Marshall v. Gore, 86-1626
Decision Date | 01 May 1987 |
Docket Number | No. 86-1626,86-1626 |
Citation | 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1143,506 So.2d 91 |
Parties | 1987-1 Trade Cases P 67,555, 2 IER Cases 318, 12 Fla. L. Weekly 1143 Marvin E. MARSHALL, Appellant, v. Fred GORE, a/k/a F.L. Gore and M.R.B., Inc., a Florida corporation, Appellees. |
Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Deeann D. Athan of Diaz, Athan & Dee, P.A., Tampa, for appellant.
John H. Rains, III of Annis, Mitchell, Cockey, Edwards & Roehn, P.A., Tampa, for appellees.
Appellant, Marvin E. Marshall, appeals the trial court order that enforced a noncompete clause and enjoined appellant from engaging in or being employed by any firm involved in the development and marketing of computer software, or in any business that competed with appellee, M.R.B., Inc.
Appellant, a ruminant nutritionist and a computer programmer, developed a formula and computer software for feeding dairy cows. Appellant contracted to work for M.R.B., Inc. The employment contract contained a noncompete agreement that appellant would not engage in the business of development or marketing of computer software, or in any business that competed with M.R.B., Inc. for five years from the date his employment ceased. The five-year period was later reduced to two years.
Appellant argues that the noncompete agreement violates section 542.33, Florida Statutes (1981) because the restrictions are not reasonably limited in time and area. We believe that under Auto Club Affiliates, Inc. v. Donahey, 281 So.2d 239 (Fla. 2d DCA 1973), the employer had a legitimate interest in protecting its business, and appellant had a legitimate interest in maintaining a livelihood. While we believe that an injunction was proper and was not an unreasonable restraint of trade, we question the breadth of the restrictions imposed. The evidence is sufficient to warrant the nationwide scope since appellee had sold forty-two software programs to dairies in Pennsylvania, Iowa, Wisconsin, Ohio, Vermont, Missouri and Oregon. It also advertised in a nationwide dairy publication. However, we believe that the scope of the injunction prohibiting appellant from participating in any computer software business is too broad. Appellant should not be completely prohibited from all participation in the computer software business. See Capelouto v. Orkin Exterminating Co. of Florida, 183 So.2d 532 (Fla.1966).
An injunction must state with reasonable certainty what the defendant is prohibited from doing. Somerstein v. City of Miami Beach, 319...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Hapney v. Central Garage, Inc.
...obvious and sole purpose of the covenant was to exclude Forbes from competing with Flatley in Pinellas County. And in Marshall v. Gore, 506 So.2d 91, 92 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987), we limited the scope of an injunction to protect only the "legitimate business interests" of the Perhaps most fundamen......
-
MedX Inc. of Florida v. Ranger, Civ. A. No. 91-3099.
...to mean that the clause was all-inclusive and spanned the globe in its effect. However, despite MedX's citation of Marshall v. Gore, 506 So.2d 91 (Fla.App.2d Dist. 1987) for the proposition that a nationwide noncompete covenant can be enforced, a worldwide scope for this agreement would be ......
-
Mathieu v. Old Town Flower Shops Inc., 90-2468
...the covenant itself. We regard three years as the outside period that the court could have found reasonable. See, e.g., Marshall v. Gore, 506 So.2d 91 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987) (five year period reduced to two years); and Dorminy v. Frank B. Hall & Co., 464 So.2d 154 (Fla. 5th DCA 1985) (three yea......
-
Southern Wine And Spirits Of Am. Inc v. Simpkins
...not substantially likely that Southern Wine will be able to defeat this argument. Southern Wine primarily cites Marshall v. Gore, 506 So. 2d 91 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1987), to support its claim that the covenant's geographic scope is reasonable. In Marshall, the court granted a preliminary i......