Marshall v. Berryhill
| Decision Date | 06 June 2017 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 8:16-2142-RMG-JDA |
| Court | United States District Courts. 4th Circuit. United States District Court of South Carolina |
| Parties | Kori Patrick Marshall, Plaintiff, v. Nancy A. Berryhill, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant. |
This matter is before the Court for a Report and Recommendation pursuant to Local Civil Rule 73.02(B)(2)(a), D.S.C., and 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B).1 Plaintiff brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to obtain judicial review of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("the Commissioner"), denying Plaintiff's claim for social security insurance benefits ("SSI"). For the reasons set forth below, it is recommended that the decision of the Commissioner be reversed and remanded for administrative action consistent with this recommendation, pursuant to sentence four of 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).
An application for SSI was filed on behalf of Plaintiff alleging his disability began on August 14, 2012, when he was a child under the age of 18. [R. 185-94.] The claim was denied initially [R. 111-14] and upon reconsideration [R. 97-109]. Thereafter, Plaintiff filed a written request for hearing and, on September 15, 2014, appeared with an attorney andhis mother and testified at a hearing before Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Jerry W. Peace. [R. 36-80.] At the time of the hearing, Plaintiff was over age 18 because he attained age 18 on August 29, 2012. [R. 15.]
The ALJ issued a decision on December 3, 2014, finding Plaintiff not disabled under the Social Security Act ("the Act"). [R. 11-31.] The ALJ undertook two separate analyses: first whether Plaintiff was disabled for the period before age 18; and second whether Plaintiff was disabled beginning at age 18. [R. 11.] At Step 1,2 the ALJ found Plaintiff was born on August 30, 1994, and was therefore in the "Adolescents (age 12 to attainment of age 18)" age group on August 14, 2012, the date the application was filed, and had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the date the application was filed. [R. 15, Findings 1 & 2.] At Step 2, the ALJ found Plaintiff had severe impairments of epilepsy and borderline intellectual functioning. [R. 16, Finding 3.] The ALJ also noted that Plaintiff had a non-severe impairment of borderline diabetes. [R. 16.] At Step 3, the ALJ found that, before attaining age 18, Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled one of the listed impairments in 20 CFR Part 404, Subpart P, Appendix 1. [R. 16, Finding 4.]
The ALJ also found that, before age 18, Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that functionally equaled the listings. [R. 16, Finding 5.] In assessing the six domains of functioning, the ALJ found that, before the age of 18, Plaintiff had marked limitations in acquiring and using information; less than marked limitations in attending and completing tasks; less than marked limitations in interacting and relating withothers; no limitations in moving and manipulating objects; less than marked limitations in his ability to care for himself; and less than marked limitations in his health and physical well-being. [R. 18-23.] Because Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled any listing or functionally equaled the listings, the ALJ found that Plaintiff was not disabled prior to attaining age 18. [R. 23, Finding 6.]
In determining Plaintiff's disability status after age 18, the ALJ first found that Plaintiff had not developed any new impairment or impairments since attaining age 18. [R. 24, Finding 7.] The ALJ noted that Plaintiff's alleged headaches were a non-severe impairment because they were well-controlled until March 2014, when he sustained head trauma. [R. 24.] Proceeding to Step 3, the ALJ found that Plaintiff did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled a listed impairment. [R. 24, Finding 9.] The ALJ specifically considered Listings 12.05B and 12.05D with respect to Plaintiff's intellectual disability. [R. 24-25.] The ALJ also mentioned 12.02 and 12.05C. [R. 24.]
Before addressing Step 4, the ALJ assessed Plaintiff's residual functional capacity ("RFC") and found as follows:
After careful consideration of the entire record, I find that, since attaining age 18, the claimant has had the residual functional capacity to perform a full range of work at all exertional levels but with the following nonexertional limitations: never climb ladders, ropes, scaffolds, ramps, or stairs; avoid even moderate use of moving machinery and moderate exposure to unprotected heights; work is limited to simple, routine, and repetitive tasks, performed in a work environment free of fast-paced production requirements, involving only simple, work-related decisions, and with few, if any, work place changes.
[R. 26, Finding 10.] Based on this RFC, Plaintiff's age (attaining the age of 18), education,lack of past relevant work experience, and the testimony of a vocational expert ("VE"), the ALJ determined that there were jobs that existed in significant numbers in the national economy that Plaintiff could perform. [R. 29, Finding 15.] Accordingly, the ALJ concluded Plaintiff had not been under a disability, as defined in the Act, since August 29, 2012, the day the Plaintiff attained age 18, through the date of the decision. [R. 30, Finding 16.]
Plaintiff requested Appeals Council review of the ALJ's decision, but on April 21, 2016, the Appeals Council declined. [R. 1-6.] Plaintiff filed the instant action for judicial review on June 23, 2016. [Doc. 1.]
Plaintiff contends that errors by the ALJ require the decision to be remanded for further administrative proceedings. [See Doc. 16.] Specifically, Plaintiff alleges the ALJ's findings with respect to the severity of Plaintiff's functional limitations under childhood disability standards is not supported by substantial evidence. [Id. at 6-15.] Plaintiff also contends the ALJ failed to provide an appropriate hypothetical to the VE, in accordance with SSR 11-2p, regarding Plaintiff's work related limitations under adult disability standards. [Id. at 15-16.] Lastly, Plaintiff challenges the ALJ's weighing of the opinion testimony of his mother. [Id. at 16-17.]
The Commissioner contends the decision is supported by substantial evidence and should be affirmed. [Doc. 17.] Specifically, the Commissioner argues that substantial evidence supports the ALJ's findings with respect to the severity of Plaintiff's functional limitations. [Id. at 12-20.] The Commissioner also contends the ALJ properly applied SSR 11-2p in evaluating Plaintiff's disability and extensively discussed numerous considerations relevant to young adults highlighted in Ruling 11-2p, such as Plaintiff's school records,including his individual educational plan ("IEP") and teacher questionnaires; psychological evaluation results; the vocational rehabilitation records; testimony and statements from Plaintiff's mother; Plaintiff's own testimony; and testimony and documentation concerning Plaintiff's activities of daily living. [Id. at 20-21.] Lastly, the Commissioner concludes that the ALJ properly weighed the statements of Plaintiff's mother regarding his limitations and properly concluded that Plaintiff's mother's opinions were less persuasive. [Id. at 21-22.]
The Commissioner's findings of fact are conclusive if supported by substantial evidence. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Substantial evidence is more than a scintilla—i.e., the evidence must do more than merely create a suspicion of the existence of a fact and must include such relevant evidence as a reasonable person would accept as adequate to support the conclusion. See Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)); Laws v. Celebrezze, 368 F.2d 640, 642 (4th Cir. 1966) (citing Woolridge v. Celebrezze, 214 F. Supp. 686, 687 (S.D.W. Va. 1963)) ( ).
Where conflicting evidence "allows reasonable minds to differ as to whether a claimant is disabled, the responsibility for that decision falls on the [Commissioner] (or the [Commissioner's] designate, the ALJ)," not on the reviewing court. Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir. 1996); see also Edwards v. Sullivan, 937 F.2d 580, 584 n.3 (11thCir. 1991) ( that where the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, the court will affirm, even if the reviewer would have reached a contrary result as finder of fact and even if the reviewer finds that the evidence preponderates against the Commissioner's decision). Thus, it is not within the province of a reviewing court to determine the weight of the evidence, nor is it the court's function to substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner so long as the decision is supported by substantial evidence. See Bird v. Comm'r, 699 F.3d 337, 340 (4th Cir. 2012); Laws, 368 F.2d at 642; Snyder v. Ribicoff, 307 F.2d 518, 520 (4th Cir. 1962).
The reviewing court will reverse the Commissioner's decision on plenary review, however, if the decision applies incorrect law or fails to provide the court with sufficient reasoning to determine that the Commissioner properly applied the law. Myers v. Califano, 611 F.2d 980, 982 (4th Cir. 1980); see also Keeton v. Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 21 F.3d 1064, 1066 (11th Cir. 1994). Where the Commissioner's decision "is in clear disregard of the overwhelming weight of the evidence, Congre...
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