinto the discrimination complaint that [p]laintiff filed with [MSHA.]" See Pl.'s Opp'n at 1.

So understood, the relief requested in Count II essentially mirrors Count I -- that is, Count I alleges that MSHA violated the FOIA by failing to respond to Justice's request and seeks the release of the requested documents, and Count II simply seeks a declaration confirming those allegations and directing that result. Cf. Laroche v. U.S. Securities & Exchange Comm'n, No. 05-4760, 2006 WL 2868972, at *5 (N.D. Cal. Oct. 6, 2006) ("The [c]ourt finds that LaRoche has failed to establish that he is entitled to relief [under the FOIA] on any of the underlying claims, and therefore he cannot be entitled to relief under the [Declaratory Judgment Act]."); Detroit Free Press, Inc. v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 16 F. Supp. 3d 798, 811 (E.D. Mich. 2014).

Justice argues that he has standing to pursue his declaratory judgment claim on that limited basis. See Pl.'s Opp'n at 4 (arguing that "the existence of a factual controversy establishing [Justice's] standing to seek declaratory judgment is not even disputed insofar as [MSHA] has not moved to dismiss Count I"), 5 ("There is no dispute about the justifiability of the case or controversy between these parties in this matter insofar as [MSHA] has not moved to dismiss Count I of the[c]omplaint."). The court agrees. Justice has a definite and concrete interest in the dispute over his own FOIA request, and the resolution of that dispute will yield specific and conclusive relief. See White v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa., 913 F.2d 165, 167-68 (4th Cir. 1990) (To satisfy the case or controversy requirement in Declaratory Judgment Act cases there must be "a real and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts." (quoting Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240-41 (1937)).

In its reply, MSHA argues that Count II should nevertheless be dismissed because "declaratory relief is generally unavailable under FOIA[.]" The defendant asserts that "FOIA remedies authorize a district court to (1) enjoin the improper withholding of...