Marshall v. Ind. Univ.

• Decision Date: 15 March 2016
• Docket Number: Case No. 1:15-cv-00726-TWP-DKL
• Citation: 170 F.Supp.3d 1201
• Parties: Jeremiah Marshall, Plaintiff, v. Indiana University, Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis, Brian Tomlinson, Jason Spratt, Maria Hinton, Chad Ahren, Melanie Peterson, and Diana Sims-Harris, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of Indiana

170 F.Supp.3d 1201

Jeremiah Marshall, Plaintiff,

v.Indiana University, Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis, Brian Tomlinson, Jason Spratt, Maria Hinton, Chad Ahren, Melanie Peterson, and Diana Sims-Harris, Defendants.

Case No. 1:15-cv-00726-TWP-DKL

United States District Court, S.D. Indiana, Indianapolis Division.

Signed March 15, 2016

Jeff Neuenschwander, Jessica A. Wegg, Jonathan Charles Little, Saeed & Little LLP, Indianapolis, IN, for Plaintiff.

Jonathan D. Mattingly, Hamish S. Cohen, Mattingly Burke Cohen & Biederman LLP, Indianapolis, IN, for Defendants.

ENTRY ON DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO DISMISS

TANYA WALTON PRATT

, JUDGE, United States District Court, Southern District of Indiana

This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Filing No. 11). While a student at Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis (“IUPUI”), Plaintiff Jeremiah Marshall (“Marshall”) was suspended, expelled and banned from all Indiana University campuses, following accusations of sexual assault by a female student. On April 6, 2015, Marshal filed this action in the Marion Superior Court, alleging that Defendants' policies and response to the accusations denied him due process and free speech rights under both the state and federal Constitutions, and violated his rights under Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972 (“Title IX”), and the Fourth, Fifth and Fourteenth Amendment's to the United States Constitution. On May 6, 2015, the Defendants removed the case to federal court and filed their motion to dismiss. For the reasons stated below, the Court grants in part and denies in part the Defendants' motion.

I. BACKGROUND

The following facts are taken from Marshall's Complaint (Filing No. 1–1) and must be accepted as true solely for purposes of the motions to dismiss. See Erickson v. Pardus , 551 U.S. 89, 94, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081 (2007)

(“[W]hen ruling on a defendant's motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in the complaint.”).

In 2014, Marshall was a nineteen year old male attending IUPUI. He was a sophomore student in good standing and worked as a paid Resident Advisor for IUPUI. On September 7, 2014, at approximately 4:00 a.m., Marshall was awaken and questioned by an IUPUI Campus Police officer regarding an accusation of sexual misconduct by another student living in his building. That same day, Marshall was placed on interim suspension and evicted from his student housing without a hearing and without being presented with the evidence against him. According to Marshall, there is no physical evidence of the alleged sexual assault. (Filing No. 14 at 26.) No criminal charges have been filed regarding the allegations against Marshall. (Filing No. 17 at 8.)

The next day, September 8, 2014, Marshall emailed Defendant, Jason Spratt (“Dean Spratt”), the Dean of Students at IUPUI, to appeal the interim suspension and eviction from campus. Dean Spratt promptly responded that the interim suspension would remain in place and that Marshall was only permitted on campus for the purpose of meeting with the Office of Student Conduct. While on interim suspension, Marshall was not permitted to attend classes or to access the on-campus Counseling and Psychological Services Center.

On September 17, 2014, Marshall emailed Dean Spratt, Defendant Brian Tomlinson (“Mr. Tomlinson”), the Assistant Dean and Director of Student Conduct, and Defendant Maria Hinton (“Ms. Hinton”), the Assistant Director of Student Conduct, for permission to meet with the Office of Student Conduct. Later that day, Marshall and his father met with Mr. Tomlinson. The next day, September 18, 2014, Marshall received a letter from Ms. Hinton stating that he was accused of on-campus personal misconduct.

Five days later, on September 22, 2014, Marshall met with Ms. Hinton and informed her that he too had been sexually assaulted by another female student. (Filing No. 1–1 at 5.) However, the Defendants never investigated Marshall's reported sexual assault. (Filing No. 1–1 at 11; Filing No. 14 at 27.)

At some point thereafter, Marshall was permitted to view the evidence against him in a closed room at IUPUI, but he was not allowed to have his own copy nor was he allowed to photograph the evidence. On October 13, 2014, Dean Tomlinson provided Marshall with a witness list but prohibited Marshall from contacting any of the witnesses and instructed him that he should not contact other IUPUI students to testify on his behalf.

On October 15, 2014, Marshall retained counsel to represent him in the upcoming disciplinary hearing. Marshall's legal team was similarly denied copies of the evidence, which exceeded over one hundred pages in length. (Filing No. 1–1 at 7; Filing No. 14 at 24.) After intervention by IUPUI's General Counsel, Marshall's attorneys were eventually permitted to read the evidence on the IUPUI campus and take handwritten notes. However, in order to prevent the attorneys from copying the evidence, they were not allowed to take their cell phones into the room. (Filing No. 1–1 at 7; Filing No. 14 at 24.)

On October 30, 2014, 53 days after his interim suspension and eviction occurred, Marshall attended a disciplinary hearing. (Filing No. 1–1 at 8.) The proceeding took place before a three-person panel, consisting of Defendants Dr. Chad Ahren, Dr. Melanie Peterson and Diana Sims-Harris (“the Panel”). In addition, Dean Tomlinson served as a non-voting coordinator on the Panel.

Ms. Hinton, a non-practicing attorney and cum laude graduate of the University of Notre Dame Law School, presented IUPUI's case against Marshall, presenting evidence and questioning and cross-examining witnesses. In contrast, Marshall was forced to represent himself at the hearing. IUPUI only allowed one of Marshall's three attorneys to be present with him at the hearing, and the sole attorney was not permitted to speak on Marshall's behalf.

At the hearing, Marshall testified and IUPUI Campus Police officers testified. However, the alleged victim did not testify and the Panel heard only hearsay evidence regarding the allegations against Marshall. The Panel assessed the allegations based on a preponderance of the evidence standard. (Filing No. 1–1 at 9.)

On October 30, 2014, Marshall received a letter from Dean Tomlinson, stating that the Panel had found him guilty of Personal Misconduct, that he was expelled from IUPUI, and that he was banned from all Indiana University campuses. On November 4, 2014, Marshall appealed the lifetime expulsion and ban, which IUPUI denied a week later, on November 11, 2014.

II. LEGAL STANDARD

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6)

authorizes dismissal if the complaint fails to sets forth a claim upon which relief can be granted. “The purpose of a motion to dismiss is to test the sufficiency of the complaint, not to decide the merits.” Gibson v. City of Chi. , 910 F.2d 1510, 1520 (7th Cir.1990). Accordingly, when analyzing a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss, a court construes the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, accepts all factual allegations as true, and draws all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Tamayo v. Blagojevich , 526 F.3d 1074, 1081 (7th Cir.2008).

At a minimum, the complaint must give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests, and the factual allegations must raise a right to relief above the speculative level. See Bissessur v. Ind. Univ. Bd. of Trs. , 581 F.3d 599, 602–03 (7th Cir.2009)

; Tamayo , 526 F.3d at 1081, 1083. While a complaint need not include detailed factual allegations, a plaintiff has the obligation to provide the factual grounds supporting his entitlement to relief; and neither bare legal conclusions nor a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will suffice in meeting this obligation. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly , 550 U.S. 544, 555, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). See also

Ashcroft v. Iqbal , 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (“the pleading standard Rule 8...demands more than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation” and “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice”). Although this does not require heightened fact pleading of specifics, it does require the complaint to contain enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face. Bell Atl. Corp. , 550 U.S. at 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955 ; Tamayo , 526 F.3d at 1083 (“[a] plaintiff still must provide only enough detail to give the defendant fair notice of what the claim is and the grounds upon which it rests, and, through his allegations, show that it is plausible rather than merely speculative, that he is entitled to relief”).

III. DISCUSSION

In his complaint, Marshall's alleges multiple due process violations, violations of his rights to free speech, violation of his rights under Title IX and violation of his Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

. The court will address each claim in turn.

A. Counts 1 and 3: Due Process

Defendants contend that Marshall has not pled a viable due process claim. Although Marshall asserts a number of compelling arguments why he should have received more due process given the gravity of the charges he faced and the severity of the punishment imposed, the Court must agree with the Defendants.

To begin, Marshall argues persuasively that the same due process standards applicable to “grade school food-fights” should not also apply to disciplinary proceedings in higher education, where adult students face expulsion for allegations of sexual assault. Marshall contends that expulsion from a state university system has serious and long-term economic consequences. See James M. Piccozi, Note, University Disciplinary Process: What's Fair, What's Due, and What You Don't Get , 96 YALE L.J. 2132, 2138 (1987)

(“[t]he most significant alteration of...