Marshall v. City of Sheboygan
| Decision Date | 24 May 1978 |
| Docket Number | No. 77-1272,77-1272 |
| Citation | 577 F.2d 1 |
| Parties | 17 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 763, 23 Wage & Hour Cas. (BN 855, 16 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 8334, 83 Lab.Cas. P 33,668 Ray MARSHALL (Successor to W. J. Usery, Jr.), Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CITY OF SHEBOYGAN, a Municipal Corporation, Defendant-Appellant. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
Michael J. Julka, Madison, Wis., Clarence H. Mertz, Sheboygan, Wis., for defendant-appellant.
Lois G. Williams, Atty., Labor Dept., Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff-appellee.
Before SWYGERT and BAUER, Circuit Judges, and CAMPBELL, Senior District Judge. 1
We must determine on this appeal whether Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to extend the Equal Pay Act to state and local governmental employees. We hold that it does.
On March 26, 1976 the Secretary of Labor commenced this action in the district court pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act, as amended, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201 et seq., to enjoin the defendant City of Sheboygan from violating the equal pay provision of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 206(d). The Secretary alleged that the City discriminated against women employed as custodians in its public schools by paying them wages at a lower rate than that paid men doing "equal work on jobs the performance of which requires equal skill, effort, and responsibility and which are performed under similar working conditions." Section 206(d)(1).
On October 1, 1976 the City filed a motion for a judgment on the pleadings contending that under National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 96 S.Ct. 2465, 49 L.Ed.2d 245 (1976), Congress does not have the constitutional authority to regulate the compensation paid by a state or local government to its employees. The district court denied defendant's motion and certified the issue for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). Usery v. City of Sheboygan, 13 E.P.D. P 11,406 (E.D.Wis.1976). This court permitted the appeal to be taken on January 11, 1977.
On appeal the City reasserts its contention that this case is controlled by National League of Cities. It argues that National League of Cities, in striking down as unconstitutional the 1974 amendments extending the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act, struck down all the 1974 amendments including the one extending the equal pay provision. In the alternative, the city maintains that the ratio decidendi of National League of Cities compels the conclusion that the Equal Pay Act cannot be applied to States and their political subdivisions. Because we reject both arguments, we affirm the order of the district court.
The Equal Pay Act of 1963, an amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, prohibits sex discrimination in the payment of wages. 2 Enacted pursuant to the Commerce Clause, the Equal Pay Act was based upon a congressional finding that sex-based wage differentials have a substantial adverse impact on interstate commerce. 3 The means chosen by Congress to remedy this situation was to require that equal work be rewarded by equal pay. Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 U.S. 188, 195, 94 S.Ct. 2223, 41 L.Ed.2d 1 (1974).
When enacted in 1963 the Equal Pay Act, as part of the Fair Labor Standards Act, covered only employers engaged in private enterprise; States and their political subdivisions were specifically excluded from its coverage. 4 In 1966, however, the definition of employer in the Fair Labor Standards Act was expanded to include state and local governmental workers employed in hospitals, institutions, and schools. 5 In 1974 this definition was further expanded to include a "public agency," which is broadly defined as "the government of a State or political subdivision thereof; any agency . . . (of) a State, or a political subdivision of a State; or any interstate governmental agency." 6 Thus, the 1974 amendments extended the coverage of the Fair Labor Standards Act () to nearly all state and local governmental employees. 7
The 1974 amendments were challenged in National League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 96 S.Ct. 2465, 49 L.Ed.2d 245 (1976). There the Supreme Court held unconstitutional the minimum wage and overtime provisions of the Fair Labor Standards Act as applied to state and local governmental employees. The basis of the Court's decision was not that the attempted extension of federal authority went beyond the scope of the Commerce Clause, but that such extension was prohibited by the Tenth Amendment which restricts the exercise of power otherwise expressly delegated to Congress.
The City first argues that the holding of National League of Cities governs this case because the Supreme Court struck down the definitions of " employer" and "employee" contained in the 1966 and 1974 amendments. The effect of National League of Cities, according to the City, is to erase these amendments from the statute books and to return the Equal Pay Act to its pre-1966 status. Because the 1963 Act applied only to private employers, the City maintains that the Act cannot be applied to it.
We believe that the City has incorrectly interpreted the holding of National League of Cities. The 1974 amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act were not stricken across the board as the City suggests. Although the opinion frequently speaks of the "1974 Amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act" as the subject matter of its analysis, the Court's discussion and examples of the effects of these amendments make clear that the Court ruled only on the extension of the minimum wage and overtime provisions. 8 Nowhere does the Court discuss the equal pay provision of the Fair Labor Standards Act.
Moreover, National League of Cities does not vitiate entirely the 1974 amendments as to the minimum wage and overtime provisions. The Court found the amendments unconstitutional only "insofar as (they) operate to directly displace the States' freedom to structure integral operations in areas of traditional governmental functions . . . ." 426 U.S. at 852, 96 S.Ct. at 2474. 9 The Court thus recognized that the minimum wage and overtime provisions are still applicable to the States in areas which are not "integral parts of (a State's) governmental activities." 426 U.S. at 854 n. 18, 96 S.Ct. at 2475. State operation of a railroad was noted as one such example where these provisions would still apply.
We agree with the Third Circuit that rather than striking down the 1974 amendments for all purposes, National League of Cities is limited and merely gives the States and their subdivisions an affirmative defense against actions brought by the Secretary of Labor to enforce minimum wage and overtime provisions against state and local governmental employers. Usery v. Allegheny County Institution Dist., 544 F.2d 148, 155 n. 11 (3d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 946, 97 S.Ct. 1582, 51 L.Ed.2d 793 (1977).
In a related argument, the City maintains that because the Equal Pay Act is only a subsection of the Minimum Wage Law, 10 the equal pay provision derivatively draws its jurisdiction from the minimum wage provision. According to the City, if the latter provision cannot be constitutionally applied to a governmental employer, it follows a fortiori that neither can the former. In support thereof the City cites 29 U.S.C. § 206(d)(1): 11
No employer having employees subject to any provisions of this section shall discriminate . . . between employees on the basis of sex by paying wages to employees in such establishment at a rate less than the rate at which he pays wages to employees of the opposite sex . . . . (emphasis added.)
The City interprets the phrase "of this section" to refer to all of section 206 of the Fair Labor Standards Act. We do not agree.
Although the Equal Pay Act and the Minimum Wage Law are both housed in the same section, they are distinct provisions. The Equal Pay Act, enacted twenty-five years after the Fair Labor Standards Act, has its own extensive legislative history 12 and is aimed at a separate evil the prohibition of "discrimination on account of sex in the payment of wages." Preamble, Equal Pay Act, Pub.L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56. This legislative history clearly establishes that the Equal Pay Act was added to the Fair Labor Standards Act primarily to utilize existing administrative and enforcement machinery. 13
Even if the Equal Pay Act is regarded as a mere amendment to the Fair Labor Standards Act, it is subject to a severability provision which reads:
If any provision of this chapter or the application of such provision to any person or circumstance is held invalid, the remainder of this chapter and the application of such provision to other persons or circumstances shall not be affected thereby.
29 U.S.C. § 219 (emphasis added). The normal presumption of divisibility created by such a provision 14 is even stronger here since, as noted above, the equal pay provision has a different legislative history and effects a different policy than the minimum wage and overtime provisions. 15
We conclude that the holding of National League of Cities does not govern this case. This, however, does not end the inquiry because the City further argues that the ratio decidendi of National League of Cities controls the outcome of this case.
In applying National League of Cities it is important to note what the Supreme Court did and did not hold. It did not hold that Congress lacked the affirmative grant of legislative authority under the Commerce Clause to reach the wages and hours of state employees. Rather, it invalidated the 1974 amendments because the Tenth Amendment was interpreted as prohibiting Congress from exercising its authority.
It is equally clear that the Tenth Amendment does not bar Congress from ever regulating the States qua States. This is...
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