Marshall v. Reinhold Const., Inc.
| Decision Date | 17 November 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 77-631-Civ-J-T.,77-631-Civ-J-T. |
| Citation | 441 F. Supp. 685 |
| Parties | Ray MARSHALL, Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor, Petitioner, v. REINHOLD CONSTRUCTION, INC., Respondent. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Bobbye D. Spears, U. S. Dept. of Labor, Atlanta, Ga., for petitioner.
Patrick D. Coleman and Michael K. Grogan, Jacksonville, Fla., for respondent.
The facts of this case have been set forth carefully by Judge Schlesinger, the Magistrate, in his findings and recommendation issued on September 19, 1977. At first, the Secretary of Labor (`the Secretary') objected to Judge Schlesinger's findings and recommendation; but later the Secretary expressly withdrew his objections. Consequently, the Court holds that consideration and determination of any issues raised by those objections is now moot and therefore unwarranted.
Instead, the Court will proceed directly to the findings and recommendation of Judge Schlesinger. The Court is completely in accord with those findings and with the reasoning underlying the recommendation; and they are expressly adopted and relied upon for the Court's holdings in this case.
First, the Court holds that its inchoative jurisdiction was invoked from the outset of this case. Furthermore, the Court has subject matter jurisdiction over this case, via 28 U.S.C. §§ 1337 and 1343, (1) to entertain the constitutional challenge to § 657 of the statute (29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq.), and (2) to hear the Secretary's petition to vindicate his authority under § 657 of the statute.
Second, the Court holds that it is unnecessary to rule on the question of whether § 657 of the statute authorizes warrantless searches which are permissible under the Fourth Amendment. Although, as a matter of law, the statute can be construed consistently with the Fourth Amendment, to accommodate the search warrant requirement, the particular facts of this case make such an interpretation unnecessary. The Secretary, without waiving his contention that § 657 of the statute authorizes constitutionally permissible, warrantless searches, alternatively made a showing of probable cause before Judge Schlesinger. As a result, an administrative search warrant was issued. Hence, in this case there has been full compliance with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment for administrative searches. Camara v. Municipal Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 534-39, 87 S.Ct. 1727, 1733-36, 18 L.Ed.2d 930, 938-41 (1967); See v. Seattle, 387 U.S. 541, 545, 87 S.Ct. 1737, 1740, 18 L.Ed.2d 943, 947 (1967).
Third, in view of the Secretary's showing of probable cause, in compliance with the Fourth Amendment, the administrative search warrant issued by Judge Schlesinger is valid; and the authority of its validity supersedes any need to rely on or enforce the earlier warrant-like order of the Court.
Finally, the good faith opposition of Reinhold Construction Company ("Reinhold") to the Court's earlier order, coupled with Reinhold's obedience to the administrative search warrant issued by Judge Schlesinger, justifies finding that Reinhold is not in contempt of this Court. Accordingly, the Court so holds.
The findings and recommendation of the Magistrate, having been approved, are incorporated in the Court's opinion. This case will be dismissed.
HARVEY E. SCHLESINGER, Magistrate.
On August 4, 1977, the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA") received a complaint from an employee of respondent, Reinhold Construction, Inc. ("Reinhold"). Pursuant to § 657 of the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651 et seq. ("the act," "the statute"), two agents of the Secretary of Labor, United States Department of Labor ("the Secretary"), appeared on August 8, 1977, at Reinhold's construction site, located at 111 Coastline Drive, Jacksonville, Florida. They sought entry onto the construction site in order to inspect the premises for violations of the act and its implementing safety regulations. Reinhold denied them access.
On August 16, 1977, the Secretary's same two representatives returned to Reinhold's premises for the purpose of inspecting the site for violations. Once again Reinhold refused them entry.
Thereafter, the Secretary on August 22, 1977, applied through his counsel ex parte for an order authorizing an inspection of Reinhold's construction premises. After a determination of probable cause, based on the employee complaint and an affidavit from one of the Secretary's inspectors, Erwin Crampton, Judge Scott entered an order authorizing entry and inspection of the construction site.
When the August 22 order was served upon Reinhold's agents on August 24, 1977, by the United States Deputy Marshal, Reinhold consulted counsel. On advice of counsel, Reinhold declined to honor the order and refused to allow the Secretary's agents to enter and inspect the construction site. Because he was away from the Court and outside of the district, Judge Scott instructed the Honorable Howell W. Melton to refer the matter to me! Pursuant to that referral, and in accordance with Judge Scott's instructions, I issued an order to Reinhold to appear and to show cause why it should not be held in contempt of the Court's August 22 order.
A hearing was held on September 1, 1977, at which time Reinhold was permitted to raise its jurisdictional, constitutional, and good faith defenses. At the same time, the Secretary, having the burden to establish the existence of the Court's jurisdiction over the present case, applied for an administrative search warrant. The Secretary expressly reserved his contention that such a warrant is not constitutionally required under § 6571 of the act; but in the alternative, he made a showing of probable cause to obtain a warrant. After concluding that probable cause had been established, I issued an administrative search warrant on September 3, 1977.
Reinhold argues that this Court is completely devoid of subject matter jurisdiction in this action to issue any order concerning it.
It is long past dispute that a federal court always has jurisdiction in the first instance to make an assessment of its subject matter jurisdiction. United States v. UMW, 330 U.S. 258, 290-95, 67 S.Ct. 677, 694-96, 91 L.Ed. 884, 911-14 (1947); Lambert v. Conrad, 536 F.2d 1183, 1185 (7th Cir. 1976). Hence, pursuant to that jurisdiction to determine whether it has jurisdiction, a federal court may issue all ancillary orders necessary to enable and effectuate the determination. Maness v. Meyers, 419 U.S. 449, 458-60, 95 S.Ct. 584, 590-92, 42 L.Ed.2d 574, 583-84 (1975); United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 532 and n. 4, 91 S.Ct. 1580, 1581 and n. 4, 29 L.Ed.2d 85, 88 and n. 4 (1971); Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 317, 320-21, 87 S.Ct. 1824, 1830, 1831-32, 18 L.Ed.2d 1210, 1217, 1219-20 (1967); United States v. Dickinson, 465 F.2d 496, 509-10 (5th Cir. 1972). It is within that scope that this Court's order to show cause, regarding contempt of its initial, August 22, 1977, order, properly obligates Reinhold. While Reinhold complains of the lack of notice before the Court issued the August 22 order, and also contends that the Court lacked all authority to issue such an order, Reinhold has now been given an opportunity, by means of the Court's show cause order, to raise its jurisdictional, as well as constitutional, challenges. Thus, by commanding the presence of Reinhold pursuant to the Court's inchoative jurisdiction, the Court has afforded Reinhold at the same time a forum of due process in which to raise its attack upon the Court's subject matter jurisdiction.
Because the subject matter jurisdiction of federal courts is strictly limited, Mt. Healthy City School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274, 277, 97 S.Ct. 568, 571, 50 L.Ed.2d 471, 478 (1977); City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 511, 93 S.Ct. 2222, 2225, 37 L.Ed.2d 109, 115 (1973); Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152, 29 S.Ct. 42, 43, 53 L.Ed. 126, 127 (1908); Cameron v. Hodges, 127 U.S. 322, 326, 8 S.Ct. 1154, 1156, 32 L.Ed. 132 (1888); Mansfield, C. & L.M. Ry. v. Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382, 4 S.Ct. 510, 511, 28 L.Ed. 462 (1884); Turner v. President, Directors, and Co. of Bank of N. Amer. 4 Dall. 7, 8 (1799); Morrison v. Morrison, 408 F.Supp. 315, 316 (N.D.Tex. 1976) a challenge to the Court's subject matter jurisdiction may be raised at any time. Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(h)(3). Hence, it was entirely proper for Reinhold to raise that issue at the hearing on the order to show cause concerning contempt of the Court's August 22, 1977, order. In addition, Judge Scott indicated to me that it was his intention that Reinhold should be able to raise all of the issues in its defense at the contempt hearing.
Notwithstanding Reinhold's attack upon the Court's subject matter jurisdiction, however, the burden remains on the party seeking to invoke the Court's jurisdiction to establish that jurisdiction exists. McNutt v. GMAC, 298 U.S. 178, 182-83, 56 S.Ct. 780, 782, 80 L.Ed. 1135, 1137-38 (1935); Rosemound Sand & Gravel Co. v. Lambert Sand & Gravel Co., 469 F.2d 416, 418 (5th Cir. 1972); Birmingham Post Co. v. Brown, 217 F.2d 127, 130 (5th Cir. 1954). Consequently, the Secretary properly has the burden to establish that the Court's subject matter jurisdiction has been truly invoked.
Under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1337 and 1343,2 respectively, federal district courts are vested with general jurisdiction to hear actions or proceedings (1) arising under any congressional act that regulates commerce, or (2) begun by the United States or any of its agencies or officers who are expressly authorized to sue. Reinhold, however, insists that those two general jurisdiction statutes do not give this Court jurisdiction over the present proceedings.
Instead, Reinhold...
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