Marshall v. Illinois Ed. Ass'n, 77-3146.
| Decision Date | 07 January 1981 |
| Docket Number | No. 77-3146.,77-3146. |
| Citation | 511 F. Supp. 144 |
| Parties | Ray MARSHALL, Secretary of Labor, Plaintiff, v. ILLINOIS EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Central District of Illinois |
Gerald D. Fines, U. S. Atty., John Germeraad, Asst. U. S. Atty., Springfield, Ill., Janet Graney, Ronald Spann, Herman Grant, Regional Sol., U. S. Dept. of Labor, Chicago, Ill., Barbara A. Babcock, Civ. Div., U. S. Dept. of Justice, Hattie Baldwin, Trial Atty., Gen. Litigation Section, Washington, D. C., for plaintiff.
Irving Friedman, Nancy E. Tripp, Katz, Friedman, Schur & Eagle, Chicago, Ill., for defendant.
On September 30, 1977, a complaint was filed by the Secretary of Labor against defendant, Illinois Education Association, pursuant to Title IV of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (29 U.S.C. § 401, et seq.). Plaintiff's complaint alleged that the Illinois Education Association (hereinafter IEA) was a labor organization within the meaning of Section 3(i) of the Act (29 U.S.C. § 402(i)), and that the defendant had violated Section 401(d) of the Act (29 U.S.C. § 481(d)) by appointing a Treasurer rather than electing a Treasurer by secret ballot among the members in good standing who had themselves been elected by secret ballot. The Secretary sought an order requiring defendant to conduct an election for the office of treasurer under the supervision of the Secretary of Labor.
On October 10, 1978, this Court issued an order granting plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment, holding that the position in question was within the definition of "officer" as set forth in the Act; therefore, the treasurer should be elected in accordance with the provisions of the Act rather than appointed. The Court's order of October 10, 1978, left the issue of whether defendant was a labor organization within the meaning of the Act to be decided at a subsequent hearing.
This issue was resolved without the necessity of a hearing as the result of a Stipulation entered into by the parties on April 22, 1980, in which defendant acknowledged that it was a labor organization within the meaning of the Act and, therefore, subject to the provisions of Title IV. In addition, it was agreed by the parties that the plaintiff was entitled to the entry of an order requiring defendant to conduct an election for the office of secretary-treasurer under plaintiff's supervision.
The issue now confronting this Court is the alleged conflict between § 401(e) of the Act (29 U.S.C. § 481(e)), and Article VI, § 4(e)(2) and Article VII, § 1(e) of the bylaws of the Illinois Education Association. Section 401(e) provides:
(e) In any election required by this section which is to be held by secret ballot a reasonable opportunity shall be given for the nomination of candidates and every member in good standing shall be eligible to be a candidate and to hold office (subject to section 504 of this title and to reasonable qualifications uniformly imposed) and shall have the right to vote for or otherwise support the candidate or candidates of his choice, ...
The Illinois Education Association's bylaws which allegedly conflict with the above statute are set forth below:
The plaintiff contends that qualifications for delegates and qualifications for the Board of Directors as set forth in the ByLaws of the Illinois Education Association are not reasonable within the meaning of the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (29 U.S.C. § 401 et seq.). It is well settled that the reasonableness of the particular eligibility requirement must be measured in terms with the command in the Act that unions conduct "free and democratic Union elections." A qualification is judged not by the burden it imposes on an individual candidate but by its effect on the free and democratic processes of union government. Local 3489, United Steelworkers of America v. Usery, 429 U.S. 305, 97 S.Ct. 611, 50 L.Ed.2d 502 (1977). Any qualification must result in a reasonable opportunity to become a candidate, keeping in mind the Congressional policy that union election procedures be both fair and democratic. Hodgson v. District 6, United Mine Workers, 474 F.2d 940 (6th Cir. 1973). Clearly, candidacy qualifications which unduly restrict the ranks of those who might run in opposition to incumbents are not reasonable qualifications within the meaning of the Act. Such unduly restrictive candidacy qualifications result in abuses of entrenched leadership that the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act was enacted to curb. See, Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel and Club Employees' Union, 391 U.S. 492, 88 S.Ct. 1743, 20 L.Ed.2d 763 (1968). Qualifications which enact almost absolute bars to candidacy of large numbers of union members have been found to be in violation of the Act. See, Local 3489, United Steelworkers of America v. Usery, 429 U.S. 305, 97 S.Ct. 611, 50 L.Ed.2d 502 (1977); Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel and Club Employees' Union, Local 6, supra.
On the other hand, the Act was not intended to take autonomy away from the labor unions. Instead, it was designed to promote union autonomy while fostering the highest standards of responsibility and ethical conduct. In Wirtz v. Hotel, Motel and Club Employees' Union, Local 6 No. 513, 381 F.2d 500 (2d Cir. 1967), the Court stated at p. 504:
In deciding the issue of reasonableness we must keep in mind the fact that the act did not purport to take away from labor unions the governance of their own internal affairs and hand that governance over either to the courts or to the Secretary of Labor. The Act strictly limits official interference in the internal affairs of the unions... The Act prescribes only certain basic minima and leaves the area not covered by these minimum prescriptions to the decisions of the unions themselves.
In Senate Report No. 187, the Committee stated that one of the governing principles of the proposed legislation was that of minimum interference by Government in the internal affairs of any private organization. See, S.Rep. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (1959), reprinted in (1959) U.S.Code Cong. and Ad.News, pp. 2318, 2323. The Committee believed that only essential standards should be imposed by legislation. A second governing principle of the legislation, according to the Senate Report, was the assumption that the individual members are fully competent to regulate union affairs, given the maintenance of minimum democratic safeguards. In addition, the Committee opposed any paternalistic attempt to prescribe detailed procedures and standards for the conduct of union business. Id.
In sum, reasonableness is apparently a balancing process between "free and democratic elections" and the express Congressional policy of leaving to the unions the maximum of self-government.
Reasonableness is not to be assessed in vacui, but in the light of the purposes which the Congress sought to achieve and the evils which it sought to eliminate. Union democracy, effective self-government, abolition of oligarchical cliques and self-serving union officers were in the forefront of Congressional thinking.
Wirtz v. Local 153 Glass Bottle Blowers Association, 244 F.Supp. 745, 749 (D.C.Pa. 1965), vacated on other grounds 372 F.2d 86 (3d Cir. 1966), reversed on other grounds 389 U.S. 463, 88 S.Ct. 643, 19 L.Ed.2d 705 (1968). Ultimately, the question of reasonableness must be decided by the courts in the light of the facts of particular cases, taking into consideration the propriety, wisdom or expediency of the regulations. Id.
The Department of Labor's interpretation of the...
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