Marshall v. Anne Arundel Cnty.
| Decision Date | 12 February 2019 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. ELH-18-74 |
| Parties | PATRICIA MARSHALL Plaintiff, v. ANNE ARUNDEL COUNTY, MARYLAND Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Maryland |
In a Second Amended Complaint (ECF 14, "SAC"), plaintiff Patricia Marshall alleges that her former employer, the Office of the State's Attorney for Anne Arundel County ("OSA" or the "Office"), discriminated against her on the basis of age and disability, in violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 ("ADA"), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 et seq.; the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 ("ADEA"), as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq.; and the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act ("MFEPA"), Md. Code , § 20-601 to § 20-610 of the State Government Article ("S.G."). She has sued Anne Arundel County, Maryland ("County"), which she maintains is functionally the same as the OSA. Marshall seeks compensatory damages, back pay, pre-judgment interest, and attorney's fees. ECF 14 at 14.1
The County has moved to dismiss the Second Amended Complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6) or, in the alternative, for pre-discovery summary judgment (ECF 15), supported by a memorandum of law (ECF 15-1) (collectively, the "Motion") and an exhibit. SeeECF 15-2 ("Affidavit of Andrea M. Rhodes"). The County contends that the Office of the State's Attorney for Anne Arundel County is a State agency, not a local agency. Accordingly, the County submits that it was not plaintiff's employer and is therefore not the proper party to this suit. See ECF 15-1 at 5-10. Marshall opposes the Motion. ECF 17 ("Opposition"). The defendant filed a reply. ECF 18 ("Reply").
The Motion is fully briefed and no hearing is necessary to resolve it. See Local Rule 105.6. For the reasons that follow, I shall deny the Motion.
In April 2015, Marshall began her employment with the OSA as a "Victim/Witness Advocate." ECF 14, ¶ 24. At all relevant times, she was over the age of forty years old and had an anxiety disorder as well as a heart condition, known as takotsubo cardiomyopathy. Id. ¶¶ 14-19.
Marshall was hospitalized for her heart condition on March 30, 2016. Id. ¶¶ 37-38. She "returned to work shortly thereafter with a doctor's note . . . requesting temporary light duty due to her disabilities." Id. ¶ 40. The Office granted her request. Id. ¶ 41.
After her light duty period ended, she experienced "spouts of dizziness" and "lapses in concentration." Id. ¶ 42. She also needed to walk slowly between courtrooms and the office. Id. ¶ 43. On June 6, 2016, she allegedly told her supervisor, Heather Amador, that "she was struggling with her caseload because of her heart condition." Id. ¶ 45. According to Marshall, she and Amador did not discuss accommodations for her disability. Id. ¶ 46.
On August 23, 2016, OSA "management" met with Marshall and told her that she would be placed on probation for a two-month period. Id. ¶ 48. Marshall advised that her heart condition was affecting her performance. Id. ¶ 50. And, the Office's Director of Human Resources, LesleyPattison, said that she agreed and that she believed Marshall's disability was "being caused by her job." Id. ¶ 51. Pattison also stated that "Marshall's job was too stressful and that she should find another job." Id. ¶ 52. The SAC alleges that Marshall and the Office's management did not discuss accommodations for Marshall's disability. Id. ¶ 53.
Marshall was terminated on September 9, 2016. Id. ¶ 57. Assistant State's Attorney Aaron Meyers allegedly told Marshall that he was terminating her because "she had been 'irritating him' through her requests for guidance." Id. ¶ 58. Pattison was also present during Marshall's termination. Id. ¶ 61. According to the SAC, Pattison again told Marshall that the job was "too stressful for [Marshall's] disability." Id.
After the meeting, Pattison allegedly told Marshall "that she thought Marshall could live off her retirement" and that Marshall "should tell prospective employers about her young children to signal that despite her age, she is not planning to retire[.]" Id. ¶¶ 68-69. Pattison also "offered Marshall a temporary position as a receptionist through the end of the year with a reduction in salary[.]" Id. ¶ 62. Marshall accepted the offer. Id. ¶ 63.
In October 2016, Marshall twice requested an accommodation for her disability. Id. ¶¶ 70, 72. Pattison allegedly first refused to discuss the request and then claimed that "the demotion to the receptionist position '[] put into effect' her requested accommodation." Id. ¶¶ 71, 73.
Marshall continued working as the "Victim/Witness Advocate" until November 7, 2016, when she began her new position as a receptionist. Id. ¶¶ 64, 76. She alleges that she requested a meeting with Pattison that day to discuss her accommodation, but her request was ignored. Id. ¶¶ 77-78. She also alleges that she requested another meeting two weeks later. Id. ¶ 79. Pattisonallegedly "responded but did not schedule any meeting to discuss [] Marshall's requested accommodation." Id. ¶ 80.
On December 22, 2016, Marshall accepted Pattison's offer to work through January 11, 2017. Id. ¶¶ 81-82. Marshall later declined an offer to extend her position through the end of January 2018. Id. ¶¶ 83-84.
To fill the now empty position of "Victim/Witness Advocate," the OSA hired Jesse Pugliese. She is allegedly in her early thirties and does not have a disability. Id. ¶¶ 65-67.
On November 30, 2016, Marshall filed a Charge of Discrimination and Retaliation ("Charge") with the Maryland Commission on Civil Rights (the "MCCR"), naming "Anne Arundel County State's Attorney's Office" as the respondent. Cf. ECF 1-1 at 1.2 The Charge was cross-filed with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") as EEOC Charge No. 12F-2017-00168. ECF 14, ¶ 8. On October 12, 2017, the Department of Justice issued Marshall a Notice of Right to Sue ("Notice") the OSA. Id.; see also ECF 1-1 at 1.
On January 9, 2018, within 90 days of receipt of the Notice, Marshall, as a self-represented plaintiff, filed suit (ECF 1, the "Complaint") against Wes Adams, who was then the State's Attorney for Anne Arundel County; Meyers; Pattison; and the Anne Arundel County State's Attorney's Office. See ECF 1.3 Marshall subsequently obtained counsel, ECF 4, and filed anAmended Complaint against Anne Arundel County, removing the other defendants from the suit. ECF 7.4 With leave of Court (ECF 13), Marshall filed a Second Amended Complaint on April 30, 2018. ECF 14.
Additional facts are included in the Discussion.
As noted, defendant has moved to dismiss or, in the alternative, for summary judgment. ECF 15. Along with its Motion, defendant submitted one exhibit (ECF 15-2), the affidavit of Andrea M. Rhodes, Anne Arundel County's Personnel Officer.
A motion styled in the alternative, to dismiss or for summary judgment, implicates the court's discretion under Rule 12(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Kensington Vol. Fire Dept., Inc. v. Montgomery Cty., 788 F. Supp. 2d 431, 436-37 (D. Md. 2011). Ordinarily, a court "is not to consider matters outside the pleadings or resolve factual disputes when ruling on a motion to dismiss." Bosiger v. U.S. Airways, 510 F.3d 442, 450 (4th Cir. 2007).
However, under Rule 12(b)(6), a court, in its discretion, may consider matters outside of the pleadings, pursuant to Rule 12(d). If the court does so, "the motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56," and "[a]ll parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent to the motion." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d). When, as here, the movant expressly captions its motion "in the alternative," as one for summary judgment, and submits matters outside the pleadings for the court's consideration, the parties are deemed to beon notice that conversion under Rule 12(d) may occur; the court "does not have an obligation to notify parties of the obvious." Laughlin v. Metro. Wash. Airports Auth., 149 F.3d 253, 261 (4th Cir. 1998).
A district judge has "complete discretion to determine whether or not to accept the submission of any material beyond the pleadings that is offered in conjunction with a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and rely on it, thereby converting the motion, or to reject it or simply not consider it." 5C Alan Wright & Arthur Miller et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 1366 (3d ed.). This discretion "should be exercised with great caution and attention to the parties' procedural rights." Id. In general, courts are guided by whether consideration of extraneous material "is likely to facilitate the disposition of the action," and "whether discovery prior to the utilization of the summary judgment procedure" is necessary. Id.
Summary judgment is usually inappropriate "where the parties have not had an opportunity for reasonable discovery." E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 637 F.3d at 448-49; see Putney v. Likin, 656 F. App'x 632, 638-640 (4th Cir. 2016) (per curiam); McCray v. Maryland Dep't of Transp., 741 F.3d 480, 483 (4th Cir. 2014). However, "the party opposing summary judgment 'cannot complain that summary judgment was granted without discovery unless that party has made an attempt to oppose the motion on the grounds that more time was needed for discovery.'" Harrods Ltd. v. Sixty Internet Domain Names, 302 F.3d 214, 244 (4th Cir. 2002) (quoting Evans v. Techs. Applications & Serv. Co., 80 F.3d 954, 961 (4th Cir. 1996)); see also Dave & Buster's, Inc. v. White Flint Mall, LLLP, 616 F. App'x 552, 561 (4th Cir. 2015).
To raise adequately the issue that discovery is needed, the nonmovant typically must file an affidavit or declaration pursuant to Rule 56(d) (formerly Rule 56(f)), explaining why, "for specified reasons, it cannot present facts essential to justify its opposition," without neededdiscovery. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(d); see Harrods,...
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