Marshall v. District of Columbia

• Decision Date: 18 September 1978
• Docket Number: No. 12193.,12193.
• Citation: 391 A.2d 1374
• Parties: Melvin A. MARSHALL, Appellant, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellee.
• Court: D.C. Court of Appeals

391 A.2d 1374

Melvin A. MARSHALL, Appellant, v. DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA, Appellee.

No. 12193.

District of Columbia Court of Appeals.

Submitted February 23, 1978.

Decided September 18, 1978.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Melvin A. Marshall, pro se.

Martin L. Grossman, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D. C., with whom John R. Risher, Jr., Corp. Counsel, at the time this case was submitted, Richard W. Barton, Deputy Corp. Counsel, and S. Perry Jones Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D. C., were on brief, for appellee.

Before KERN, YEAGLEY and FERREN, Associate Judges.

FERREN, Associate Judge:

This is a false arrest and battery case. Plaintiff-appellant Melvin A. Marshall maintains, first, that the trial court's entry of judgment for defendant-appellee District of Columbia (District) at the close of plaintiff's case was erroneous because it was not supported by the evidence. He also contends that the trial court's grant of defendant's request to withdraw answers to admissions was erroneous because the District did not demonstrate good cause for withdrawal. We agree that the evidence of record at the close of plaintiff's case did not justify entry of judgment for the District, pursuant to Super.Ct.Civ.R. 41(b). We accordingly reverse and remand for further proceedings.

I. The Facts; Trial Court Proceedings

The only evidence presented at trial, constituting plaintiff's side of the story, was the testimony of Mr. Marshall, three exhibits offered and admitted in his case, and certain of the District's answers to Mr. Marshall's requests for admissions. This evidence indicates that on March 4, 1975, as Mr. Marshall emerged from the Dupont East Apartment House where he had been visiting a friend, he saw three individuals, one man and two women, seated inside a black automobile. He ran across the street to beat a changing traffic light. The three individuals left the automobile and pursued him hurriedly. The man walked up to Mr. Marshall, "flashed something," and said "Police Officers. Stop!"

Mr. Marshall asked why they were stopping him. He learned that they thought a protrusion from his back pocket, under his topcoat, was a gun. He showed them that it was a folded copy of the District's gun regulations. The male officer requested Mr. Marshall's birth date. He refused to give it, based upon his "knowledge" as an ex-policeman that the police had no right to demand such information. When pressed by the officer, Mr. Marshall replied he was skeptical that the three were actually police officers.

Mr. Marshall testified that he feared physical harm because the man seemed intoxicated and, further, because Mr. Marshall knew that the area was dangerous based on his previous work as a narcotics officer. After a further exchange, during which the officer told Mr. Marshall that he could not leave until he gave his birth date, the officer said that he was going to call a transport to take Mr. Marshall in for questioning. Mr. Marshall responded "good," because that would prove whether or not they were police.

A patrol car arrived 15 to 20 minutes after the initial stop. After a "friendly" ride to the police station, Mr. Marshall disclosed his name, as well as his status as an ex-policeman, to an inquiring sergeant (he had not given this information to the officers on the street). He then called his brother. The police confirmed Mr. Marshall's status as an ex-officer and told him he was free to go. He then filed a complaint with the Department and, apparently, also filed a notice of intent to sue the District pursuant to D.C.Code 1973, § 12-309. On May 19, 1975, Mr. Marshall filed a complaint in Superior Court for false arrest.

During the pendency of this action, on April 27, 1976, while walking on New Hampshire Avenue, appellant Marshall passed two police officers at a call box at the intersection of New Hampshire and N Streets, N.W. One officer stopped him, removed an eyeglass case from appellant's pocket, and looked inside it. Mr. Marshall refused to give any information and inquired as to the "Terry" basis for the stop. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868, 20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). The officers replied that they thought he had a gun in his back pocket. Mr. Marshall opened his coat and displayed that the bulge they had seen was created by folded papers — pleadings in this lawsuit. He expressed a desire to leave, whereupon the officer told him that the police had the right to hold him for 10 minutes. Mr. Marshall tried three times to continue on his way but was prevented from doing so despite his protests that they had no right to hold him. Eventually, the officers permitted him to depart from what he characterized as a "strange and friendly" stop.

Mr. Marshall sent a letter of complaint to the Mayor. He then amended his complaint in the present action to include this latter incident, charging false arrest and battery, in violation of his constitutional rights.

Nonjury trial commenced on February 3, 1977. Preliminarily, the District requested permission to file overdue answers to plaintiff's second set of requests for admissions. Mr. Marshall objected to the late filing, arguing that under the rules of civil procedure such requests were deemed admitted by virtue of the defendant's failure to answer and were conclusive upon the issues raised. After argument, the court found little excuse for the District's dereliction but nonetheless granted the District's request; the judge could see no prejudice to Mr. Marshall from permitting withdrawal of the deemed admissions in favor of filing actual responses. The judge extended to Mr. Marshall the opportunity for a continuance to review the answers, but he declined.

After Mr. Marshall had testified at trial, he requested that certain of the District's answers be admitted into evidence. These disclosed that Mr. Marshall is a former Metropolitan Police Department probationary officer; that on March 4, the police officers did not tell Mr. Marshall that he had no obligation to accompany them across town, although, as an ex-officer, he "should have" known this; and that Mr. Marshall was the one who requested the police transport vehicle. As to the April 27 episode, the District's answers disclose that an officer did reach into Mr. Marshall's pocket and extract and search his eyeglass case.

After plaintiff Marshall rested, the District moved for judgment in its favor. The court granted the motion. In his oral findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial judge stated that he could not conclude that Mr. Marshall was, or even believed he was, "arrested" during either incident. The judge further stated that the March 4 stop was justified and the trip to the station house voluntary. The judge added that the April 27 stop was both reasonable and proper. With respect to the alleged battery, the court found all physical contacts, including the April 27 search, to have been reasonable. Overall, the court concluded that Mr. Marshall had not established a "prima facie case." Finally, the court bolstered its decision with the finding that Mr. Marshall had sustained no damage and no abridgement of his constitutional rights. The court indicated that he had accorded considerable weight to Mr. Marshall's chronic litigiousness. (Mr. Marshall testified that he had filed numerous lawsuits against private parties, the federal government, and the District government — including one against the police department based on termination of his employment for refusing to cut his hair.)

The court entered judgment on February 3, 1977, and a more detailed order on February 9, 1977. This order incorporated the court's February 3 findings and conclusions and specified that the court had "considered all of plaintiff's evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff" before granting the District's motion.

II. The Requests for Admissions

Appellant claims that the District's failure to demonstrate "good cause" or "excusable neglect" renders erroneous the trial judge's decision to permit the District to withdraw its "admissions by default" and file "actual responses" to his second set of requests for admissions. We disagree.

Superior Court Civil Rule 36(b) permits the court to allow

withdrawal or amendment [of admissions] when the presentation of the merits of the action will be subserved thereby and the party who obtained the admission fails to satisfy the court that withdrawal or amendment will prejudice him in maintaining his action or defense on the merits. The rule does not impose a "good cause" or "excusable neglect" burden upon the moving party; rather, it focuses on the lack of prejudice to the opposing party and on the policy for furthering just and complete resolution of the merits. See Wright & Miller, Fed. Prac. & Proc., Civil §§ 2257, 2264 (1970) (interpreting the identical federal rule). Accordingly, unless a party demonstrates prejudice by reliance upon previous admissions, the trial court can and should extend permission to withdraw or amend. Id. See French v. United States, 416 F.2d 1149, 1152 (9th Cir. 1969); Williams v. Krieger, 61 F.D.R. 142, 144 (S.D.N.Y.1973); Pleasant Hill Bank v. United States, 60 F.R.D. 1, 3 (D.Mo.1973).

We cannot fault the trial court's decision to exercise its discretion in favor of the District. Although the judge found that the District's delay in answering was not excusable (based as it was on the hope that a pending motion to dismiss would be resolved in its favor and thus render the requests moot), he concluded, nonetheless, that Mr. Marshall would suffer no prejudice if the "deemed" admissions were withdrawn and the actual responses filed. He further found that the confusion inherent in the plethora of pleadings in the suit required Mr. Marshall to share the blame for any delay consequent upon such confusion. The trial court also extended to Mr. Marshall an opportunity for a continuance, in the event that he believed his case would be hampered by...