Marshall v. Rawlings Co.
| Decision Date | 20 April 2017 |
| Docket Number | No. 16-5614,16-5614 |
| Parties | Gloria MARSHALL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. THE RAWLINGS COMPANY LLC, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
ARGUED: J. Chris Sanders, Louisville, Kentucky, for Appellant. Michael D. Risley, STITES & HARBISON, PLLC, Louisville, Kentucky, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: J. Chris Sanders, Louisville, Kentucky, Jill M. Guarascio, Louisville, Kentucky, for Appellant. Michael D. Risley, Shannon Antle Hamilton, Rebecca A. Weis, STITES & HARBISON, PLLC, Louisville, Kentucky, for Appellee.
Before: MOORE, SUTTON, and WHITE, Circuit Judges.
MOORE, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which WHITE, J., joined, and SUTTON, J., joined in part. SUTTON, J. (pp. 386–87), delivered a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.
Plaintiff-Appellant Gloria Marshall appeals the district court's judgment granting summary judgment for Defendant-Appellee The Rawlings Company. Marshall was an employee of The Rawlings Company. After taking time off under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. § 2601 et seq. , for mental-health problems, which are a disability covered by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. § 12112, Marshall was demoted and then fired. Marshall alleges claims of FMLA interference, FMLA retaliation, ADA retaliation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The district court granted The Rawlings Company's motion for summary judgment on all four claims. For the reasons discussed below, we AFFIRM the district court's judgment on Marshall's claims of FMLA interference and intentional infliction of emotional distress, REVERSE the district court's judgment on the FMLA retaliation and ADA retaliation claims, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
The Rawlings Company provides recovery or "cost containment" services to health insurance providers. R. 34-2 (Plumley Aff. at ¶ 6) (Page ID #165); R. 34-3 (Elsner Dep. at 13–14) (Page ID #170). Gloria Marshall began working as a Workers' Compensation Analyst for The Rawlings Company in 2006 and was promoted to Team Lead in 2011. R. 37-1 (Marshall Dep. at 57–60) (Page ID #341).
Marshall suffers from depression, anxiety, and post-traumatic stress disorder
. Appellant Br. at 4; R. 34-5 (Marshall Dep. at 109–10) (Page ID #220); R. 37-1 (Marshall Dep. at 40) (Page ID #337). To receive treatment for her mental-health problems, Marshall took her first FMLA leave in February and March 2012. R. 34-5 (Marshall Dep. at 132) (Page ID #224). Marshall's FMLA leave was not planned in advance; she took leave unexpectedly to address acute mental-health problems. Id. at 109, 112–13, 134 (Page ID #220–21, 225).
When Marshall returned from leave, she had a backlog of work waiting for her. Id. at 133–36 (Page ID #225). Although Marshall did not accumulate new work while she was on leave, there was old work that she had not finished because her leave was unexpected. Id. at 133–34 (Page ID #225). Marshall testified that she asked for but was denied assistance clearing out this backlog. Id. at 177–78 (Page ID #229). The Rawlings Company, on the other hand, claimed that Marshall did receive assistance catching up on her work. See R. 40 (Reply in Support of Summ. J. at 12) (Page ID #507).
In addition to the conflicting evidence about how much help Marshall received catching up on her backlog, there is also conflicting evidence about whether having a backlog was common or, rather, the sign of a serious problem. Another team lead, Elizabeth Estrada, testified that "[i]t was a constant struggle for all Team Leads to stay on top of closing the NR1 files and I know of many Team Leads who had a constant inventory of NR files that needed closing." R. 37-12 (Estrada Aff. at ¶ 12) (Page ID #435). This statement is imprecise about whether other team leads succeeded in their "struggle" to keep up with the "constant inventory of NR files that needed closing." Id . Estrada pointed to an example of an analyst with "a history of tremendous backlog" who was nevertheless promoted to a team-lead position, but this statement is again imprecise. Id . at ¶ 15 (Page ID #435). Estrada did not give any context about either what constitutes a "tremendous" backlog or about the analyst's other qualifications. Id . For its part, The Rawlings Company pointed to an example of another team lead with a backlog, explaining that it treated Marshall and the other team lead similarly. R. 34-1 (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 7) (Page ID #131); R. 34-5 (Marshall Dep. at 189–98) (Page ID #231–32). In addition, The Rawlings Company noted that correspondence between Marshall and Vice President Jeff Bradshaw showed that Marshall was consistently falling behind even though she was allegedly working ten to twelve hours per day. R. 34-1 (Def.'s Mot. for Summ. J. at 7) (Page ID #131); R. 34-14 (Marshall & Bradshaw Emails) (Page ID #253–58); R. 34-5 (Marshall Dep. at 214) (Page ID #234). This correspondence may indicate that Marshall's performance problems were more severe than other team leads' problems, but it does not provide information about whether other team leads also struggled, or any other basis of comparison, and does not rebut Estrada's testimony. We do know that after Marshall cleared out her backlog of NR files, Bradshaw quickly became worried that a new backlog was forming. R. 37-2 (Elsner Dep. at 80) (Page ID #398). "[A]t that point [Bradshaw] didn't think [Marshall] was succeeding in her role." Id.
In September 2012, The Rawlings Company demoted Marshall from team lead to analyst, the position she initially held at the company. R. 34-2 (Plumley Aff. at ¶ 9) (Page ID #165). Mike Elsner, Division Director for the Workers' Compensation Division and Marshall's second-level supervisor, testified that Bradshaw recommended demoting Marshall to Laura Plumley, then the President of the division, id. at ¶ 8 (Page ID #165), and that demoting Marshall was Plumley's decision, R. 37-2 (Elsner Dep. at 80) (Page ID #398). Plumley confirmed Elsner's testimony that she "was the final decision-maker in demoting Plaintiff [Marshall]." R. 34-2 (Plumley Aff. at ¶ 9) (Page ID #165). Plumley stated that her "decision was based solely on Plaintiff's performance as an Analyst and a Team Lead," although she did not state what role Bradshaw's recommendation played in her conclusion that Marshall was performing inadequately. Id. at ¶ 12 (Page ID #165). Plumley also said that she "was not familiar with" Marshall's FMLA leave or health conditions when she decided to demote Marshall. Id. at ¶ 12 (Page ID #165). Plumley did not inform Marshall about the demotion; Plumley had Bradshaw and Elsner inform Marshall. Id. at ¶ 13 (Page ID #165).
Some evidence in the record indicates that after being demoted Marshall excelled as an analyst, but other evidence indicates that she struggled to keep up with her workload even after being given less responsibility. On the one hand, upon Marshall's return from her second leave, she was recognized as a high-performing analyst for having one of "the five highest submitted recoveries in the first quarter" of 2013. R. 37-23 (Elsner Email to Analysts) (Page ID #458). In June 2013, Marshall was exceeding the standard for amount of money invoiced. On the other hand, she was below the standard on other metrics, including number of checks recovered each month, number of files worked on per day, and number of outgoing calls per day. R. 37-2 (Elsner Dep. at 134–36) (Page ID #410); R. 34-18 (Mid-Year Assessment) (Page ID #274–75). Marshall's supervisor Matthew Monyhan submitted a mid-year report covering the first half of 2013 emphasizing similar difficulties. R. 34-18 (Mid-Year Assessment) (Page ID #274–75).
There were also interpersonal problems that started around the time of Marshall's demotion. Marshall testified that, on a few separate occasions, Bradshaw harassed her. First, Marshall testified that during the demotion meeting, which took place in September 2012, Bradshaw "raised his voice and started belittling" her, saying "you don't know what you're doing, you're completely inefficient" and "[y]ou come in here long hours and you still can't get your job done." R. 37-1 (Marshall Dep. at 216) (Page ID #363).
Second, Marshall testified that at a May 2013 celebration lunch for Marshall and the other four analysts with the highest first-quarter recoveries, Bradshaw bullied her. During the lunch, Bradshaw asked a question about morale and when no one responded, he asked Marshall individually. R. 37-1 (Marshall Dep. at 24) (Page ID #370). Marshall testified, Id. She further testified that when she gave a very generic answer, Bradshaw "was intentionally trying to escalate ... the conversation in order to antagonize me" and that she felt "singled out" by "some kind of bully that was just blatantly trying to make me ... upset." Id. at 25–26 (Page ID #371).
Third, Marshall testified about a comment Bradshaw made that, she alleged, showed that Bradshaw's hostility toward her stemmed from her taking FMLA leave for her mental-health problems. In August 2012, Marshall and Bradshaw met to discuss her workload. According to Marshall, the meeting "initiated with him saying a sarcastic comment to me, where he said, ‘So are you planning on being out any time soon again?’ " R. 34-5 (Marshall Dep. at 166) (Page ID #227). She testified that she "was completely astounded" and Id.
Only Bradshaw, Marshall, and Elsner (who Marshall...
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