Marshall v. Peter
| Decision Date | 26 August 2016 |
| Docket Number | Supreme Court No. S–16017 |
| Citation | 377 P.3d 952 |
| Parties | Michele Marshall and Donald Marshall, Husband and Wife, Appellants, v. Matthew H. Peter and Robert L. Nelson, Appellees. |
| Court | Alaska Supreme Court |
Robert C. Erwin, Robert C. Erwin, LLC, Anchorage, for Appellants.
Gregory R. Henrikson and Laura Eakes, Walker & Eakes, Anchorage, for Appellees.
Before: Stowers, Chief Justice, Winfree, Maassen, and Bolger, Justices.
On a particularly icy day, a driver came to a stop about one-half car length behind a vehicle stopped at a stoplight. After the vehicle ahead began to move forward, the driver behind released his foot from the brake, but the driver ahead stopped sooner than the following driver expected. Despite his braking and his low speed, the driver behind slid into the back of the car. The driver ahead contends that no reasonable juror could have found the other driver not negligent and that the superior court therefore should have granted her motion for a directed verdict on liability. We conclude that the jury reasonably found the driver behind not negligent, and we therefore affirm the denial of the motion.
Mid-afternoon on an icy early March day, plaintiff Michele Marshall was stopped at a stoplight on 36th Avenue in Anchorage preparing to turn left onto New Seward Highway from the outside turn lane. Two Jack Russell terriers were in the backseat. Defendant Matthew Peter testified that he came to a complete stop about one-half car length behind her. After about 30 seconds, the light turned green, Marshall began to move forward, and Peter released his foot from the brake. But Marshall stopped sooner than Peter expected; Peter returned his foot to the brake, attempted to stop, and slid into Marshall's vehicle. He testified that his car “just tapped the back of her car” at a speed that “couldn't [have] be[en] more than three miles an hour.” He had yet to place his foot on the accelerator.
Marshall recalled stopping and then after a “long pause” feeling “slammed” from behind. She testified that she had not yet entered the intersection when the light turned yellow for the second or third vehicle in front of her: “[K]nowing that I would not be able to make it through on the ... red light [,] I came to a stop on ... the red light.” The collision was so forceful, she testified, that her car slid forward one car length and her purse and dogs fell to the floor. She confirmed that her brake lights were functioning and emphasized both the particularly slick conditions and the “very short” nature of the light. Peter recalled that one or two vehicles were in front of Marshall; he and Marshall “weren't very far behind.” Though Peter could see the intersection, he did not recall whether the light was red when he saw Marshall stop. His attention, he explained, was focused on the space between his car and hers; he confirmed he was not “in any way distracted.”
At the scene of the collision, Officer Michael Farr of the Anchorage Police Department questioned Marshall and Peter about the incident. Farr testified that there appeared to be no damage to either vehicle. Marshall told him that she was experiencing neck pain and noted that a previous collision had left her completely disabled. Based on Peter's and Marshall's brief descriptions, Farr concluded that Marshall had not done “any improper driving” and that Peter had engaged in an improper start.1
In February 2014, about two years after the collision, Marshall and her husband filed a complaint alleging that Peter was negligent and claiming about $212,500 in damages—car damage ($1,029.35), medical bills ($51,458.57), personal pain and suffering ($150,000), and loss of consortium ($10,000). About one month later, Marshall moved for summary judgment on the issue of Peter's liability. Within the week Peter made two offers of judgment under Alaska Civil Rule 68 : $2,651.17 for Marshall's claims plus costs, applicable interest, and Alaska Civil Rule 82 attorney's fees; and $100 for her husband's loss of consortium claim plus costs, applicable interest, and Rule 82 attorney's fees.2 Marshall did not reply to either offer, and about two months later the superior court denied her motion for summary judgment.
At the jury trial, Marshall, Peter, and Officer Farr testified to the above account. Marshall also called four other witnesses: her husband, the owner of the car Peter was driving,3 and two physicians who treated her before and after the March 2012 collision.
After Peter rested Marshall moved for a directed verdict on the issue of liability.4 The court denied the motion. The court stated that the motion was not timely because Marshall did not make the motion before she rested, and even if timely there was evidence to suggest that liability was an issue—the parties were stopped at a stoplight, the roads were very icy, and Peter testified that “he hadn't even put his foot on the gas.”
On a special verdict form, the jury found Peter not negligent. Marshall then moved for judgment notwithstanding the verdict5 and in the alternative for a new trial.6 Peter moved for actual attorney's fees under Rule 687 and in the alternative for fees under Civil Rule 82.8 The court denied Marshall's motion and granted Peter's motion, awarding him 75% of reasonable actual fees under Rule 68 for a total of $61,641.00.
Marshall appeals the denial of her motion for a directed verdict and the attorney's fee award.
In reviewing the denial of a motion for a directed verdict, “we apply an objective test to determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, is such that reasonable [persons] could not differ in their judgment.”9 “[B]ecause the sufficiency of the evidence to support a jury verdict is a question of law,” we review the denial of a motion for a directed verdict de novo.10
“ ‘We review an award of attorney's fees for abuse of discretion,’ so a fee award ‘will not be disturbed on appeal unless it is “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly unreasonable.” ’ ”11 But we consider de novo “[w]hether the superior court applied the appropriate legal standard in its consideration of a fee petition,”12 including “whether [the] superior court correctly determined a settlement offer's compliance with Rule 68.”13
Marshall contends that no reasonable juror could have found Peter not negligent and therefore the superior court erred when it denied her motion for a directed verdict.14 As noted we review de novo a grant or denial of a motion for a directed verdict.15 Here, after objectively reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Peter, the non-moving party,16 we conclude that reasonable persons could differ in their judgment as to Peter's liability. Therefore we affirm the denial of Marshall's motion.
In four previous cases, we have held that the evidence could only support a conclusion that the following driver was negligent.17 A driver exercising due care must anticipate changing road conditions,18 and absent notice to the contrary a following driver generally can assume that other drivers will obey the law.19 Thus a reasonable driver generally anticipates sudden stops, routine turns, stalled vehicles, downgrades, intersections, and treacherous road surfaces.20 In accounting for such conditions, a driver must control his or her speed and maintain a safe following distance.21 A failure to stop safely cannot be justified by the mere existence of icy conditions and suddenly stopping vehicles.22
But this case differs from those in which we have concluded that reasonable persons could only conclude that the following driver was negligent. Peter had just stopped and thus was aware of the icy conditions. He knew how his vehicle might respond, and he took conscious measures accordingly. He left about one-half car length between his vehicle and Marshall's vehicle, monitored the distance between his vehicle and hers, and was traveling at a low rate of speed—about three miles per hour—when he slid into her car. Before attempting to stop again, he had only released his foot from the brake. Viewing these facts in the light most favorable to Peter, reasonable persons could conclude that Peter anticipated that Marshall might stop unexpectedly, followed her at a safe distance and speed, and exercised due care when he saw her stop.
We therefore affirm the denial of Marshall's motion for a directed verdict.
Marshall contends that Peter's offers of judgment failed to comply with Civil Rule 68 because they were too low to encourage settlement.23 Peter recognizes his offers of $2,651.17 and $100 were “on the low end of the spectrum,” but he contends that the offers nonetheless provided a reasonable starting point for negotiation, as Rule 68 requires. We review de novo whether a settlement offer triggers Rule 68.24
Under Civil Rule 68 either party may make “an offer to allow judgment to be entered in complete satisfaction of the claim for the money or property or to the effect specified in the offer, with costs then accrued.”25 If the final judgment is at least 5% less favorable to the offeree than the offer (or in the case of multiple defendants, at least 10% less favorable), “the offeree ... shall pay all costs as allowed under the Civil Rules and shall pay reasonable actual attorney's fees incurred by the offeror from the date the offer was made.”26 Rule 68 thus creates a financial incentive for settlement by “encourag[ing] parties to assess their litigation risks carefully and penaliz[ing] an offeree's rejection of a reasonable settlement offer.”27
Not all settlement offers trigger Rule 68. An offer must “serve the purpose of [the rule]”: “encourag[ing] settlement and avoid[ing] protracted litigation.”28 Disingenuously low offers that...
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...to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue” and where “the testimony is based on sufficient facts or data”). [97] Marshall, 377 P.3d at 958 Anderson, 234 P.3d at 1289). [98] Alaska R. Civ. P. 68(b). [99] This represents 50 percent of $494, 673.73 in total attorney's fees inc......