Marshall v. Bankston Motor Homes, Inc.
| Decision Date | 08 February 2013 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO.: CV# 5: 11-CV-02116- TMP |
| Parties | KAY MARSHALL and CHRIS MARSHALL, Plaintiffs, v. BANKSTON MOTOR HOMES, INC, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama |
This cause is before the court on the motion for summary judgment filed by the defendant, Bankston Motor Homes, Inc., on April 19, 2012. The matter has been briefed and orally argued to the court. The parties have consented to the jurisdiction of the undersigned magistrate judge pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c). Having considered all the pleadings and arguments of the parties, the court finds the motion for summary judgment is due to be granted.
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment is proper "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The party seeking summary judgment "always bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion, and identifying those portions of 'the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,' which it believes demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of materialfact." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986) (quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)). The movant can meet this burden by presenting evidence showing there is no dispute of material fact, or by showing that the nonmoving party has failed to present evidence in support of some element of its case on which it bears the ultimate burden of proof. Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322-23. There is no requirement, however, "that the moving party support its motion with affidavits or other similar materials negating the opponent's claim." Id. at 323.
Once the moving party has met his burden, Rule 56(e) "requires the nonmoving party to go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the 'depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file,' designate 'specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.'" Id. at 324 (quoting former Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). The current version of Rule 56 still requires that the nonmoving party may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading. Rather, the nonmoving party's response must set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) provides that if a party fails to respond to a properly supported factual assertion by another party, the court may deem the fact undisputed and grant summary judgment if otherwise appropriate. "[T]he plain language of [former] Rule 56(c) mandates the entry of summary judgment, after adequate time for discovery and upon motion, against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 322; see Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
After the plaintiff has properly responded to a proper motion for summary judgment, the court must grant the motion if there is no genuine issue of material fact, and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). The substantive law will identify which facts are material and which are irrelevant. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,248 (1986). A dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Id. at 248. "[T]he judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 249. His guide is the same standard necessary to direct a verdict: "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to a jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Id. at 251-52; see also Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. N.L.R.B., 461 U.S. 731, 745 n.11 (1983). However, the nonmoving party "must do more than show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586 (1986). If the evidence is merely colorable, or is not significantly probative, summary judgment may be granted. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249 (citations omitted); accord Spence v. Zimmerman, 873 F.2d 256 (11th Cir. 1989). Furthermore, the court must "view the evidence presented through the prism of the substantive evidentiary burden," so there must be sufficient evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 254; Cottle v. Storer Communication, Inc., 849 F.2d 570, 575 (11th Cir. 1988). Nevertheless, credibility determinations, the weighing of evidence, and the drawing of inferences from the facts are the function of the jury, and therefore the evidence of the non-movant is to be believed and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 255. The non-movant need not be given the benefit of every inference but only of every reasonable inference. Brown v. City of Clewiston, 848 F.2d 1534, 1540 n.12 (11th Cir. 1988).
The principal business of Defendant Bankston Motor Homes, Inc. ("Bankston") is the sale of motor homes, recreational vehicles (RV), and related items. (See Plaintiffs' Complaint, Para. 2, herein described as Exhibit A). Fred Jackson ("Jackson") is an a salesperson for Bankston, and he acted within his scope of employment throughout the times material to this case. Id. Plaintiffs Chris Marshall and (then) Kay Flugge ("Kay") contacted Bankston in early 2009 about purchasing an RV. The plaintiffs had a home in Ohio, but also lived in Florida at times. Id. Jackson was the primary contact who dealt with the Plaintiffs. Id. From February through early March 2009, plaintiff Chris Marshall ("Chris") negotiated with Jackson for the purchase of an RV. (See Exhibit A, Para. 3). At that time, plaintiffs were not married, but Chris was authorized to negotiate for Kay as well as himself. On March 9, Jackson made an offer to plaintiffs via email to sell them the RV for $258,660.00. Id. To determine whether financing for the purchase could be obtained, Chris provided Jackson with plaintiff Kay Flugge's financial information. Chris explained to Jackson that due to past financial problems and bankruptcies by Chris, the financing would need to be arranged in Kay's name and based on her credit worthiness. (Depo. of Kay Marshall, p. 47). Although Chris was unemployed on disability, Kay was employed. Also, plaintiffs explained to Jackson that financing for the purchase would need to be approved before May 15, 2009, because of Kay anticipated taking early retirement on that date. They were concerned that due to her early retirement, she would not have a salary, making credit approval more difficult. Jackson told Chris that financing for the purchase would likely be approved and should not be a problem getting approval before May 15. Id.
On March 15, 2009, after their discussions with Jackson, Kay received a letter explaining that financing by the Bank of the West had not been approved. (See Exhibit A, Para. 6). Jackson told Chris that he knew somebody and would be able to get financing approved for the plaintiffs' purchase of the RV. Id. Plaintiffs again communicated to Jackson that financing must be approved by May 15. (See Exhibit A, Para. 7).
Around this time, Kay gave notice to her employer that she intended to take early retirement beginning on May 15, 2009. (See Exhibit A, Para. 4). Plaintiffs also decided to marry around this time; thus, Kay Flugge became Kay Marshall on March 16, 2009,1 when they married. Id. By marrying Chris, Kay also gave up alimony payments she was receiving from her ex-husband.
On March 30, Bank of America approved a financing arrangement for Kay in the amount of $218,660.00 (See Defendants' Exhibit 5), and Jackson notified the plaintiffs that he had succeeded in finding someone willing to provide financing for the purchase. Chris instructed Jackson to email the purchase contract to them, and the next day, Kay signed the Purchase Agreement ("Agreement") for the RV on March 31, 2009. (See Defendants' Exhibit 2). There was a $5,000 down payment paid using Kay's credit card. (See Exhibit A, Para. 6). On April 2, Bank of America approved a financing arrangement for Kay in the increased amount of $235,198.30. (See Defendants' Exhibit 6). The credit approval was guaranteed only for a period of 60 days, however. Although Bankston received notice of the credit approval, neither Kay nor Chris saw the credit-approval letters fromBank of America. (Depo. of Chris Marshall, Doc. 15-4, p. 30). Chris was aware, however, that the credit approval was good only to the end of May.2
By its express terms, the Purchase Agreement called for Kay to purchase and Bankston to sell a 2009 Allegro Bus RV to be custom built by Tiffin Motorhomes. The Purchase Agreement stated immediately above Kay's signature that, "This agreement contains the entire understanding between you [seller] and me [buyer] and no other representation or inducement, verbal or written, has been made which is not written in this contract."3 (Defendant's Ex. B, Doc. 15-2). It did not specify a time for closing or completion of the purchase, except in Paragraph 6, "FAILURE TO COMPLETE PURCHASE," in which it is stated that, "If I [the purchaser] fail or refuse to complete this purchase within the time frame specified, by the agreed upon terms of this contract or as specified in the Uniform Commercial Code of the state of your [the seller] jurisdiction..." the seller may offset losses or expenses from the purchaser's down payment and trade-in. (Defendant's Ex. B, Doc. 15-2, p. 2, ¶ 6). Additionally, the contract provided that, "I [buyer] will not hold you [seller] liable for...
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