Marshall v. Karl
| Decision Date | 30 September 1871 |
| Citation | 60 Ill. 208,1871 WL 8116 |
| Parties | DANIEL MCM. MARSHALL et al.v.THEODORE S. KARL, Administrator, etc. |
| Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Henderson county; the Hon. ARTHUR A. SMITH, Judge, presiding.
Messrs. STEWART & PHELPS, for the appellants.
Mr. JOHN J. GLENN, for the appellee. Mr. JUSTICE BREESE delivered the opinion of the Court:
This was an action before a justice of the peace, on a promissory note executed by the defendants to the plaintiff's intestate, Martha Karl, deceased.
It appears that Martha Karl had made a charge before one Richey, a justice of the peace, against David Trimble, one of the makers of the note, of bastardy, and before justice Froelich, another charge that he had attempted to procure an abortion. This, by our statute, is a felony. Laws of 1867, p. 89. Trimble was arrested on both these charges, and on the execution of notes to the amount of $300 or $400, payable to Martha Karl, of which this in suit was one, the prosecutions were dismissed.
It appears that Mr. Rice acted as the agent of Martha Karl, the deceased, in settling the matter, and it became a question, what was the real consideration of the notes. Was it that the bastardy suit only should be dismissed, or that and the abortion case also? Mr. Rice testified fully as to his understanding on this point.
Marshall, one of the sureties, and one of the defendants in the action, was then called as a witness for the defense, who testified that he was present during the entire negotiation for the settlement of the cases at the time the note was given, being the same time to which Mr. Rice had testified, and that he knew what was then agreed on as the settlement of the two cases, and knew what was the consideration of the note; and being called on by the defense to state what the consideration was, and what took place during the negotiation testified to by Mr. Rice, the plaintiff objected, and the court refused to allow Marshall to testify on that subject. An exception was taken to this ruling, and it is to this alone we have directed our attention.
The fact that Mr. Rice was the agent of deceased, acting as such in the whole matter, and allowed to testify fully in regard to it, opened the door to the testimony of either defendant, and made them competent witnesses under the second clause of section 2 of the act of 1867. Session Laws 1867, p. 183. That clause is as follows: “When, in such action, suit or...
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Combs v. Bradshaw
...v. Rucker, 71 Ill. 410. He could only be rendered a competent witness by the previous introduction of the agent of the deceased: Marshall v. Karl, 60 Ill. 208; Freeman v. Freeman, 62 Ill. 199; Stonecipher v. Hall, 64 Ill. 121; Jacquin v. Davidson, 49 Ill. 82. Indefinite extension of time fo......
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Premack v. Chicago Transit Authority
...a transaction in which he had made a contract on behalf of the deceased with the opposite party for the purchase of corn, and in Marshall v. Karl, 60 Ill. 208, an agent, who had obtained a promissory note for deceased, testified regarding a conversation between deceased and the opposite It ......
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Bradshaw v. Combs
...defendant in error had introduced Brown, the agent, then Miller would have been competent, but can not be so unless this is done. Marshall v. Karl, 60 Ill. 208; Freeman v. Freeman, 62 Id. 189; Stonecipher v. Hall, 64 Id. 121; Jacquin v. Davidson, 49 Id. 82. Miller being incompetent in the s......
- Barnett v. George T. Cline.