Marshall v. City of Farmington Hills, 13-2011
| Decision Date | 27 August 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 13-2011,13-2011 |
| Parties | DAVID MARSHALL AND CHANDRA MARSHALL, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. CITY OF FARMINGTON HILLS, et al., Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION
File Name: 14a0672n.06
DAMON J. KEITH, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff David Marshall entered into a release-dismissal agreement with the City of Farmington Hills ("the City"), whereby his pending criminal charges were to be dismissed if a) he released the City from civil liability, and b) the two parties could agree to the wording of a press release. The parties could not agree to a press release and Plaintiffs filed this action in the district court. The City filed a motion to dismiss, which the district court granted. We reversed that decision and remanded to the district court to determine the validity of the original release-dismissal agreement. The district court found the agreement valid, and again dismissed the action. Plaintiffs appealed this decision to our Court. We REVERSE the decision of the district court and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
On December 13, 2006, Plaintiff David Marshall, an African-American Detroit police officer, was pulled over while off-duty after running a red light in Farmington Hills, Michigan, where he resides. Marshall, who was in uniform at the time, was ordered to exit the vehicle and to remove his service weapon. Marshall stated that he was leery of motioning towards his firearm, refused to remove it, and instead requested that the officers, who were white, call a supervisor to assist the scene. Upon arrival of the supervisor, who was also white:
When [the supervisor] exited his vehicle, Meister reached for Mr. Marshall's weapon, but Mr. Marshall pushed his arm away. Meister yelled, 'That's it!' and Jarrett immediately returned to his patrol car and retrieved an electronic stun gun known as a TASER weapon.
Marshall was twice tasered, and, while incapacitated, the officers removed his firearm. Marshall was arrested, brought to the Farmington Hills police station, and ordered to strip to his underwear. Marshall was charged with obstructing law enforcement, and his arraignment was scheduled for January 8, 2007.
Roughly seven months prior to this incident, Marshall had physically disciplined his son. Consequently, the Farmington Hills Police Department undertook an official inquest into allegations of child abuse. According to the lead detective on the case, Stacey Swanderski, the City Attorney failed to contact her, and, as to the best of her knowledge, the case was closed as of August, 2006. On December 13, 2006, the same day of Marshall's arrest, Swanderski's supervisor, Scott Cronin, was contacted by his supervisor about the status of the child abuse investigation. In turn, Cronin contacted Swanderski at home (while she was on medical leave) to likewise inquire. The re-initiation of the matter culminated with the Farmington Hills PoliceDepartment's decision to send the misdemeanor child abuse file to the Oakland County Prosecutor's Office. That office then charged Marshall with child abuse on January 5, 2007.
With the obstruction charge still pending,1 Marshall went to trial on the child abuse charge. Marshall won. Following this resolution, on June 21, 2007, the parties—the Marshalls, or "Plaintiffs," and "the City"—put a conditional settlement agreement on the record before the state judge. The terms of the conditional agreement (the "release-dismissal") were that the City would dismiss the obstruction charges and Plaintiffs would release the City from liability, contingent upon the parties (1) reaching agreement on the exact wording of a press release about the dismissal of the charges, and (2) agreeing on the terms of a release of civil liability.
The parties were unable to reach an agreement as to the exact wording of the press release. Marshall submitted revisions to the City's initial draft, which included the following edits: "NO Deal, Come Again"; "Hell NO"; NO Way (twice); "more neutral"; and a giant "X" struck through the entire document. In turn, the City submitted a revised draft. Both drafts relayed that the charges against Marshall had been dismissed and included the statement: "[t]he disposition of this case in no way reflects negatively on my officers' excellent work records or professional reputations."
Plaintiffs assert that the City was recalcitrant in failing to acknowledge that its officers were involved in wrongdoing, and that, as per Marshall's attorney, the City did not want to fully exonerate Marshall. According to Marshall's attorney:
At a hearing on August 14, 2007, Marshall, having viewed any further negotiations as futile, requested a trial date on the obstruction charge. The trial judge declined to grant his motion and held that the release-dismissal was valid, even though the parties failed to agree to the language of the press release. The court stated:
My read of this is that this case is over . . . . [I]t's interesting to note that maybe there's a holdup for a press release. Frankly, something that happened [earlier], now that it's August 14th is probably moot anyway. I'm not sure that the press has any great interest in this file and the Court does have a public record which notes a dismissal and if the press is interested, that's certainly what the court file would show.
The state court, issuing the ruling from the bench, dismissed the criminal obstruction charges and found the parties to be bound by the terms of the release-dismissal agreement. The state court later issued a perfunctory order stating "that Plaintiff's Motion for Trial Date is hereby denied [and the criminal charges] are dismissed with prejudice."
Nevertheless, on July 29, 2009, Plaintiffs filed suit in the Eastern District of Michigan, alleging violations of 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985, as well as state law claims of loss of consortium, assault and battery, excessive force, and false arrest. On November 3, 2009, Defendants filed an amended motion for summary judgment, arguing that Plaintiffs' suit was barred by collateral estoppel. In a March 1, 2010 opinion, the district court dismissed the suit, finding that the release-dismissal agreement barred Plaintiffs' civil suit and that they werecollaterally estopped from challenging the validity of the release-dismissal. Plaintiffs appealed to this Court, and we reversed and remanded on May 1, 2012. Specifically, we remanded to the district court to evaluate the validity of the release-dismissal agreement, directing the district court to consider whether the "agreement was voluntary; [whether] there is . . . evidence of prosecutorial misconduct, and [whether] enforcement of this agreement would . . . adversely affect the relevant public interests." Marshall v. City of Farmington Hills, 479 F. App'x 661, 665 (6th Cir. 2012).
On April 3, 2013, the state court entered a written order nunc pro tunc2 explicitly incorporating the oral statements made during the original 2007 hearing. Subsequently, and on this basis alone, the district court, in an opinion issued on July 2, 2013, held that Marshall voluntarily entered into the release-dismissal agreement, that the agreement was valid and enforceable, and that it barred Plaintiffs' claims. Accordingly, the district court granted the City's motion to dismiss. Marshall appeals.
Although Defendants labeled their motion a "motion to dismiss," Defendants employed the standard used for summary judgment motions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56.Accordingly, our review is de novo. Fuhr v. Hazel Park Sch. Dist., 710 F.3d 668, 673 (6th Cir. 2013). Under this standard, the Court construes all reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party. Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., Ltd. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The party opposing the motion "must do more than simply show that there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts." Id. at 586. The dispute over a material fact must be "genuine, that is, if the evidence is such that a reasonable juror could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986) (internal quotation marks omitted). After considering all of the record evidence, "[t]he court shall grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." FED. R. CIV. P. 56(A).
We remanded this matter to the district court to determine whether the policies underlying § 1983 render the release-dismissal unenforceable as matter of federal law. Marshall, 479 F. App'x. at 665. Although release-dismissal agreements are not per se illegal, see Town of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386, 392 (1987), "[t]he availability of such agreements may threaten important public interests" embodied in our civil rights laws, id at 395 (plurality opinion). As Justice O'Connor explained:
Permitting such releases may tempt public officials to bring frivolous criminal charges in order to deter meritorious civil complaints. The risk and expense of a criminal trial can easily intimidate even an innocent person whose civil and constitutional rights have been violated. The coercive power of criminal process may be twisted to serve the end of suppressing...
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